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The extant risk disclosure literature has explored the determinants and incentives for risk 
disclosure. However, no study to date has examined the design process of risk disclosures. The 
purpose of This study is to fill this gap, while using a qualitative case study approach within the 
context of a UK listed Bank. 
The research examines the management of risk disclosures, with particular focus on users’ 
expectations for risk disclosure quality, and the degree to which these are incorporated in the 
decision choices taken by management when deciding what to disclose and what not to disclose. 
It explores a set of discrepancies between what a user of risk disclosure expects of the quality of 
such an information and their perceptions on the actual disclosures they get mainly from the annual 
report and the pillar 3 risk disclosure report.  
Drawing on the Gaps Model of Service Quality from the marketing literature (Parasuraman et al., 
1985; Zeithaml et al., 2002;2016), it is argued that this overarching discrepancy is influenced by 
the degree to which preparers perceive and understand the expectations of their users and the 
disclosure designs they establish to reflect how they have perceived these expectations. Even 
though the authors of the Gaps Model refer to disclosure designs as the decision choices made by 
management in relation to how the disclosures should be presented, the Model provides little scope 
for examining these decision choices. For this reason, the Gaps Model is amalgamated with the 
Disclosure Management Framework from the accounting literature (Gibbins et al., 1990; Mayorga, 
2013; Johansen and Plenborg, 2018) to provide an explanation on how the internal decision - 
making process is undertaken by management when translating their perceptions of users’ 
expectations into risk disclosure quality specifications and a new framework is developed in the 
process.The findings indicate that even though user participants express a desire for an access to 
the bank’s regulatory reporting, reduction in the volume of the disclosures and reliability of the 
information provided, it is evident that they recognise these may not always be possible.  
The findings support the notion that user expectations for the quality of risk disclosure is a key 
antecedent to the corporate disclosure process. However, in meeting these expectations, 
management faces multiple challenges when deciding what to disclose and what not to disclose 
including the risk of misinterpretation and the disclosure of commercially sensitive information. 
It is also evident that, irrespective of users’ expectations, there are a number of challenges 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 An overview of the risk disclosure practice  
Risk management is an important part of any business and in the last few decades, risk 
management has emerged in numerous and familiar ways to include a considerable increase in risk 
reporting activities (Billings, 2017). Risk reporting as a branch of risk management and accounting 
serves as a means for which investors and other users are well informed to understand the 
governance of a firm’s risk-taking and its performance. The main users of risk disclosures include 
shareholders, investors, regulators, and financial analysts.  
Particularly for the banking sector, where issues on risk are predominant and the disclosure on the 
risks they face are on high demand, banks are expected to provide adequate risk disclosure in a 
timely manner. As a result, regulatory authorities and standard setters have changed their reporting 
requirements for risk disclosure on several occasions to reflect this demand. In order to ensure that 
companies provide adequate accounting information, regulators may pay more attention to the 
changes in economic circumstances that could affect the information needs of the users.  
It is worth noting at this point that most of the bank’s risk disclosures are provided in their annual 
reports mainly in connection with the UK Companies Act 2006 (414A and 414C), IAS 1 – 
Presentation of Financial Statements, IFRS 9 – Financial Instruments, IFRS 7 – Financial 
Instruments: Disclosures, Basel pillar 3 risk report which is produced as a stand-alone document, 
UK corporate governance code and the International Standard on Auditing 700. These standards 
and regulations are relevant to UK banks. 
Nevertheless, risk reporting is constantly changing and an essential component of this demand for 
risk reporting stems from a growing number of new and increased risks that have emerged from 
the continuing corporate scandals (Power, 2004; ICAEW, 2011a; Camfferman and Wielhouwer, 
2019). A few of these new and emerging risks are not standardized and their disclosures are not 
subject to regulatory requirements at the moment (e.g. climate change related risks, cyber risks). 
As a result, and as a response to the external demands for adequate risk disclosure, banks attempt 
to provide disclosures in the form of ad-hoc and voluntary disclosures. There are also agencies 
such as the Task Force on Climate Related financial disclosures and the Enhanced Disclosure Task 
Force (EDTF) who provide guidance on the way such risks could be provided. 
Prior studies on corporate financial disclosures find that, while managers have adopted the 
regulators’ practices for better disclosure and taken a cautious view of disclosure. Managers 




immense process that goes behind deciding what to disclose (Mayorga, 2013; Amel-Zadeh et al., 
2019). Within this process, firms have in place a series of activities, procedures, threads, and 
connections among people and events when deciding what to disclose and what not to disclose.  
 
 Management of risk disclosure and risk disclosure quality 
The provision of quality risk disclosures is essential for information users (i.e. investors, analysts, 
and regulators) as it enables them to make informed economic decisions which in the long run may 
impact the financial performance of the business. In this demanding environment, management 
needs to increase its credibility through the quality of the firm’s on-going risk communications. 
Risk disclosures enable investors, for instance, to assess specific events prior to their occurrence 
and how that is going to impact their investments. Therefore, providing a well-defined subset of 
the bank’s individual risks allows users to better predict changes in the firm’s performance and to 
evaluate its future events as they happen (Ryan, 2012).  
One of the main factors that contributed to the 2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) was the 
inadequate public risk disclosures provided within the banking sector, as investors were unable to 
judge the risks banks were facing (Bank of England, 2013). One question this poses is whether 
banks fully understood the risks they were facing and/or whether their disclosure processes were 
inadequate to convey relevant disclosures for investors to comprehend.  
The banking sector has experienced significant changes concerning their business models over the 
years driven by regulations established by both national and institutional bodies, technological 
changes, and the globalization of goods and financial markets (Chen et al., 2014; Blum, 2008). 
Most of these changes took effect after the GFC such as the revisions of the Basel Accord including 
the introduction of the Basel, Pillar 3 requirements concerning risk disclosures in the banking 
sector. After the GFC, banks realized that their information technology and data architectures were 
inadequate and they were unable to manage their risks properly because of weak risk aggregation 
capabilities and risk reporting practices (Bank for international settlements, 2012). In response to 
this, regulators and standard setters have increased the amount of pressure placed on banks to 
account for their risk exposures and provide more adequate risk disclosures. In view of this, 
ICAEW (2011a) posits that following the GFC, the issue of risk disclosure within the annual 
reports has gained even greater prominence. It is therefore believed that risk disclosures in the 





Banks are required to provide a description of their risk management strategy and how senior 
management and the board of directors assess and manage risks, enabling users to gain a clear 
understanding of the bank’s risk tolerance or risk appetite in relation to its main activities and all 
significant risks (Bank for International Settlements, 2015; UK Companies Act, 2006).  In doing 
this, banks are also required to present a description of the process of risk information reporting 
provided to the board and senior management, in particular the scope and the main content of 
reporting on risk exposure.  
Risk disclosures are mainly provided publicly through the bank’s annual report and pillar 3 
disclosure report. The annual report is the most common and well-known form of publishing 
financial reports used by firms to communicate information about their performance and structure 
(Stone, 1967; Walton and Aerts, 2006; Edwards, 2018). The pillar 3 risk disclosure requirements 
on the other hand require banks to publish a report on their risk profile, how they manage and 
mitigate these risks, as well as provide information on the frequency of disclosure (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2015). Even though the Pillar 3, Basel requirements for instance require 
banks to provide information in a stand-alone report on what risk information banks should 
disclose and when they are to be disclosed, the banks have the discretion to choose how widely 
the disclosure requirements should apply (Bank for International Settlements, 2015). Therefore, 
the management of these disclosures is essential to the outcome of the disclosure output in ensuring 
that information users are well informed.  
Considering the role of risk disclosures, it is worth noting that the attitude of accounting 
information users towards a firm’s current risk disclosures would depend on the users’ perceptions 
on previous risk disclosures provided by the firm. Therefore, the production of risk disclosures 
requires the attention of preparers who are expected to engage with the varying demands of users 
and to understand the expectations of information users. Additionally, preparers are expected to 
provide users with disclosures that are not just in line with the regulatory disclosure requirements 
but also reflect the actual risk profile of the firm in a clear and concise manner. It is believed that 
management plays a vital role in the provision of quality risk disclosures and a lot of time and 
effort is spent by management in preparing them. However, due to users’ needs and expectations, 
the management of corporate disclosure has become more difficult (Mayorga, 2013; Amel-Zadeh 




 Problematization and research objectives 
Risk information and the internal and external disclosure of risk plays a vital role in developing a 
firm’s awareness of its risk position in order to support informed and efficient capital allocation 
decisions. It is expected of firms as part of their risk reporting responsibilities to keep their 
information users well informed of their risk exposures and how these are being managed in order 
to facilitate informed economic decision making.  In relation to this, prior studies highlight that 
information users can exploit risk information through enhancing their ability to identify, 
anticipate and assess the firm’s key risk exposures (Linsley and Shrives, 2005; Abraham et al. 
2012). Therefore, firms need to ensure that adequate risk disclosures are provided in order to 
protect information users by overcoming the information asymmetry and enhancing capital market 
efficiency. In relation to this, risk disclosures play a role in both the stewardship responsibilities 
of management in the process of risk disclosure and the decision making by key stakeholders. 
Therefore, risk disclosure quality can be assessed through the processes enacted by management 
and the understandings of information users on the quality of the risk disclosures provided. 
On one hand, there is evidence from prior studies on the provision of disclosure quality with 
particular focus on disclosure quality specifications such as; readability, informativeness, quantity, 
and reporting style (Ryan, 2012; Kravet and Muslu, 2013; Abraham and Shrives 2014). On the 
other hand, despite the importance of management’s involvement in the risk disclosure process 
and their impact of disclosure choices, there is little research on how risk disclosures are designed 
and developed in order to convey risk information to its users. Having said this, very little is known 
about the current expectations for disclosure quality specifications from the understanding of 
information users themselves (Solomon et al., 2000; Bean and Irvine, 2015). 
Users’ understandings and perceptions on corporate disclosure depends on their experiences with 
the disclosures received in the past and how that has reflected the firm’s actual performance. The 
global financial crisis 2007-2008 is a good example as it drew the attention of stakeholders to the 
inadequacy of the disclosures at the time in predicting the risk perceptions and risk attitudes of the 
bank prior to the crisis. This hindered their ability to judge the risks faced by banks during the 
period prior to the crisis (Scannella and Polizzi, 2018).  As a result, banks are subject to stringent 
regulations to ensure that adequate corporate disclosures are provided. It is argued that banks do 
have an internal process for managing compliance with disclosure requirements (Gibbins et al., 
1990, Mayorga, 2013). These internal processes are highly dependent on the firms’ systems, 




Existing research on risk disclosure finds that, another way of improving risk disclosure in the 
annual reports is the continuous consideration of investor needs (ACCA, 2008; ICAEW, 2011b; 
Mayorga, 2013). According to Mayorga (2013), common issues associated with the disclosure of 
material information arise primarily from the perceived high costs associated with not meeting 
regulator and market expectations. Despite the effect of users’ expectations on the disclosure 
management process, the way in which risk disclosures are managed to incorporate and to meet 
user expectations and user needs have been rarely explored. 
In response, this study aims to contribute to the accounting literature by providing insights into the 
different roles and responsibilities associated with the production of risk disclosures and the 
decision choices involved in the first instance. This study particularly provides insights on users’ 
expectations for risk disclosure quality from the understandings of information users and 
management’s response to these expectations. This is the first study to explore how preparers 
manage and respond to the users’ expectations for quality risk disclosures through the perceptions 
of both preparers and users in the banking sector. 
In recent times the banking sector has been subject to scrutiny for providing little information on 
risks leading a number of corporate scandals (e.g., the recent PPI scandal which hit £50bn after 
claims rise at Lloyds and Barclays in 2019) (Financial Times, 2019).  The banking sector has been 
chosen because it has been hugely affected by a number of corporate scandals and crisis, including 
the GFC, the Eurozone crisis and the Chinese stock market crash which have affected the banking 
sector Elamer et al. (2020). As a result, these scandals and crisis have increased the demand for 
banks to provide enhanced and adequate risk disclosures. 
To achieve the objectives of the current study, the study argues that in order to explore disclosure 
quality from the understandings of information users, it is important to examine the management’s 
existing processes and systems that underlie the disclosures they convey. 
Whilst there have been studies on the management of corporate disclosure, there is currently a 
research gap on the degree to which management incorporates user expectations in the disclosure 
process (Holland and Stoner, 1996; Mayorga, 2013; Mayorga and Trotman, 2016; Johansen and 
Plenborg, 2018; Amel-Zadeh et al., 2019). This is important because managing the disclosure of 
material information reflects the nature of learning how to identify users’ expectations and how to 





In view of this, the current study aims to contribute to this stream of literature. Specifically, the 
study pursues three primary research objectives. Firstly, the study explores the definition of risk 
from the perspective of both preparers and users. Despite the amount of research conducted on 
risk and risk management, there is currently no agreed definition on the definition of risk 
(Elshandidy, 2011; Ibrahim and Hussainey, 2019). Prior literature provides several definitions of 
risk ranging from the idea of risk as anything that can result in a loss or a negative outcome 
(Lupton, 1999; Horcher, 2005), to risk that carries the potential of either a gain or a loss (Hodder 
et al., 2001; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Mokhar and Mellet, 2013). In order to explore the users’ 
expectations for risk disclosures and the perceptions of preparers, the researcher believes that it is 
important to identify their views on the concept of risk. Variations in the meaning of risk from 
different user groups is an area that is currently lacking in the risk disclosures literature. In an 
effort to interpret the risk disclosure practice, this study investigates participants’ views on the 
concept of risk before assessing their perceptions on the risk disclosures. 
Secondly, the study explores users’ expectations for risk disclosure and investigates management’s 
response to these expectations. This is aimed at identifying any potential causes for a discrepancy 
between what users expect and management understanding of users’ expectations. It is also 
believed that the users’ expectations for corporate disclosure is an important consideration for 
management’s disclosure decision making (Mayorga, 2013; Mayorga and Trotman, 2016). Despite 
arguments from these studies on the importance of seeking users’ perspectives during the 
construction of corporate disclosures, research in this area is limited. It is worth noting that these 
studies explore the management of disclosures with the context of a range of sectors including the 
financial sector and not predominantly the banking sector. This study explores this within the 
context of the UK banking sector predominantly in an attempt to offer new insights on the 
phenomenon.  
And thirdly, the study investigates the process within management for the design and development 
of risk disclosures in light of users’ expectations and other antecedents. In achieving this objective, 
the study aims to investigate the role and responsibilities of management in the provision of risk 
disclosures as well as the degree to which user expectations may be incorporated within the risk 
disclosure process. Following on from this, the study identifies the challenges faced by 
management in their risk disclosure process.  
Accounting research on the roles and responsibilities of management in the provision of corporate 
disclosure as well as how these roles are assigned and guided is limited. According to Amel-Zadeh 




different managers are involved in creating disclosures is that disclosures are prepared privately 
within firms and the process is therefore not publicly disclosed”. 
In the UK, and under the risk disclosure requirements, firms are required to immediately inform 
the market of any material information that could alter their economic decision making. Although 
regulators and standard setters provide guidance on what information is required to be disclosed, 
in what form and when it should be disclosed, there is little to any guidance on how these should 
be designed or developed.  The lack of requirements in this area suggests that managers are 
effectively able to choose the process that they feel is appropriate for the creation of disclosure 
documents as long as the final document conforms to expectations. Thus, these disclosure 
requirements implicitly assume that companies have in place responsive internal control systems 
to manage compliance (Mayorga, 2013). However, there is little information on the processes 
enacted by management when deciding what to disclose and what not to disclose. This is 
particularly true for risk disclosures. Such information is important as it provides users with a 
deeper understanding of the degree to which risk disclosure decisions are assigned and guided, the 
activities involved and the range of issues considered in the disclosure management process 
(Gibbins et al., 1990, Amel-Zadeh et al., 2019). This is an area suggested by prior researchers 
requiring further attention in relation to how a firm’s internal control affects its efficiency to 
externally report its risks (Elshandidy et al., 2018).  
In an attempt to contribute to this stream of literature, this study aims to explore the management 
of risk disclosures with particular focus on users’ expectations for risk disclosure quality and 
management’s response to these expectations. This research particularly examines this within the 
context of banking considering the magnitude of risk this sector is exposed to.  Mayorga (2013) 
finds that the issues with the disclosure of material information arise primarily from the perceived 
high costs associated with not meeting regulator and market expectations. The reality is when it 
comes to disclosure everyone wants something different and there can be a variety of audiences 
whose different information needs are expected to be met and this can be really difficult. Getting 
the balance is therefore critical. ICAEW (2011) also highlights that one of the ways of improving 
risk disclosure in the annual reports, for instance, is the continuous consideration of investor needs. 
Thus, companies should report to their users what they need to know to make their risk assessment 




 Research motivations and research questions 
The provision of risk disclosures within the banks’ annual and pillar 3 reports is a requirement and 
there are a number of expectations around a bank’s compliance with these requirements. In 
response to this and in the awakening of events that may have disclosure implications, management 
has processes in place to respond to these events. These include the use of specific activities and 
procedures as well as the influence of the individuals and groups involved in the disclosure process 
exerted to ensure compliance (Gibbins et al., 1990). The objectives of this study is motivated by 
the researcher’s attempt to explore users expectations for quality risk disclosure and the degree to 
which risk disclosures are managed to incorporate these expectations. 
A number of studies on the ways in which corporate disclosures are managed and constructed have 
adapted and developed the Disclosure Management Framework initiated by Gibbins et al. (1990) 
(Holland and Stoner, 1996; Mayorga, 2013). The initiated framework has been adopted and 
developed by a number of researchers to include the identification of the locus of disclosure 
responsibility (Holland and Stoner, 1996; Mayorga, 2013; Johansen and Plenborg, 2018), the range 
of issues considered when making disclosure decisions (Mayorga, 2013), and the impact of 
disclosure regulations on disclosure decision (Johansen and Plenborg, 2018).  
Although a number of these studies have been useful in identifying the different variables that 
influence disclosure as well as the relationships that may exist among these variables, there is little 
evidence on the specific processes used by firms when fulfilling disclosure responsibilities.  
Additionally, these studies find that managing the disclosure of material information reflects the 
nature of learning how to identify users’ expectations and how to meet the different audience 
disclosure expectations (Holland and Stoner, 1996; Mayorga 2013). However, little is known 
about the capital market’s perception of the disclosures provided and management’s response to 
these. Nevertheless, to enable an improved understanding of the role of risk disclosure, the 
perceptions and expectations of risk information users as well as management’s response to these 
need to be explored. The way management responds to the user’s demands for risk disclosure 
could impact the way users react to any information provided about a change in the firm’s 
performance. This study contributes to the accounting literature by addressing the following 
research questions.  





Research on the variations in the meaning of risk from the perspectives of different user groups is 
limited. The researcher believes that in order to understand the views of preparers and users on 
risk disclosure, it is important to identify what they refer to as risk. This provides an opportunity 
to identify any varied views expressed by participants on the concept of risk and its definition. 
RQ2: What are the users’ expectations for risk disclosure quality and how do managers learn 
about and manage their responses to users’ expectations?  
Risk disclosure research on users’ perceptions and expectations for quality risk disclosure is 
limited. An exception to this is Solomon et al. (2000) and Bean and Irvine (2015) who examined 
the attitudes of UK institutional investors and analysts towards risk disclosure. This study 
contributes to the existing risk disclosure literature by identifying and exploring users’ perceptions 
and expectations on the current quality of the risk disclosures provided as well as management’s 
response to these expectations. Users’ perceptions and expectations for risk disclosures were 
obtained from semi-structured interviews conducted with users who have an interest in the risk 
disclosures provided by the UK listed bank chosen for this research. Secondly, the researcher 
attempts to identify and explore management’s response to these expectations using concepts from 
the Gaps Model Framework (Zeithaml et al., 2002). 
 
RQ3: What are the processes preparers enact for the design and development of risk 
disclosures and the challenges faced in this process? 
Following on from the findings of Gibbins et al. (1990), Holland and Stoner (1996), Mayorga 
(2013) and focusing mainly on the annual report and the pillar 3 risk report, the study explores the 
process of designing and developing risk disclosures within the context of a UK listed bank. The 
study also explores the degree to which risk disclosure responsibilities are assigned and guided 
within the bank.  
Prior studies on the management of corporate disclosure find that companies do employ a variety 
of individuals, processes, and guidelines to manage compliance. Mayorga (2013) identifies that a 
firm’s compliance with disclosure demands often includes established structures such as training, 
routine responsibilities, reviewing and authorizing accounts as well as procedures for releasing 
information and responding to analysts and investors. However, research on how managers 
participate in specific accounting phenomenon, such as risk disclosure is rare. This study aims to 
explore the different roles involved in providing risk disclosures, specifically in the banking sector, 




Prior studies on the management of corporate disclosure have often conducted their studies with 
more than two different sectors including the financial sector and this has provided generic 
information on the roles and responsibilities of management in the provision of corporate 
disclosure. Therefore, exploring this within a specific industry such as the banking sector, where 
firms have different and unique features as compared to the non-financial sector, will provide 
deeper insights within a specific context. 
There has been a number of studies in the disclosure literature on how different users of corporate 
disclosure can be provided with adequate information that will enable them to assess the firm’s 
risk profile (Meidell and Kaarbøe, 2017; Johansen and Plenborg, 2018; Amel-Zadeh et al., 2019). 
However, considering the importance of risk disclosures there is currently no research to date on 
how risk disclosures are managed and provided to users. This area has been rarely explored in the 
risk disclosure literature. In an attempt to contribute to the risk disclosure literature, the current 
study examines the management of risk disclosures from the understandings of both prepares and 
users of risk related information. 
The study explores risk disclosure in the UK for the following. The UK provides a unique context 
to analyse risk disclosure. Risk disclosure in the UK, especially in the banking sector, is considered 
an important tool in ensuring market discipline. Additionally, not all risk disclosure in the UK is 
quantifiable and some risk disclosures are qualitative in nature and are not immediately verifiable 
(Athanasakou and Hussainey, 2014). 
The study then focuses on the actual process for risk disclosure, including the interactions between 
the individuals involved and how decisions about the content of public risk disclosures are made.  
With a particular focus on managing user expectations for quality risk disclosure, the study aimed 
to identify challenges that are associated with incorporating users’ expectations into the 
disclosures. In order to answer this research question, the views from the preparers of public risk 
disclosures from a UK listed bank were sought through semi-structured interviews. Some 
information pertaining to this was also derived from the bank’s recent annual report at the time of 
the data collection. 
 Research contribution 
Even though there have been recent calls for research on the ways in which managers interact with 
stakeholders when making disclosure decisions and whether these then motivate their decision to 
disclose or not disclose some level of risk disclosure, research in this area is scant (Elshandidy et 




Marorga (2013), Mayorga and Trotman (2016), and Johansen and Plenborg (2018), This study 
contributes to the limited risk disclosure literature by examining how preparers incorporate users’ 
expectations when setting up their risk reporting. This study particularly examines management’s 
responses to users’ expectations for risk disclosure quality in the banking sector and these 
expectations motivate their risk disclosure decisions. Prior to this examination, the study examines 
users’ perceptions and expectations for risk disclosure quality. 
The study recognizes the need to engage with information users so as to provide insights into what 
their expectations for risk disclosure quality are, and their perceptions on how the current risk 
disclosures provided match up to these expectations. This study thus responds to the call for 
research that seeks to address stakeholder perceptions on risk disclosure (Mayorga, 2013; Johansen 
and Plenborg, 2018). This study explores this within the context of the UK banking sector.  
Moreover, this study is the first study to explore how preparers manage and respond to the users’ 
expectations for quality risk disclosures through the perceptions of both preparers and users. 
Methodologically, prior studies have mainly adopted a content analysis and statistical approach to 
risk disclosure. These studies have been useful in providing an understanding on the different firm 
specific characteristics and variables associated with the disclosure output as well as the 
relationships between these. However, such an approach does not allow for an understanding of 
managements’ practices and processes for risk disclosure. As a result, the current study provides 
rich insights into new research fields by adopting a qualitative case study approach to allow for an 
exploration of users’ and preparers’ perceptions on the management of risk disclosures. 
Furthermore, the study contributes to research by developing a theoretical framework that guides 
the insightful discussion of management’s approach to incorporating users’ expectations for risk 
disclosure quality. The current study does this by combining concepts from both the Disclosure 
Management Framework and the Gaps Model of service quality. These are discussed in more detail 
in the theoretical chapter later in this thesis. 
Theoretically, the current research questions where arrived at by firstly spotting existing gaps in 
the Disclosure Management Framework initiated by Gibbins et al. (1990).  At the initial stages of 
the researcher’s Ph.D. experience, while identifying possible gaps in the literature to explore, the 
Disclosure Management Framework initiated by Gibbins et al. (1990) was identified. The 
Disclosure Management Framework presents a structure to inform the activities, procedures, 




The framework had been criticized for its oversimplification and failure to identify the relationship 
between the relationships of its components (Holland and Stoner, 1996; Mayorga, 2013). Even 
though prior studies that adapted this model identified user-expectations as a disclosure antecedent 
that may influence the disclosure process, the framework provides limited scope for exploring the 
degree to which user-expectations are incorporated in the disclosure management process. Further 
to this, the current study identified the Gaps model of service quality (Parasuraman et al., 1985; 
Zeithaml et al., 2002) to serve as a lens for exploring users’ expectations for risk disclosure quality 
and management’s response in translating their perceptions on these expectations into disclosure 
quality specifications. The study argues that in order to explore the degree to which risk disclosures 
are managed to incorporate user expectations it is important to first investigate what these 
expectations are and any efforts made by management to obtain such information. Therefore, the 
study begins with the Gaps Model and identifies any potential causes for a discrepancy between 
users’ expectations for risk disclosure and management’s understanding of these expectations. 
However, the application of the Gaps Model as a tool for exploring the management of disclosure 
is limited in scope. The Gaps Model does not provide a clear approach to examine the decision 
choices taken by management in translating their perceptions of users’ expectations or in ensuring 
that their perceptions of users’ expectations are incorporated in the actual disclosures provided. 
For this reason, concepts from the Disclosure Management Framework (Gibbins et al., 1990; 
Mayorga, 2013; Johansen and Plenborg, 2018) were introduced to explain how the internal 
decision-making process is undertaken by management in translating their perceptions of users’ 
expectations into disclosure quality specifications. This is where the current study combines both 
theories in order to provide insights and develop a theoretical framework in the process (Ryan et 
al., 2002, p150). 
 Theoretical background 
The current study draws on concepts from the Disclosure Management Framework initiated by 
Gibbins et al. (1990) in combination with the Gaps Model of service quality. The Disclosure 
Management Framework presents a structure to inform the activities, procedures, individuals or 
groups involved in the corporate disclosure process. The interest in applying the Disclosure 
Management Framework to understand how preparers make disclosure decisions is the 
fundamental motivation behind this research. Specifically, the issue of user expectations as a key 
antecedent of the corporate disclosure process. However, due to the oversimplified nature of the 
existing Disclosure Management Framework, there is limited scope for exploring this objective in 




with the Disclosure Management Framework to frame the valuable insights on preparers 
interaction with users during the management of risk disclosures. This process is explained in more 
detail in chapter 4. 
 Philosophical and methodological stance 
The current study is in line with a broad research paradigm with the view that facts and values are 
inevitably influenced by human interactions and interpretations (Collins and Hussey, 2014, P48). 
According to Ryan et al. (2002, p146), this approach believes that social systems are socially 
constructed and, as such, can be changed by human actions and the activities of individuals located 
within a specific social context. This philosophical notion fits into the current study’s’ objectives. 
The management of risk disclosure gives meaning to how reality is created through the decision 
choices taken by management when creating risk disclosures. At the same time, exploring users’ 
perceptions and expectations for risk disclosure quality and the degree to which these are 
incorporated in the management of risk disclosures. The study employed a qualitative case-study 
approach. This study also used problematization as a methodology to challenge existing theoretical 
assumptions in order to construct research questions in an attempt to lead to the development of a 
more influential theory. This method of problematizing was adopted as it provides the researcher 
the opportunity to carefully record and reflect on her on-going practical experience within a highly 
regulated organizational and institutional environment. 
In relation to data collection, the main tool used were semi-structured interviews. Focusing on a 
UK listed bank, the interviews were conducted with users to obtain their insights into their 
perceptions and expectations for risk disclosure quality.  The researcher then gathered information 
from preparers on their process for constructing risk disclosures, their understanding of user 
expectations, and the degree to which their risk disclosures are managed to incorporate these 
expectations. The interview data includes; 4 risk reporting managers of a UK listed bank, 8 
Regulators, 7 Equity research analysts and 4 fund managers from the institutional investor 
companies of the UK bank used in this study. 
 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured around nine chapters. This chapter had provided an overview of the 
research problem, objectives, research questions, and contribution. The study seeks to provide 
insights into how preparers incorporate users’ expectations for risk disclosure quality when setting 




Chapter 2 explores the literature on risk disclosure and the management of corporate disclosure. 
This chapter mainly consists of some evidence on the developments of the risk disclosure practice, 
literature on risk disclosure quality, why assessing the quality of risk disclosure is important for 
information users as well as the key literature on the management of corporate risk disclosure.   
Chapter 3 then offers an overview of the UK banking sector, its role, and characteristics, within 
the context of risk disclosure. The chapter also provides some details on the risk disclosure 
requirements and the degree of managerial discretion within its scope. 
Chapter 4 provides details on the theoretical framework applied in this study, the rationale for 
choosing the theoretical approach and its application in this study. 
Chapter 5 addresses the philosophical basis of the study as well as the research design and 
methodology. This includes the data collection method and the approach to analysing the data 
gathered. 
Chapter 6,7 and 8 provides insights into the results. Within the context of UK bank risk disclosure, 
chapter 6 presents some findings on the researcher’s attempt to conceptualize the definition of risk 
through the understandings of the key participants in the study (i.e. preparers, analysts, institutional 
investor, and the regulator).  
Chapter 7 focuses on users’ expectations for risk disclosure quality and management’s response 
to these expectations. Following on from chapter 7, chapter 8 provides some findings into the 
process of designing and developing risk disclosures in an attempt to throw some light on the 
degree to which users’ expectations for risk disclosures may be incorporated in the risk disclosure 
process. 
Chapter 9 provides a synthesis and overall discussion of the main findings and results of the current 
study. The theoretical concepts of the Disclosure Management Framework (Gibbins et al., 1990; 
Mayorga, 2013; Johansen and Plenborg, 2018) and the Gaps Model of service quality 
(Parasuraman et al., 1985; Zeithaml et al., 2002; Zeithaml et al., 2016) as discussed in chapter 4, 
are employed to frame the results gathered.    
Finally, chapter 10 presents the concluding chapter for the overall thesis. It summarises the 
research overview and provides an explanation of the key empirical and theoretical contributions 
of this thesis. The chapter further provides the limitations of this research. It then presents the 
implication of the findings for managers, academics, and risk information users. Finally, it ends 
with some recommendations for future research.  
 25 
Chapter 2 Literature review 
 Introduction 
This chapter reviews and discusses the literature on risk disclosure, risk disclosure practice, and 
risk disclosure quality, as well as to set the foundation for analysing the results gathered from this 
research in a later chapter. This chapter begins by discussing the concept of risk and the 
development of the risk disclosure practice. It then problematises the risk disclosure literature to 
discuss the limited attention paid by researchers to the management of risk disclosure and user-
perceived risk disclosure quality.  Following on from this, chapter 2 describes the elements of 
quality risk disclosures as stipulated in the literature, discusses user demands for risk information 
and throws light on the importance of quality risk disclosures. In the last few sections, the chapter 
discusses the role of managerial discretion in the provision of risk disclosure and explores the 
literature on the management of corporate disclosures. This is essential to the objectives of the 
current study. 
Risk disclosures as a key part of a business’ disclosure strategies are believed to play a key role in 
the stewardship responsibilities of management within the process of risk disclosure and in the 
decision-making actions of stakeholders. This has led to the emergence of a substantial body of 
risk reporting regulations on the quality of risk disclosures and the attention from different 
stakeholders on the impact of adequate risk disclosures on their economic decisions. 
Efforts have been made by academic researchers in accounting, to provide insights into the impact 
of some firm characteristics on risk disclosure: profitability, corporate governance factors; 
company size, and company risk level, on risk disclosure (Linsley and Shrives, 2005; Miihkinen, 
2012; Elshandidy et al., 2013,2015; Helbok and Wagner, 2005; Nahar et al., 2016; Malafronte et 
al., 2016 and Abraham and Cox, 2007). Accounting academic researchers have also explored the 
impact of a firm’s risk disclosure on its cost of equity and market values (Lang and Lundholm 
1996; Botosan and Plumlee, 2005). These studies have mainly focused on assessing the disclosure 
output and the reports itself and have been useful in examining how the quantity and the quality 
of risk disclosures correlate with some firm characteristics. However, the key role of management 
and their actions in providing risk disclosures necessary for information users to make informed 
economic decisions have rarely been explored. A few studies have investigated how firms manage 
corporate disclosures and the decision choices that shape the corporate information environment 
(Gibbins et al., 1990; Adams, 1997; Holland and Stoner, 1996; Trabelsi et al., 2004; Mayorga 




or how management considers users’ needs when designing and managing corporate disclosures. 
This study, therefore, contributes to the literature on risk disclosure by exploring management’s 
response to the users’ expectations on risk disclosure quality and the degree to which their 
disclosures are managed to reflect these user demands.   
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the concept of risk and its development 
in the risk disclosure literature. Section 2.3 then explains the development of risk disclosure 
practice. Sequentially, section 2.4 problematises the risk disclosure literature to discuss the limited 
attention paid by researchers to the management of risk disclosure and user-perceived risk 
disclosure quality. Following on from this, section 2.5 discusses the current literature on risk 
disclosure quality and section 2.6 explains user demands for risk information as well as the 
importance of risk disclosure quality. Section 2.7 then reviews the literature on the management 
of corporate disclosure and the chapter ends with a summary in section 2.8. 
 The concept of risk and its definition in prior literature 
Risk has been defined as the effect of any uncertainty on the objectives of an organization or the 
consequences of some events from either within or outside the organization (ISO 31000, 2018; 
Green, 2016; James, 2014). According to the International Organization for Standardisation (ISO) 
31000 (2018), the consequences associated with risk can either enhance the achievement of an 
organization’s objectives (i.e. positive consequences) or can limit or diminish the achievement of 
its objectives (i.e. negative consequences). In the risk management literature, the concept of risk 
has evolved over the years to include both the positive and negative consequences of its effects on 
the organization and there is currently no agreed definition of risk. While some authors refer to the 
negative effects of risk, other researchers refer to both the negative and positive effects of risk in 
their definition of risk.  
The study conducted by Elshandidy (2011) identifies three different streams of literature relating 
to the definition of risk. The first trend focuses on the downside or negative effects of risk such as 
harm, hazard, danger, damages, threats, or potential losses (e.g. Kaplan and Garrick, 1981; 
Akintoye and MacLeod, 1997; Lupton, 1999, Horcher, 2005 and Adams, 2009). Prior literature 
has referred to this definition of risk as the pre-modernist view of risk (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; 
Ibrahim and Hussainey, 2019).  
The second trend identified by Elshandidy (2011) focuses on the fact that the concept of risk could 
involve either a positive effect (i.e. opportunity, prospect, and potential gain) or a negative effect 




et al., 2000; Hodder et al., 2001; Elmiger and Kim, 2003; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Damodaran, 
2008; Elshandidy, 2011). This has been referred to as the modernist view on risk (Ibraham and 
Hussainey, 2019, p130). 
Another stream of literature refers to risk as the variations or fluctuations or changes around a 
target value at a specific time horizon (Elshandidy, 2011). Such variations could either have a 
positive or a negative effect on the business. This definition is similar to that provided by the 
International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS 4 – Insurance Contracts). The IFRS 4 standard 
defines financial risk as the risk of a possible future change in one or more of a specified interest 
rate, financial instrument price, commodity price, foreign exchange rate, index of prices rate, credit 
rating, credit index or other variables. Prior to Elshandidy (2011), Abraham and Cox (2007) also 
use risk in three texts: risk as variation (Elshandidy, 2011), risk as any uncertainty and risk as an 
opportunity. 
These definitions provide details on how different academic authors have viewed and defined risk 
based on empirical evidence.  It is evident that there is currently no agreed definition for risk. In 
relation to the current research objectives aimed at exploring user’s views on risk disclosure, it is 
important to understand what they consider as risk and how they define risk. In response to this 
gap, the researcher aims to define risk based on the perspectives of the different interviewee 
participants in order to conceptualize and distinguish their definition of risk. This is an area that is 
currently lacking in the risk disclosures literature.  
 The development of the risk reporting practice 
Originating from the 17th and 18th centuries when accounting was synonymous with double-entry 
bookkeeping, the term accounting in recent times has evolved over the years to include ‘the 
preparation and communication to users of financial and economic information’ (Parker, 1992, 
p4). This was due to the increasing demand for information on how businesses were being 
managed as organizations changed from being sole trading businesses and partnerships to large 
corporations owned by investors but managed by elected directors.  
Corporate reporting further developed, particularly in the 19th century, to include the emergence 
of capital markets and the urgency to meet the needs of absentee investors, professional 
management and regulatory demands as oversea trading developed and investment opportunities 
became more prominent. This development led to the demand for an effective risk reporting 
practice which is necessary for the well-functioning of capital markets (Deumes, 2008). If 




confidence as well providing managers with the ability to eliminate any disparities between what 
investors understand and expect and what management can deliver (Hutton, 2004; Deumes, 2008). 
Risk as an important aspect of any business became larger and more varied in the presence of these 
developments and there is a growing demand for management to provide adequate risk reporting 
to enable users make informed decisions (CIMA, 2006). It is evidenced that keeping investors 
informed and engaged in the risk reporting process could reduce the chances of an investor making 
adverse decisions and in effect lead to an unfavourable consequence for the company and its 
performance (Lundholm and Winkle, 2006).  
As a result of this, the rise in external reporting became part of a market-driven agenda and as 
shareholders and other stakeholders demanded reliable information from organizations, managers 
also responded by arranging for an independent audit to make credible the financial information 
they provide (Edwards, 2018). Even though this suggested that market forces were the driving 
forces for ensuring management keeps users informed, the usefulness of the financial reporting 
relied on the willingness of corporate managers to comply with best accounting practice. 
In the early 2000’s risk reporting as a vital component of corporate reporting gained much 
prominence, especially in the financial sector, resulting from the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
and a series of high-profile corporate failures and incidents that damaged well-known brands.  
In the aftermath of the GFC, banks realised that their information technology and data architectures 
were inadequate, and they were unable to manage their risks properly because of weak risk 
aggregation capabilities and risk reporting practices (Bank for international settlements, 2012). 
According to KPMG (2017), these reporting issues remain unresolved and regulators are still 
concerned that the risk reports being generated by globally and domestically systematically 
important banks were based on poor quality (Bank for International Settlements, 2013). In relation 
to this, the regulatory reporting framework for banks in the UK has evolved rapidly in recent years 
to include amendments to the IASB’s IFRS 7 and the requirements of the Basel Accord (KPMG, 
2017).  
According to KPMG (2017), regulatory bodies in the UK and supervisory authorities around the 
world are creating an increasingly onerous and complex issue of overlapping but often data-driven 
requirements. However, most banks do not have proper controls over the huge portfolio and 
inventory of financial and non-financial regulatory reports they must produce: risk reports, 




Therefore, concerns about the quality of risk disclosures still remain. Including issues of 
comparability, consistency, and clarity remain unresolved. 
In addition to this and despite the growth in financial disclosure regulation, much of the 
evolutionary nature of corporate disclosure has involved broadening non-financial disclosure. It is 
also believed that the accounting and disclosure of non-financial elements does not, at present, 
benefit from a standardised approach to corporate disclosure (OECD, 2014; ICAEW, 2017). 
Nonetheless, the disclosure of non-financial information has increased as companies are expected 
by stakeholders to provide disclosure on risks that are often very difficult to quantify and 
standardise (i.e. reputational risk, cyber risk, climate change risk, strategic risks) and which form 
part of their overall risk profile. 
Considering the stakeholders’ involvement in the risk reporting process, there is a motivation to 
explore the current state of risk reporting quality based on understanding stakeholders’ 
perspectives for improving risk disclosure practices and overcoming the current limitations and 
management’s response to these. 
An in-depth investigation of their perspectives and actions would therefore provide insights into 
the degree to which management considers users’ expectations for risk disclosure quality in their 
risk disclosure process. In relation to this, section 2.2 problematise the risk disclosure literature to 
emphasise the need for a study in this area. 
 Problematization of the risk disclosure literature 
Disclosures have been judged to be risk disclosures if the reader of the disclosure report is 
informed of any opportunity, prospect, hazard, danger, harm or any form of exposure, that has 
impacted the company in the past or may impact the company in the near future or impact the 
management of such opportunity, prospect, hazard, harm, threat or exposure (Linsley and Shrives, 
2006, p389). Prior studies find that the disclosure of risk-related information provides users with 
an understanding of an entity's risk profile and also with an ability to assess and anticipate the 
entity's future economic performance (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; 
Moumen et al., 2016). According to Khandelwal et al. (2019), corporate risk disclosure provides 
information about the company’s material risks that help stakeholders understand and evaluate the 
interrelated risks of the company, the effect of these risks as well as the company’s risk 
management strategies. This information is useful particularly to investors in making pricing 
decisions and in enabling them to obtain the best estimate on appropriate rates on their investments. 




The aftermath of the GFC, corporate failures and scandals have increased the demand for banks to 
provide adequate and enhanced risk disclosures. The pressures from various stakeholders resulted 
in the need for changes in the risk disclosure practices in the banking sector, driven mainly by 
enhanced regulations and guidelines established by both national and institutional bodies (Blum, 
2008; and Chen et al., 2014). This has also been as a result of the fact that during the GFC, 
stakeholders suffered some form of limitations and distortions in their understanding of the risk 
perceptions and risk attitudes of the banking sector, which hindered their ability to judge the risks 
faced by banks during the period of the crisis (Scannella and Polizzi, 2018). 
Adequate corporate disclosure can play vital role in reducing information asymmetries between 
bank managers and investors; and reducing the probability of a banking crisis if bank managers 
disclose information about risks that allows those investors to correctly price the bank’s liabilities 
(Sowerbutts and Zimmerman, 2016).  
Although risk reporting is increasingly becoming an issue of particular interest to a wide range of 
user groups, prior studies have found the current risk disclosures as being unhelpful in conveying 
real meaning to its users (ACCA, 2008). And the consequences of this lack of adequate 
transparency could include poor market discipline which then leads to the mispricing of risk and 
the misallocation of capital (CFA Institute, 2016).  
The pillar 3 risk disclosure requirements for financial institutions, for instance, are mainly to 
encourage market discipline so as to reduce information asymmetry and help to promote 
comparability among banks (Bank for International Settlement, 2015).   
Market discipline is encouraged as it reflects the ability of investors to accurately access the bank’s 
actual economic conditions so as to incorporate these into the banks’ security prices by making 
economic decisions that could either favour the bank or not. Thus, inadequate market discipline 
may influence the process by which a security’s price changes, thereby causing managers to 
respond to any adverse changes in their financial and economic conditions (Bliss and Flannery, 
2002). Nonetheless, without accurate information about the bank’s capital requirements, which 
constitutes a huge part of the bank’s risk assessment process, it becomes difficult for users to be 
accurately informed in order to process the information correctly and for market discipline to be 
implemented.  
Additionally, providing quality risk disclosure is important because, according to Deumes (2008), 
when investors are well-informed of the bank’s underlying risk profile, it provides managers with 




and what management can deliver. One of the ways of then improving risk disclosure in the annual 
reports, for instance, is the continuous consideration of investor needs (ICAEW, 2011). Thus, 
companies should report to their users what they need to know to make their own risk assessment 
of the company's risks.  
In a study conducted by Mayorga (2013) on the management of continuous disclosure, Mayorga 
(2013) finds that the issues with the disclosure of material information arise primarily from the 
perceived high costs associated with not meeting regulator and market expectations. In light of 
this, the current study investigates users’ expectations for risk disclosure quality through the 
understandings of information users and the degree to which management considers and 
incorporates users’ expectations for risk disclosure quality within their risk disclosure process. The 
extant literature on risk disclosure in the UK has mainly examined the incentives and 
informativeness of risk disclosures, as well as the impact of some firm characteristics on risk-
related disclosure relying largely on public signals (Linsley et al., 2006; Helbok and Wagner, 2005; 
Nahar et al., 2016; and Abraham and Cox, 2007). However, only a few studies have investigated 
how firms manage corporate disclosures and the decision choices that shape the corporate 
information environment (Gibbins et al., 1990; Adams, 1997; Holland and Stoner, 1996; Trabelsi 
et al., 2004; Mayorga 2013). 
One of the earlier studies on the management of corporate disclosures in Canada, from which this 
study draws motivation, was by Gibbins et al. (1990). Gibbins et al. (1990) explored the 
management of corporate financial disclosures in Canada and developed a Disclosure 
Management Framework using a grounded theory qualitative approach. Gibbins et al. (1990, 
1992) offers an understanding of financial disclosure as a managed phenomenon, using different 
perspectives to propose and develop a theory about managing financial disclosure, and the 
motivations, events, processes, structures and people behind the financial disclosures made by 
organizations. Prior studies on the management of risk disclosures have adopted and developed 
the framework initiated by Gibbins et al. (1990) and have been useful in identifying disclosure 
issues, structures, and antecedents associated with the management of disclosures in different 
disclosure contexts (i.e. corporate financial disclosure, price sensitive information, and continuous 
disclosures). 
An important aspect of the management of disclosures is the management of users’ disclosure 
expectations. Mayorga (2013) highlights that even though market expectations are one of the key 




disclosure in every circumstance. Prior studies (Holland and Stoner, 1996 and Mayorga 2013) find 
that managing disclosure of material information reflects the iterative nature of learning how to 
identify events which the market will consider to be material information and meet different 
audiences’ disclosure expectations. Despite the importance of managing user-expectation in the 
disclosure process, the extent to which corporate disclosures are managed to identify and 
incorporate user expectations has been rarely explored. The section below discusses the concept 
of risk disclosure quality; why firm’s need to provide quality risk disclosure; the literature on the 
management of corporate disclosures as a key underlying factor to the provision of corporate 
disclosures. 
 What is risk disclosure quality? 
As explained in an earlier section the first decade of the twenty-first century and the aftermath of 
the GFC together with recent bank scandals has led to an increase in demand for quality risk 
disclosures and pressures from various users have intensified to include; a need for an increased 
ability to assess and anticipate a bank’s portfolio of risks, improved risk disclosure quality and a 
reduction in information asymmetry. This has therefore drawn the attention of users of accounting 
information to the importance of risk-related disclosures. As a result, there is some amount of 
pressure on banks to provide enhanced risk disclosure quality on both their numeric and narrative 
risk disclosures. Accounting disclosure quality in the literature has been defined in a variety of 
ways and there is therefore no clear definition of what quality means when it comes to the 
disclosure of accounting information. This is true especially for narrative accounting disclosures 
(Beattie et al., 2004). However, some commonalities exist among the different definitions of 
accounting disclosure in the literature. One of the principles of ensuring risk disclosure quality is 
to assess whether the disclosures are clear, comprehensive, and understandable (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2015). According to Hopkins (1996), disclosure quality has been 
referred to as the ease with which investors can read and interpret the information given in a 
company’s accounting disclosures. However, prior studies (Abraham et al., 2012) find that there 
is still evidence that users are dissatisfied with the clarity of the disclosures they receive.   
In addition to the fact that disclosures are expected to be clear, readable and understandable, prior 
studies on risk disclosure quality have associated the quality of risk disclosure with the 
informativeness of risk disclosure in improving the users understanding of the business’ portfolio 
of risk; the quantity of risk disclosure; and the provision of mandatory and voluntary disclosures 
(Ryan, 2012; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Kravet and Muslu, 2013; Abraham and Shrives, 2014; 




2.5.1 The informativeness of risk disclosure  
Prior studies (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Kravet and Muslu, 2013 and Abraham and Shrives, 2014) 
identify informativeness as an important factor of risk disclosure quality. Abraham and Shrives 
(2014) measure risk disclosure informativeness as a function of three themes; disclosure should 
be specific; managers should evaluate their risk disclosures on a regular basis identifying 
significant events and prevent repetitious annual reporting, and that actual experiences are 
discussed in the reports. Other studies refer to risk disclosure as informative when it; reflects the 
business’s actual portfolio of risk and predicts its financial health (Baule and Tallau, 2016). Thus, 
when it better identifies the business’s actual economic drivers (Ryan, 2012). 
However, these studies find that, companies provide a large amount of risk disclosure which are 
often generic in nature rather than specific and therefore the substance of the risk discussed is less 
informative and remains the same over time. The provision of informed and specific disclosures 
is important for investors because it enhances their ability to identify the different risks faced by 
the firm and also assess and estimate the amount and timing of future cashflows (Abraham et al., 
2012, Linsley and Shrives, 2005). 
Even though this specificity of risk disclosure is essential for informed decision making, there are 
different users of risk information and each user may be interested in a different category of risk-
related information. Therefore, Beattie et al. (2004) highlight that for there to be risk disclosure 
quality it is important to have in the disclosures a wide spread of disclosures across topics and 
categories with a degree of balance (not necessarily equal coverage) seeming desirable. This does 
not take away the importance of specificity as an important dimension of risk disclosure quality. 
From the literature, it is therefore important for management to ensure that the risks disclosed 
reflect the business’s actual portfolio of risks.  
In line with the specificity of risk disclosure and the disclosure of numeric risk related information, 
Ryan (2012, p296) defines risk disclosure quality as the provision of financial report information 
that better identifies the economic drivers (e.g. exposures with market risk, credit risk, liquidity 
risk, or information risks) and/or conveys the statistical properties (e.g. variances and relevant 
covariances) of the variation in firm’s future economic performance (Ryan, 2012, p296). This 
definition stresses on the importance of enabling users better identify the firm’s actual economic 
drivers. According to Ryan (2012, p296) identifying these economic drivers is important for users 
of financial information because it enables them to understand any existing variations on a 




Another stream of literature associates risk disclosure quality with the degree to which 
management withholds or discloses full disclosure of accounting information (King 1996; Hughes, 
2006). King (1996) refers to disclosure quality as the degree of self-interested bias in the 
disclosure. In relation to this, Hughes (2006) examined the impact of the litigation environment 
on the quality of discretionary disclosure. Hughes (2006, p56) distinguished among full disclosure, 
where the manager makes a truthful and precise disclosure or one that can be inverted through the 
managers private signal; partial disclosure, where the manager adds noise to his or her signal about 
future earnings; and biased disclosure, where the manager adds a deterministic bias to her signal 
under conditions that do not allow precise reversal of the bias. Thus, enhanced risk disclosure 
quality is associated with full disclosure and the provision of truthful and precise information, 
where there is no or very little self-interested bias.  
Some empirical papers (Hodder et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2009; Abraham and Shrives 2014) refer 
also to risk relevance, which can be assumed to imply enhanced risk disclosure quality (Ryan, 
2012). These studies perceive disclosure as risk relevant if it has explanatory power for measures 
of a firms’ risks, both systematic risks (e.g. beta, cost of capital, and valuation multiples), and total 
risks (e.g. share return variance) or downside risk (e.g. probability of default and loss given 
default). This is in line with Ryan (2012) definition of risk disclosure quality where risk disclosure 
quality refers to financial information (e.g. bets, cost of capital, share return variance) that better 
identifies the firm’s economic drivers and financial performance. Thus, the disclosure should be 
clear and explanatory the best way possible to enable users make well informed economic 
decisions.  
2.5.2 The quantity of risk disclosures provided 
Beattie et al. (2004) identify disclosure quantity, relative to a firm’s size, as one dimension of 
disclosure quality. Beattie et al. (2004) argue that, quality is not synonymous with quantity. This 
is in contrast to prior studies which assumes that the significance of a disclosure can be 
meaningfully represented by the quantity of information disclosed (Deegan and Gordon, 1996; 
Gray et al., 1995; and Unerman, 2000). In addition to this, Miihkinen (2012, p 437) find that there 
are more extensive and more comprehensive risk related information with an increase in the 
quantity of risk disclosures provided. 
Beattie et al. (2004) argue that a primary attribute of disclosure quality is likely to be the actual 
amount of the disclosure, relative to the amount expected, given the company’s size and 




their annual reports and pillar 3 risk disclosure reports, which tends to be 100s of pages long. Gray 
et al. (1995) argue that, the overload of accounting information can cause users to lose some key 
risk information or make it difficult for users to identify the most significant information. In 
relation to this Gray et al. (1995, p84) posit that this issue can be mitigated to a degree by 
attempting to assess the quality of the information disclosed by first assessing whether the 
statements made are quantitative (financial or other numeric) or declarative and second, whether 
the statement refers to events which reflects well, badly or neutrally on the reporting entity.  
2.5.3 The provision of mandatory and voluntary risk related disclosures 
As a result of the concerns regarding the disclosure of risk related information, regulators and other 
standard setters have introduced a number of risk related disclosure standards and have altered the 
nature of accounting that is mandated (Hernández, 2003). Disclosure regulations and requirements 
are primarily intended to improve the informativeness of financial reporting information by forcing 
companies to provide certain information in order to protect investors and assist them in making 
informed decisions as well as ensure capital market efficiency. For this reason, it is expected that 
the compliance with disclosure regulations should improve financial reporting quality and enhance 
the reliability and transparency of financial reporting (Abayo et al., 1993; Brown and Tarca, 2012). 
Therefore, it could be argued that regulations contribute to better quality disclosure. 
Prior studies (Rajgopal, 1999; Pérignon and Smith, 2010) have indicated that the increase in risk 
related disclosure regulations have had a positive impact on risk reporting and have limited 
discretion by mandating risk disclosures by type and format. According to Leuz and Wysocki 
(2016), mandatory disclosure is used in lieu of financial reporting regulation that explicitly 
prohibits certain behaviours, the idea being that mandated disclosure and transparency incentivize 
desirable behaviours and discourage undesirable ones. In contrast, Baule and Tallau (2016) argue 
that, despite the continuous increase in the complexity of the Basel risk disclosure requirements 
for instance, especially in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, their effectiveness in 
reflecting a bank’s actual portfolio risk and in predicting their financial health is limited. In 
addition, Miihkinen (2012) find that the quantitative risk related disclosures, as guided by the 
regulators and standard setters, are less extensive and comprehensive. 
Even though the aftermath of the GFC has increased the number of prescribed rules guiding the 
disclosure of risk related information in the UK banking industry, there still exists some form of 
managerial discretion. The regulatory requirements of risk disclosure provide a very standardised 




disclosures and very limited guidance for the operational risks and risks that rely on managements’ 
inherent judgement when it comes disclosure of such risks (Mayorga, 2013). Reporting regulation 
in highly regulated countries such as the UK tend to focus on a narrow set of risks, primarily 
market and credit risks, and risks connected with the use of financial instruments.                                                                               
In line with this, prior studies argue that, allowing for some form of managerial discretion allows 
firms to provide risk related disclosures in the form of voluntary disclosures which then enables 
firms to discuss issues that are unique to their environment (Abraham and Cox, 2007; Abraham et 
al., 2012). However, there is also the risk that non-compliance will be high if disclosure were to 
be made voluntary. Furthermore, although it is possible under regulatory disclosures to initiate 
legal proceedings where company directors withhold material information, shareholders and other 
users are not necessarily protected within a voluntary framework (Solomon et al., 2000). Thus, 
there are potential concerns regarding both forms of corporate disclosure. 
In relation to this, there is evidence supporting the view that a balance between mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure is important as the two forms of disclosure complement each other 
(Einhorn’s, 2005; Bagnoli and Watts’,2007 and Elshandidy et al., 2015). Gigler and Hemmer 
(2001) and Butler, Kraft and Weiss (2007) also find mandatory disclosure to be substantive for 
voluntary disclosure. In relation to the above, Kravet and Muslu (2013) caution against more 
mandatory disclosures in that, companies may technically comply with the regulations without 
providing useful and informed risk disclosures. Prior studies also raise concerns over the increase 
in regulations and over the quality of risk disclosure (Dobler, 2005; 2008; Dobler et al., 2011). 
The findings from Solomon et al. (2000) show that, most users, especially institutional investors, 
are averse to a legal framework for corporate disclosure and emphasise the importance of voluntary 
disclosures in providing context to the standardised disclosures provided in the firm’s financial 
reporting. The section below provides a discussion in the motivations and incentives for 
management’s discretion when providing corporate disclosure. 
2.5.3.1 Motivations for discretionary disclosure 
When it comes to the disclosure of accounting information, prior studies highlight that, 
management’s disclosure choices are not always directly related to the economic incentives 
generated by market forces (e.g., Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Judge et al., 2010; Chen 
and Roberts, 2010; Elshandidy et al., 2015). It is believed that firm’s disclosure choices may also 
be subject to institutional pressures or even to the best practices among their competitors (e.g., 




pressures which provides insights into how the provision of risk disclosure could stem from 
different pressure levels (e.g., Chen and Roberts, 2010; Elshandidy et al., 2015). In addition to 
this, the regulatory theory provides a conceptual basis for the disclosure of mandatory information 
necessary to compensate for market failures (Dobler, 2008).  
It is believed that, managers may have higher risk incentives to issue less readable disclosures 
(Chakrabarty et al., 2018). Prior studies also find that, management may have an incentive to signal 
the possibility of higher risk in advance, through their disclosures, in order to reduce the possibility 
of shareholder litigation that might be triggered by withholding such information (Hassan and 
Romilly, 2018; and Lemma et al., 2018). Other studies also suggest that, managers may release 
good news prior to raising external finance and delay the disclosure of bad news (Frankel et al., 
1995; Lang and Lundholm, 2000 and Kothari et al., 2006). This relates to the incentive 
management may have to reduce their cost of debt and equity by providing a certain level of 
corporate disclosure. There is some evidence that firms that provide timely and detailed disclosures 
reduce lenders’ and underwriters’ perceptions of default risk for the disclosing firm, reducing the 
cost of debt (Sengupta, 1998, p459). 
In relation to this, there have been some arguments in the literature on managements’ motivations 
for discretionary disclosures and voluntary disclosures in the banking sector. These arguments 
have been based on areas covering information risk, agency theory (e.g. Abrahim and Cox, 2007), 
signalling theory, institutional theory and political cost theory (Helbok and Wagner, 2005; 
Elshandidy et al., 2015).  
From an information risk perspective, the return on an investment demanded by the investor 
depends on the level of information and disclosure provided to them by the bank. In relation to 
this, a few studies (e.g. Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Botosan and Plumlee, 2005 and Lemma et al., 
2018) have found that firm’s making better quality disclosure and providing an increase in the 
information disclosed are often rewarded with a lower cost of capital. However, Heinle and Smith 
(2017) argue that only risk disclosure concerning systematic risk, will impact the cost of capital. 
Prior studies argue that adequate risk disclosures that represents risks inherent in the entire market 
segment reduces uncertainty for all firms in the economy and reduces the aggregate cost of capital 
(Heinle and Smith, 2017, p1479) 
Additionally, Lang and Lundholm (1996) highlight that companies whose disclosure processes are 
more future oriented can attract a lower cost of capital by improving the accuracy in market 




market surprises. Botosan and Plumlee (2005) also found some evidence to suggest that managers 
might achieve a favourable cost of capital by choosing accounting policies and disclosure practices 
that increase the quality of their overall information set. These findings tend to suggest that 
managers may have an incentive to manage their disclosure practices so as to achieve some cost 
of capital benefits.  
Eisenhardt (1989) highlights that, agency theory stems from an economic view of risk-sharing 
between a principal (e.g. managers, creditors) and an agent (e.g. shareholders), where each of these 
two parties possess different approaches to solving issues and may be subject to different risk 
attitudes which in turn could give rise to an agency conflict. Helbok and Wagner (2005) argue that, 
in an agency conflict between the shareholder and the creditors, where the firm has high leverage 
ratios which could potentially lead to a high risk of bankruptcy, management may have an 
incentive to provide more disclosure in an attempt to lower the conflict between shareholders and 
creditors. From an agency theory perspective where there exists an agency problem between the 
shareholders and the creditors, resulting from a higher leverage taken by management, agency 
theory suggests that this conflict may lead to an effective incentive for company managers to avoid 
the risk of a bank failure (Helbok and Wagner, 2005). This is because, providing more disclosures, 
in this instance, may reduce the costs due to conflicts between shareholders and creditors. On the 
other hand, Helbok and Wagner (2005) argue that, for banks that are reasonably leveraged but are 
highly capitalised, management may have an incentive to choose not to disclose in an attempt to 
reduce a conflict between management and its shareholders. Thus, whereas highly leveraged banks 
might give priority to trying to lower the conflicts between creditors and shareholders by choosing 
to increase disclosure, highly capitalised banks, which outsiders may believe are unlikely to fail, 
may give priority to reducing the conflicts between the bank managers and the shareholders by 
choosing not to disclose some information on the adequacy of their capital.  
Another motivation for disclosure or non-disclosure is followed by the idea of the political cost 
theory advanced by Watts and Zimmerman (1986). Watts and Zimmerman (1986) suggest that, 
banks disclose information to ward off unwanted attention by the supervisor. Given the 
supervisors’ role in ensuring the stability of the banking system, regulators must specifically focus 
on under-capitalized banks which are less likely to withstand a potentially large capital absorbing 





Finally, from a signalling perspective, banks may have an incentive to make certain disclosure 
decisions in an attempt to signal their competence to the market. In an example given by Helbok 
and Wagner (2005) during the early 2000’s when concerns for operational risk where emerging. 
Helbok and Wagner (2005, p11) argued that banks that have less capacity to absorb major 
operational risk losses might be more concerned about the existence and relevance of operational 
risk within their institutions. They suggest that these high performing institutions may have an 
incentive to voluntarily disclose information about their capabilities for operational risk and how 
it’s being managed in an attempt to distinguish themselves from other firms (Verecchia, 1983; 
Welker, 1995). 
 Users’ demands for risk information and the importance of risk disclosure quality 
Accounting information is an important aspect of any business because it allows capital providers 
(i.e. shareholders and creditors) to evaluate the potential return on their investment and other 
investment opportunities (i.e. the ex-ante or valuation role of accounting information) as well as 
to monitor the use of their capital once invested (i.e. ex-post or stewardship role of accounting 
information).  
In relation to this, Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) highlight that, the demand for a firm’s accounting 
information by its users arise for two main reasons. First, ex-ante, the providers of corporate 
disclosure typically have more information about the expected profitability of the firms’ current 
and future investments than its users. This information asymmetry problem is exacerbated because 
providers of such information may have an incentive to exaggerate their firm’s projected 
profitability, which may lead to a potential market failure. In relation to this, there is a demand 
from users expecting the regulator to intervene and ensure that they are protected from material 
levels of information asymmetry (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004). Secondly, ex-post, Beretta and 
Bozzolan (2004) suggest that the ex-post demand for accounting information arises from a 
separation of ownership and control, which results in investors especially not having full decision-
making rights as to what information should be disclosed.  
In the aftermath of the GFC, the demand for a more transparent and accurate risk reporting practice 
became more prominent and the attention of information users were drawn to the importance of 
risk related information. For this reason, there is currently some amount of pressure on firms to 
provide enhanced and adequate risk disclosures (Mokhtar and Mellet, 2013; Solomon et al., 2000; 




especially for institutional investors, financial analysts and the regulators as primary users of 
accounting information.  
One of the primary functions of a firm’s financial reports is to provide information to external 
users on the operational activities and financial performance of the firm. As such, the attitudes of 
accounting information users towards the current state of corporate disclosure would depend on 
the relevance of the information disclosed for economic decision-making. Solomom et al. (2000) 
investigated the attitudes of UK institutional investors towards risk disclosure by UK companies. 
Solomon et al. (2000) find that, institutional investors believe that increased corporate disclosure 
would help their portfolio investment decision-making and they would therefore welcome any 
process that encourages the disclosure of additional risk information. According to Hirschman 
(1970) there are two main choices available to institutional investors when they are unhappy with 
a particular portfolio firm: they could either engage with management directly to try to effect 
change, or they could exit the firm by selling their investment. These concerns may be related to 
the firm’s corporate governance or corporate strategy of which accounting and the disclosure of 
accounting information is a big part of (McCahery et al., 2016). Prior studies have also shown that 
the threat of exit demonstrated by investors can serve as a form of discipline to management 
(McCahery et al., 2016).  For this reason, management may have an incentive to provide a certain 
level of disclosures in an attempt to foster trust and confidence in their investors. 
Financial analysts are both primary users of financial information and key information 
intermediaries between the target company and its investors. Therefore, as analysts, their needs 
should be considered, not just by management in the preparation of accounting disclosures, but 
also when regulators establish accounting policies and standards (Garcia-Meca and Martinez, 
2007). For financial analysts, their assessment of the risk disclosures provided is important when 
analysing stocks and making recommendations in the valuation process of a target company, as 
such assessments affects the risk perception of investors (Hope et al., 2016). It is therefore 
important for such information to be value-relevant (Flostrand and Strom (2006). Information has 
valuation relevance if it is forward-looking and if it is used by the analyst or other users in their 
valuation process or decision-making processes (Flostrand and Strom, 2006; Breton and Taffler, 
2001).  
Financial analysts often base their valuation process primarily on their evaluation of a target 
company’s earnings relative to its balance sheet and cash flow evaluations, the analysis of this 




operating data (Previts et al., 1994; Rogers and Grant, 1997). Financial analysts also make use of 
the firm’s non-financial disclosures including company risks, anticipated changes, competitive 
position, management and strategy. Prior studies also find that, financial analysts focus more on 
information relating to the firm’s new investments, firm credibility, consistency of strategy and its 
strategic alliances and agreements (Garcia-Meca and Martinez, 2007). Therefore, the quality of 
such information provided within a target company’s disclosures is key to the decisions made by 
analysts in their valuations.  
Bean and Irvine (2015) examines analysts’ perceptions on the usefulness of derivative disclosure 
in corporate annual reports from a credit analysts’ point of view in four Australian banks. Their 
findings suggest that analysts perceive the current corporate disclosures as uninformative and 
generic in the sense that they focus on year-end positions with very little detail on risk and risk 
management practices. In this instance, there is the concern that companies may hold different 
positions during the year that what is provided in their disclosures at the end of the year. Their 
findings further suggest that the disclosure provided were inadequate to reflect the company’s 
actual use of derivatives throughout the period. There has been an increasing concern from practice 
that disclosures are growing in length while decreasing in information value, with poor disclosure 
quality limiting its usefulness to information users. 
The regulator plays a key role in the provision of quality risk disclosures. Not only is the regulator 
responsible for providing guidelines and requirements for the provision of adequate risk 
disclosures, they are also users of the firm’s risk disclosures in ensuring that organisations are 
operating in a sound and efficient manner.  
In the UK, the Financial Reporting council (FRC) is particularly responsible for promoting 
transparency in businesses with a particular focus on ensuring that investor and other stakeholder 
needs are met. Despite an increase number of regulatory guidelines and requirements on corporate 
disclosure and reporting it is believed that there is still more scope for improvements (FRC, 2019). 
It is expected that management discusses within their corporate disclosures forward looking 
information, the potential impact of unknown and emerging risks and opportunities on future 
business strategy and the carrying value of assets and the recognition of liabilities. The FRC (2019) 
highlights that in instances where the firm fails to discuss such risks and opportunities in its 
disclosures, it can lead to the conclusion that management is not aware of the potential impact of 
its risks and it’s not managing them effectively (FRC, 2019). This could in turn hamper on the 




The FRC engages with users on projects in an attempt to summarise their observations on what 
users are interested in when it comes to their analysis of a firm’s activities and performance, as 
well as to encourage firms to consider adopting these stakeholder interests into their governance 
and disclosure practices (FRC, 2017; 2018b). Although reports on internal control over financial 
reporting and risk related disclosures may be instrumental in restoring confidence in the integrity 
of financial reporting, the reporting of organisational risks must satisfy users’ needs for improved 
internal and external decision making (FRC, 2015).  
Despite the importance of risk disclosure and the number of concerns regarding the provision of 
adequate disclosures, there is very little evidence on why such disclosures may be considered 
inadequate by information users and most importantly management’s response to these concerns. 
In relation to this, the current study aims to explore users’ perceptions and expectations for quality 
risk disclosure within the context of a UK listed bank. The study also examines the management 
of risk disclosures within the bank and the degree to which management’s perceptions of what the 
user expects are incorporated within the bank’s risk disclosure decisions. Section 2.7 discusses the 
literature on the management of corporate disclosure and how this study contributes to this stream 
of literature. 
 A review of the literature on the management of corporate disclosure 
Although an extensive literature on risk reporting and corporate disclosure explores the 
determinants and incentives for the quality of the disclosures provided by companies as discussed 
in the earlier sections (e.g. Woods et al., 2009; Elshandidy and Shrives, 2016; Linsley and Shrives, 
2005; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004) there is also evidence that the quality of corporate disclosure 
is driven by the decision choices and internal processes under which these disclosures are 
established (Amel-Zadeh et al., 2019). The process within the firm for obtaining reliable and 
accurate information regarding risk events that may have disclosure implications is said to be vital 
and could have a harmful impact on the company itself (Bryce et al., 2019). Therefore, it is worth 
noting that firms do have an incentive to disclose risk related information of a certain level of 
quality.  
However, little is known on how firms manage these disclosures to understand the decision choices 
associated with such disclosure judgements. Although studies on the determinants of the quality 
and quantity of corporate disclosure are essential to regulators, users and management in 
improving the adequacy of corporate disclosure and awareness, it is also important to examine and 




Mayorga (2013) managing corporate disclosures have become messier over the years and more 
difficult, as capital markets become more complex and the corresponding risk of not providing 
adequate disclosures to investors increase. In large companies, especially, where there are a large 
number of operations, the monitoring of potential disclosure events is a challenging task (Mayorga, 
2013). Therefore, exploring the management of corporate disclosure provides insights on the locus 
of corporate disclosure responsibility, the activities involved and the range of issues considered 
when making disclosure decisions (Gibbins et al., 1990; Eccles and Mavrinac, 1995). Prior studies 
on the management of corporate disclosures have mainly adopted and developed the framework 
initiated by Gibbins et al. (1990) (Mayorga, 2013; Holland and Stoner,1996; Adams, 1997; 
Trabelsi et al., 2004). Gibbins et al. (1990) explored the management of voluntary corporate 
financial disclosures in Canada and developed a Disclosure Management Framework based on a 
grounded theory approach established from interview data. Gibbins et al. (1990) found that, the 
attributes of disclosure which are managed include the information content itself; the timing and 
interpretation of information; the structures for disclosure either from within the organisation or 
from external demands; external mediators; disclosure issues; opportunities and norms. The 
Disclosure Management Framework therefore comprised of five main components used to 
describe the process of how disclosures are managed and establish relations between components. 
The main components include the disclosure outputs as a dependent variable and; disclosure 
position, disclosure antecedents, disclosure issues, disclosure norms and opportunities as 
independent variables.  
The findings from Gibbins et al. (1990) further suggest that,  
‘When management perceives an issue as having disclosure implications, any disclosure 
norms and opportunities are (or maybe) identified. Disclosure position, mediators, and 
structures may influence the identification of these issues and their perceptions of 
associated norms and opportunities. Disclosure outputs are then generated as a function 
of these perceived norms and opportunities (disclosure issues) as well as any existing 
structures. p 128). 
Using a similar grounded theory approach Holland and Stoner (1996) developed the Disclosure 
Management Framework to predict and explain how companies’ and managers’ disclosure 
experiences become the basis for the way disclosure is managed within the context of Price 
Sensitive Information (PSI). Holland and Stoner (1996) found that, corporate communication 




understanding a firm’s corporate communication policies and how they are managed and 
controlled promotes the image of the company in its capital markets and ensures that the image 
and reality of the firm is well understood (Holland and Stoner, 1996).  
Holland and Stoner (1996) find that;  
“When management perceived an event as having PSI, disclosure implications and 
opportunities were identified. The identification of events and issues, and the classification 
of such issues as either PSI or non-PSI were found to be influenced by disclosure 
responsiveness (disclosure structures); external mediators; market and professional 
norms”. 
Trabelsi et al. (2004) adopted the Disclosure Management Framework by examining the 
management of financial information disclosed in a firm’s Traditional Financial Reporting (TFR) 
as compared with the website disclosures (Internet Financial Reporting (IFR)) focusing primarily 
on the firm’s disclosure position with respect the TFR and IFR. Where the firm’s ritualistic 
disclosure position is defined as a firm’s propensity to adhere to prescribed norms for the 
measurement and the disclosure of financial information and the firm’s opportunistic disclosure 
position is the propensity of the firm to seek firm specific advantage in the disclosure of financial 
information (Gibbins et al., 1990). Their findings show that, a firm’s ritualistic or opportunistic 
behaviour under IFR is not different from its behaviour under TFR. However, they find a wide 
variability in both forms of financial reporting in their use of financial reporting content, format 
and technology. Trabelsi et al. (2004) suggests that both the ritualistic and opportunistic disclosure 
position can coexist within the same firm but on average the firm could either be geared more 
towards either a ritualistic position or an opportunistic position. This is in line with findings from 
Gibbins et al. (1990) that; these two dimensions may exist within the same firm for different kinds 
of disclosure. In the context of voluntary disclosure in the public annual reports of New-Zealand 
based life insurance companies, Adams (1997, P.730) find that the process by which managers in 
New Zealand -based life insurance companies, irrespective of their organisational characteristics, 
routinely seek and generally follow, the advice of auditors (external mediators) on disclosure 
matters is considered to be a common ritualistic behaviour.    
Prior studies on the management of disclosure have also adapted the Disclosure Management 
Framework in other disclosure contexts such as continuous disclosure and have identified specific 




2013). Other studies on the management of corporate disclosures include Eccles and Mavrinac 
(1995), Meidell and Kaarbøe (2017), Giovannoni et al, (2016).                               
In line with the importance of firm communication policies in promoting the image of a firm in its 
capital market, Eccles and Mavrinac (1995) examined how US companies communicate to the 
capital markets by exploring the perceptions of corporate managers, financial analysts and 
portfolio managers on disclosure regulations using interview data. Eccles and Mavrinac (1995) 
found that, all companies may improve their disclosure process and communication by developing 
a strategy for corporate information disclosure, upgrading the role of investor relations staff, and 
voluntarily reporting non-financial information to increase analysts understanding, management 
credibility, investors’ practice, and share value. Prior studies have also examined the roles and 
responsibilities involved in the management of corporate disclosures (Meidell and Kaarbøe, 2017; 
Giovannoni et al., 2016). Meidell and Kaarbøe (2017) examined how the Enterprise Risk 
Management (ERM) function influences the use of risk information in decision making processes 
overtime, drawing on Carlie (2004), to better understand how middle line managers within the risk 
function can influence decision making in the organisation by managing knowledge across 
boundaries. In their case study, Meidell and Kaarbøe (2017) find that when new risk information 
(risk technologies) are introduced the risk knowledge had to cross progressively more complex 
boundaries: an informative-processing boundary, which looks at the sufficiency of sharing and 
assessing knowledge between people in the ERM function; an interpretive boundary, where there 
is a process of translating the risk knowledge to establish a common meaning; and the political 
boundary, where the different interests among the various actors generate costs for the actors 
involved. In the process of managing the risk knowledge at each boundary, Meidell and Kaarbøe 
(2017) find that, the ERM function followed one of three phases of managing knowledge (i.e. 
transferring knowledge, translating knowledge and transforming knowledge) and each of these 
phases involved a particular boundary. Thus, when managing knowledge across the different 
boundaries within the organisation, the risk function could be involved in either the transferring of 
knowledge, the translation of knowledge and the transformation of the knowledge which in turn 
influences their use of risk information.  
Giovannoni et al. (2016) highlights that, the roles and responsibilities involved in the management 
of corporate disclosures and the control of the main information flows within the reporting systems 
of an organisation influences the prevailing assumptions about risk management within the 
organisation. They find that the mobilisation of risk experts’ technical and managerial capabilities 




within strategic decision making, thus enabling the process of risk management change. These 
studies suggest that firms do have established controls and strategies for the management of risk 
reporting. Considering the influence risk disclosures have on market participants in making 
economic decisions that may influence the firm’s performance, prior studies suggest that firms 
may have different incentives when deciding what to disclose and what not to disclose. Therefore, 
exploring the decision choices taken by management when making disclosure decisions provides 
an understanding on the different disclosure responsibilities, the structures in place and the range 
of issues considered when making disclosure decisions. Nevertheless, there is a gap on the degree 
to which corporate disclosures are managed to incorporate user expectations (Holland and Stoner, 
1996; Mayorga 2013). This is important because evidence suggests that, managing the disclosure 
of material information reflects the nature of learning how to identify user expectations and how 
to meet the different audiences’ disclosure expectations (Holland and Stoner, 1996; Mayorga 
2013). This study follows the example of Mayorga (2013) to some extent by adapting the 
Disclosure Management Framework in combination with the Gaps Model which serves as a lens 
for exploring users’ expectations for disclosure, managements understanding on these expectations 
and the degree to which management then translates their understandings of these into disclosure 
quality specifications.  
 Summary 
The purpose of chapter 2 was to provide a detailed background on the development of the risk 
disclosure practice and provide an overview of the literature on risk disclosure quality. The chapter 
discusses the concept of risk, the development of the risk disclosure practice, problematising the 
risk disclosure literature, describing the elements of quality risk disclosures, user demands for risk 
information user and the importance of quality risk disclosures. This chapter then discusses the 
role of managerial discretion in the provision of risk disclosure and explores the literature on the 
management of corporate disclosures. 
The recent financial crisis and banking scandals over the years have increased management’s risk 
reporting responsibilities to include a growing need to provide confidence to stakeholders and 
reduce information asymmetry by providing accurate and informed risk disclosures. Standard 
setters and regulators have also played a key role in rules guiding the disclosure of risk related 
information in the UK banking industry. However, there still exists some form of managerial 
discretion within the process in providing disclosures around that non-financial information which 
are often very difficult to quantify and standardise as well as providing contexts and narratives 




Nonetheless, steps towards the improvement of risk disclosure quality and its usefulness stems 
from assessing users’ expectations and the willingness of corporate managers to comply with best 
accounting practice. A few studies have investigated the degree to which the corporate disclosures 
are structures and established with management as well as the roles and responsibilities involved 
in the process (Mayorga, 2013, Meidell and Kaarbøe, 2017; Giovannoni et al., 2016).  
Surprisingly and considering its complex nature, the management of risk related disclosures have 
been rarely explored. More specifically the degree to which they are managed to incorporate users’ 
expectations. The aim of this study is to contribute to this stream of literature by providing insights 
into the different roles and responsibilities associated with the production of risk disclosures and 
the decision choices involved in the first instance as well as insights on users’ expectations for risk 
disclosure quality from their understandings and management’s response to these. It is believed 
that the findings from these will improve the understanding of user perceived risk disclosure 
quality and the actions and individual roles and responsibilities carried out in the risk disclosure 
practice. 
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Chapter 3: An overview of the UK banking system, risk disclosure requirements and the 
degree of managerial discretion  
 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the banking sector in terms of its role, characteristics, risk 
management and risk reporting. The chapter also focuses on the risk disclosure requirements in 
the UK which serve as a minimum stipulated regulatory requirement for banks to report. The main 
disclosure requirements are the disclosure requirements under the IFRS (International Financial 
Reporting Standards), the Basel Accord (pillar 3), and risk reporting guidelines in the UK 
corporate governance code. However, UK banks are also expected to meet their risk disclosure 
responsibilities as stipulated in the UK Companies Act 2006 and the International Standard of 
Auditing 700 (revised). 
These requirements, however, do not provide a maximum stipulation and a number of companies 
can decide to either go above and beyond. For this reason, this section also discusses the degree of 
managerial discretion in the provision of risk disclosures. This is relevant to the current study 
because it emphasises the degree of management’ discretion in the presence of the regulations 
when providing quality risk disclosures. The study argues that the provision of quality risk 
disclosures is not solely the responsibility of the regulators and therefore management plays a vital 
role in this process. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 explains the role and characteristics of banks. 
Sequentially, section 3.3 explains the risk disclosure regulatory requirements in the UK banking 
sector as well as the degree of managerial discretion within the scope of these requirements. 











 The role and characteristics of UK banks 
The word ‘bank’ initially came from the word ‘banco’ meaning a desk or bench covered by a green 
tablecloth, that was used several hundred years ago by Florentine bankers (Hull, 2015). The nature 
of a bank is highly risky mainly because of its fundamental role in taking deposits and making 
loans to individuals and corporations. For this reason, there is a continuous need for banks to 
operate in a safe and sound way. 
Today most UK banks engage in either commercial banking, investment banking or both. 
Commercial banking involves, among other things, the deposit-taking and lending activities as 
discussed above and commercial banks in the UK are highly regulated to ensure that individuals 
and companies have confidence in the banking system (Hull, 2015, p28). Among the issues 
addressed by the regulation is the amount of capital banks are required to keep. In the UK, as 
stipulated in the prudential regulation rules, banks are required to hold sufficient capital and have 
adequate risk controls in place (Bank of England, 2017). The amount of capital required to be held 
by the regulator is determined by the bank’s risk assessment of its Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA). 
Commercial banks can be classified as retail banking or wholesale banking. Retail banks are 
mainly involved in taking relatively small deposits from private individuals or small businesses 
and making relatively small loans to other individuals and businesses. Retail banking involves 
smaller deposits and loans. In contrast, wholesale banking involves the provision of banking 
services to medium and large corporate clients, fund managers, and other financial institutions.  
Investment banking, on the other hand, is concerned with assisting companies in raising debt and 
equity financing, and providing advice on mergers and acquisitions, major corporate restructuring, 
and other corporate finance decisions (Hull, 2015, p31). Thus, investment banks facilitate the 
allocation of capital and the flow of funds between corporation and individuals. Some large UK 
banks are involved in security trading (e.g. by providing brokerage services). However, most UK 
banks are involved in commercial banking. As a result of the inbuilt risky nature in the role of the 
banking sector, risk management in banks has substantially changed over the last decade especially 
in the aftermath of the GFC and risk disclosures are especially key to understand their business 
(Abraham and Shrives, 2014). This is highly attributed to the increase in regulatory requirements 
around risk managements which has triggered a change in risk functions across the sector and 
higher standards for risk reporting (McKinsey and Company, 2015). According to Linsley (2011), 
this has resulted in calls for a more coherent and lucid risk reporting within the annual report of 




provides some brief information on the bank chosen for this study and its principal risks as 
disclosed in its annual reports.  
According to the Bank of England (2010; 2016) banks in the UK are often involved in three main 
services; payments and settlement services, intermediation between savers and borrowers and 
insurance against risk (Bank of England, 2010).  This is particularly true for commercial banks.  
In a first instance, commercial banks are involved in the provision of deposit and custody accounts, 
as well as services to support the efficient settlement of payments between households and 
companies. Secondly, banks are also intermediaries as household savings are typically pooled in 
deposit accounts, pension funds or mutual funds. They are then transformed into funding for 
households, companies or government. In the United Kingdom today, more than 300 banks and 
building societies are licensed to accept deposits (Bank of England, 2010; Bank of England, 
2019b).  According to the Bank of England (2019a), banks do not just lend money deposited by 
individual and corporations but also create deposits when making loans and therefore effectively 
increasing money supply. Thus, banks create more money in circulation and are limited to the 
amount created mainly by their assessment of the implications of any new lending on their 
solvency position and profitability. This is mainly particular for commercial banks.  
Thirdly, the central bank highlights that banks play a vital role in allowing households and 
companies insure themselves against liquidity shocks mainly through deposit accounts by 
partaking in financial activities such as securitisation, derivatives and other insurance contracts 
that facilitate the dispersion of other financial risks within the economy. For example, foreign 
exchange derivatives allow companies to protect their international revenues from fluctuations in 
foreign exchange rates; and securitisation markets package and disperse banks’ loan exposures 
(Bank of England, 2010).  
 A briefing of risk disclosure regulatory requirements in the UK banking sector and the 
degree of managerial discretion. 
In a speech made by the general manager of the Bank for International Settlements in 2001, 
Andrew Crockett posits that, for market discipline to be fully effective in ensuring financial 
stability, four pre-requisites have to be met; market participants need to have sufficient information 
to reach informed judgements; market participants need to have the ability to process the 
information correctly; market participants need to have the right incentives; and finally market 
participants need to have the right mechanisms to exercise discipline (Bank for International 




capital requirements, which is a huge part of a banks risk assessment process in the UK, and 
therefore its risk disclosures, it becomes difficult for users to process the information correctly and 
for market discipline to be implemented.  
In the aftermath of the GFC, risk reporting increasingly became an issue of particular interest to a 
wide range of user groups. Professional bodies and regulatory authorities enacted significant 
changes to risk disclosure and reporting regulation and also found a need for an improved level of 
corporate risk disclosure. This attempt was mainly to enrich the annual reports and meet risk 
information needs of investors and stakeholders in general (ICAEW, 2011; Leuz and Wysocki, 
2016). Despite efforts made by professional bodies and regulatory authorities to improve the 
quality of risk disclosure, the CFA Institute (2016) highlights that there still exists a lack of 
adequate transparency attributable to inadequate market discipline which then leads to the 
mispricing of risk and the misallocation of capital. Regulatory authorities have therefore taken 
stringent measures to ensure market discipline. The regulatory requirements for risk disclosure in 
the UK mainly include; risk disclosure requirements under the Basel pillar 3; IAS 1, IFRS 7 and 
IFRS 9; the corporate governance guidelines. However, the Basel pillar 3 risk disclosure 
requirements for financial institutions are mainly to encourage market discipline so as to reduce 
information asymmetry and help to promote comparability among banks (Bank for International 
Settlement, 2015).   
The existing regulatory framework under which UK bank risk disclosures are regulated is essential 
to consider for the purpose of this study because the regulator plays a key role in ensuring risk 
disclosure quality. It also provides insights into the degree to which the regulators are involved in 
the management of risk disclosure and the degree of managerial discretion available to managers 
in the process. The sections below describe and discuss the Basel Pillar 3 risk disclosure 
requirements and its application and development in the UK; the IFRS standards relating to risk 
disclosure; the bank’s risk disclosure responsibilities as stipulated in the UK Companies Act 2006, 
the UK Corporate Governance Code and the International Standards of Auditing. 
3.3.1 Basel, pillar 3 risk disclosure requirements 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is the primary global standard-setter for 
the prudential regulation of banks. The UK prudential regulator, however, requires UK financial 
institutions to maintain sufficient capital and have adequate risk controls in place (Bank of 
England, 2020). As part of its standards, the BCBS together with the Capital Requirements 




disclosures, as well as the need for banks to hold sufficient capital to cover its Risk-Weighted 
Assets (RWA). The amount of capital required to be held is determined by the bank’s risk 
assessment of its Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA). RWAs are used to determine the minimum 
amount of capital required by the bank based on the number of risks it is exposed to. This is aimed 
at reducing the risk of insolvency. A bank’s risk of insolvency reflects its ability to control and 
mitigate its exposure to risks. The CRD IV is a European Union (EU) legislative package that 
contains prudential rules for banks, building societies and investment firms which is made up of 
the CRD itself and the Capital Requirement Regulation (CRR). These requirements are mainly 
outlined and detailed within the Basel Capital Accord established by the BCBS and the CRD IV 
since the 1980s. The Basel Accord was established to enhance financial stability by improving the 
quality of banking supervision worldwide and to serve as a forum for regular cooperation between 
its member countries on banking supervisory matters (Bank for International Settlements, 2016). 
Over the years these requirements have evolved to address changes in economic circumstances 
and are now made up of the Basel I, II and III Accord. The BCBS initiated the Basel 1 framework 
and the CRD IV introduced the supervisory framework which reflects the Basel II and the Basel 
III (Bank for International Settlement, 2016).   
In the UK, the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA), under the authority of the Bank of England 
and the FCA require banks to comply with the guidelines and standards set out by the BCBS and 
the CRD IV which relates to their objective to ensure that UK banks hold sufficient capital to cover 
its RWA.  The BCBS in line with its capital adequacy initiatives promotes market discipline as a 
way of imposing strong incentives on banks to conduct their business in a safe, sound and efficient 
manner, including an incentive to maintain a strong capital base as a cushion against future losses 
arising from risk exposures (Bank for International Settlements, 2001). In relation to this, the Basel 
Accord pillar 3 requirements aim to promote market discipline and increase transparency through 
regulatory disclosure requirements. These requirements enable market participants to access key 
information relating to the overall adequacy of a bank’s regulatory capital and risk exposures 
(Bank for International Settlements, 2016). The section below provides a broad overview of the 
Basel accord and discusses the UK bank’s risk disclosure responsibilities under this requirement. 
This provides an understanding of banking and their related regulatory risk reporting requirements. 
As an initial initiative the Basel I Accord was established in 1988 to strengthen the stability of the 
international banking system and to remove a source of competitive inequality arising from 
differences in national capital requirements (Bank for International Settlements, 2015). Thus, the 




intention that the regulatory authorities will impose in each country at least the same capital 
standards for banks in order to facilitate competitive equality (McKnight, 2007). The term capital 
is classified by the BCBS into the Tier 1 (Core Capital) which represents the highest quality of 
capital and includes stock issues and some types of preferred stock and Tier 2 (Supplementary 
Capital) largely comprises a range of lower quality financial instruments, such as subordinated 
term debt and certain hybrid instruments (King and Tarbert, 2011). 
The Basel I requirements at the time focused mainly on bank’s credit risk exposure and called for 
a minimum capital ratio of capital to RWA to be implemented by the end of 1992. The framework 
was then refined in 1997 to address risks other than credit risks. This led to the issuance of the 
Market Risk Amendment which adds a market risk element to the calculation of the Risk 
Weighting Assets Calculation. The Market Risk Amendment was designed to incorporate a capital 
requirement for the market risks associated with the banks’ exposure to foreign exchange, traded 
debt securities, equities, commodities and options (McKnight, 2007). 
Banks, for the first time, were then allowed to use internal models, such as the Value-at-Risk 
models, as a basis for measuring their market risk capital requirements other than the standardised 
method required by the Basel Accord (Bank for International Settlements, 2015). 
Following on from Basel I the Basel committee issued a proposal for a new capital adequacy 
framework in 1999, known as the Basel II framework and is also known as the International 
Convergence of Capital Standards.  The objective here was to promote the safety and soundness 
in the banking system; to better align regulatory capital to the banks’ underlying risks and to 
encourage banks to further improve their risk management systems with particular focus on 
internationally active banks and banks of varying levels of complexity and sophistication (Bank 
for International Settlement, 2015). During the Basel II amendments, operational risk was the 
added as a third element for the calculation of RWA and three main pillars (i.e. Pillar 1, Pillar 2 
and Pillar 3) were introduced (King and Tarbert, 2011). In 2010 and following on from the Basel 
II, the Basel III was initiated in response to the 2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis to strengthen 
the regulation, supervision and risk management of banks (Bank for International Settlements, 
2017a). During this period the banking sector had entered into the financial crisis with too much 
leverage and inadequate liquidity buffers, accompanied by poor governance, poor risk 
management, and inappropriate incentive structures. The committee’s empirical analyses 
highlighted a worrying degree of variability in the calculation of risk weighted assets by banks 




At the peak of the GFC, a wide range of stakeholders, including academics, analysts and market 
participants, lost faith in banks reported risk-weighted capital ratios and the key objective of the 
revisions in the Basel III was to reduce the excessive variability of risk-weighted assets. The Basel 
III comprised a revision of the three pillars from Basel II.  
Pillar 1 comprised the minimum capital requirements sought to develop and expand the 
standardised rules of the 1988 Basel I Accord for the three major types of risk (i.e. credit risk, 
market risk and operational risk). These requirements were revisited under the Basel III to include 
a further countercyclical buffer intended to be applied when credit growth is judged to result in an 
unacceptable build-up of systematic risk. There were also revisions to the standardised approach 
for calculating credit risk, market risk, credit valuation adjustment risk and operational risk. 
The pillar 2 then comprises the PRA’s review and regulatory response, as supervisors, to the bank’s 
capital adequacy and internal assessment process as implemented in the pillar 1. The pillar 2 
provides a framework for managing the other banking risks not included in the pillar 1 (e.g. 
systematic risk, strategic risk, reputational risk and legal risk) in order to ensure that sufficient 
capital is held against these risks as well. The aim of the Pillar 2 processes was to enhance the link 
between and bank's overall risk profile, its risk management and those discussed in the pillar 1. 
The pillar 2 therefore addresses firm-wide governance and risk management, including any risk of 
off-balance sheet exposures and securitization activities, sound compensation practices, valuation 
practices, stress testing, corporate governance, and supervisory colleges.  
Pillar 2 is divided into 2 main parts. There is the Pillar 2A which requires banks to provide 
disclosures on risks to the bank that are not fully captured under the capital requirement (i.e. pillar 
1). The second is the Pillar 2B which requires banks to provide disclosures on risks to which the 
bank may become exposed over the forward-looking planning horizon (Bank of England, 2018a). 
Within the pillar 2A is the Individual Capital Guidance (ICG) which is unique to each bank and is 
driven by the bank’s Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP) and the PRA’s 
review of that ICAAP. The ICAAP within the ICG requirements require individual banks to assess 
on an ongoing basis the amounts, types, and distribution of capital that it considers adequate to 
cover the level and nature of the risks to which it is or might be exposed. These include disclosures 
on non-financial risks, such as operational risk disclosures and those that are subjective, less 
verifiable which users highlight a desire for more of, especially in relation to how these are linked 
to the numbers firms provide in their disclosure report. It is worth noting that most of the pillar 2 




does not have access to this information. Documents relating to the pillar 2 are provided to the 
regulator and the regulator has the ultimate say in deciding which level of capital as per the bank’s 
ICAAP is acceptable or not acceptable under pillar 2. 
Finally, Basel pillar 3 comprises the risk disclosure requirements and the effective use of disclosure 
as a lever to strengthen market discipline and encourage sound banking practice. These Pillar 3 
disclosures are provided to the public to facilitate market discipline. The pillar 3 requirements of 
the Basel II Accord were amended and enforced in 2016 and banks were required to publish their 
first pillar 3 report as a stand-alone document (Bank for International Settlement, 2015). 
The pillar 3 requires banks to disclose information under the pillar 1 capital requirement on their 
risk profiles, including credit risk, counterparty risk, market risk, and operational risk; and the risk 
management strategies in place to mitigate these risks so as convey to information users a clear 
understanding of the banks risk tolerance levels and all its significant risks (Bank for International 
Settlement, 2015). The revised pillar 3 disclosure requirements under the Basel III comprised a 
consolidated and enhanced framework covering disclosure on all the reforms to the new Basel 
framework. 
The Bank for International Settlements (2015), as well as the BCBS’ framework to guide for an 
effective risk data aggregation and risk reporting (Bank for International Settlements, 2013; 2017a; 
2018), sets out principles for adequate risk reporting. These principles in conjunction with the 
literature were useful in constructing the interview questions needed to undertake the study. These 
principles are explained below. 
1. Disclosure should be clear and useful 
It is expected that the risk management disclosures communicate information in a clear and concise 
manner that is understandable to the key stakeholders and communicated through an accessible 
medium. Important messages should be highlighted and easy to find. Complex issues should be 
explained in simple language with important terms defined. Related risk information should be 
presented together. Reports should include an appropriate balance between risk data, analysis and 
interpretation, and qualitative explanations.  
2. Disclosures should be comprehensive 
The risk disclosures provided should describe a bank’s main activities and all significant risk 
should be supported by relevant underlying data and information. Significant changes in risk 
exposures between reporting periods should be described, together with the appropriate response 




quantitative terms on a bank’s processes and procedures for identifying, measuring, and managing 
those risks. The level of detail of such information should be proportionate to a bank’s complexity. 
Approaches to disclosure should be sufficiently flexible to reflect how senior management and the 
board internally assess and manage risks and strategy, helping users to better understand a bank’s 
risk tolerance/appetite. 
3. Disclosures should be meaningful to users and accurate 
Disclosures should highlight a bank’s most significant current and emerging risks and how those 
risks are managed, including information that is likely to receive market attention. When 
meaningful, linkages must be provided to line items on the balance sheet or the income statement. 
Disclosures that do not add value to users’ understanding or do not communicate useful 
information should be avoided. Furthermore, information which is no longer meaningful or 
relevant to users should be removed. The risk management reports provided are expected to 
accurately and precisely convey aggregated risk data and reflect risk in an exact manner. Reports 
should be reconciled and validated. 
4. Disclosures should be consistent over time and comparable across banks 
It is also expected that the risk management disclosures should be consistent over time to enable 
key stakeholders to identify trends in a bank’s risk profile across all significant aspects of its 
business. Additions, deletions and other important changes in disclosures from previous reports, 
including those arising from a bank’s specific, regulatory or market developments, should be 
highlighted and explained. The level of detail and the format of presentations of disclosures should 
also enable key stakeholders to perform meaningful comparisons of business activities, prudential 
metrics, risks and risk management between banks and across jurisdictions.  
5. The frequency of the disclosures 
The board and senior management (or other recipients as appropriate) are expected to set the 
frequency of risk management report production and distribution. Frequency requirements should 
reflect the needs of the recipients, the nature of the risk reported, and the speed at which the risk 
can change, as well as the importance of reports in contributing to sound risk management and 
effective and efficient decision-making across the bank. The frequency of reports should be 
increased during times of stress/crisis. 
6. Distribution of reports 
Risk management reports should be distributed to the relevant parties and while ensuring 




information as a foundation for effective risk management. However, the risk information on itself 
does not guarantee that the board and top management will receive appropriate information to 
make effective decisions about risk and facilitate an effective risk management. Therefore, in order 
to manage risk effectively, it is important that the right information is presented to the appropriate 
decision-makers in a time that allows for an appropriate response (Bank for International 
Settlement, 2013). 
3.3.1.1 The degree of managerial discretion within the scope of the Basel pillar 3 risk 
disclosure requirements 
Dobler (2008) highlights that requiring a minimum level of information through regulations can 
serve as a risk management benchmark for managers and directors but cannot eliminate or 
overcome managerial discretion and incentives in risk reporting at each level of analysis. In view 
of this, this section discusses the degree to which management can apply some discretion when 
complying with the disclosure requirements and providing risk information. This is important 
because it provides a foundation for the researcher to assess the degree to which the responsibility 
for the disclosure of quality risk information lies with management. This constitutes a part of the 
current research objectives. 
Even though the Pillar 3, Basel II requirements for instance provides risk disclosure requirements 
on what risk information banks should disclose and when they are to be disclosed, the banks have 
the discretion to choose how widely the disclosure requirements should apply (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2015). For example, the Bank for international Settlements (2015, p4) 
states that,  
‘If a bank considers that the information requested in the disclosure requirements would 
not be meaningful to users, for example because the exposures and Risk Weighted Assets 
are deemed immaterial, the bank may choose not to disclose part or all of the information 
requested’. 
The Basel committee also gives banks the option to choose between two broad methodologies 
when calculating their risk-based capital requirements for credit risk and market risk. The first 
method is the standardised approach and it assigns standardised risk weights to exposures. The 
second method is the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach, which allows banks to use their own 
internal rating systems for credit risk, subject to the explicit approval of the bank’s supervisor 




Banks are also expected to supplement the quantitative information provided, within their ‘fixed’ 
and ‘flexible’ templates, with a narrative commentary to explain at least any significant changes 
between reporting periods and any other issues that management considers to be of interest to 
market participants. This is important because, the disclosure of additional quantitative and 
qualitative information provides market participants with a broader picture of a bank’s risk position 
and promote market discipline. However, the quantitative information banks choose to disclose 
must provide sufficient meaningful information to enable market participants to understand and 
analyse any figures provided. It must also be accompanied by a qualitative discussion. Any 
additional disclosure must comply with the guiding principles of the BCBS (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2015). 
3.3.2 The International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
In addition to the Basel requirements on risk and risk disclosure, banks are required to provide 
financial statements and disclosures in accordance with the IFRS. The co-existence of both 
requirements has been said to be overlapping and confusing. However, it is evident that since the 
adoption of the pillar 3 disclosure requirements, banks have increased their risk disclosures 
substantially more that when they had to comply with similar requirements under IFRS beforehand 
(Bischof et al., 2016). This section provides an overview of the IFRS and IAS (International 
Accounting Standards) as well as associated risk disclosure requirements. There is the IAS 1 which 
focuses on the presentations of financial statements. 
In line with the Basel Accord, IAS 1 requires firms to provide disclosures about their objectives, 
policies and processes for managing capital, including any related qualitative information. IAS 1 
mainly sets out the overall requirements for the preparation of a firm’s financial statements, 
including how they should be structured and the minimum requirements for their content. The aim 
is to ensure comparability both with the firm’s financial statement of previous periods and with 
the financial statements of other entities. In relation to risk disclosures specifically, IAS 1 requires 
firms to disclose information about the key assumptions concerning their future as well as other 
key sources of estimation uncertainty at the end of the reporting period that may have a significant 
risk of causing a material adjustment to the carrying amounts of the entity’s assets and liabilities 
within the financial year (Deloitte, 2020). These are to be presented within the notes section of the 
financial statements in a way that faithfully represents the effects of transactions, other events and 




IFRS 7 is the main standard associated with risk-related disclosures under the IFRS. The 
International Accounting Standards Board, which is the standard setting body for the IFRS, 
amended the IFRS 7 introduced in 2005 on financial instrument disclosures to ensure adequate 
disclosure on financial instruments. The IFRS 7 superseded the International Accounting Standard 
(IAS) 30 and replaced the IAS 32 on disclosure. Financial instruments refer to contracts that gives 
rise to either a financial asset or financial liability or equity instrument of another entity (ACCA, 
2018). Thus, how a firm account for its investment in shares, bonds and receivables (financial 
assets); trade payables and long-term loans (financial liabilities); and equity share capital (equity 
instruments) in the event of a financial contract. The accounting standard relating to the 
identification, measurement and the recognition of financial instruments is the IFRS 9.   
The objective of IFRS 7 is focused on financial instrument disclosures and is based on the notion 
that entities should provide disclosures in their financial statements that enable users to evaluate 
the significance of financial instruments for the entity’s financial position and performance.  
The disclosure requirements under the IFRS 7 is mainly divided into two main parts, the 
significance of financial instruments for a firm’s financial position and performance and the nature 
and extent of risks arising from financial instruments and how these are managed (Deloitte, 2017). 
Thus, IFRS 7 requires firms to provide disclosures on the nature and extent of risks arising from 
the use of financial instruments. The required risks include credit risks, market risks and liquidity 
risks. For each type of risk arising from financial instruments, companies are required to disclose 
their exposures to these risks, how they arise as well as their objectives, policies and processes for 
managing the risks involved (Adjei-Mensah, 2017).  
As part of the IFRS 7 requirements, companies are expected to present the disclosure in two 
categories (i.e. qualitative and quantitative). The qualitative disclosures required are presented on 
a firm’s exposure to these risks; how these risks come about; as well as management’s objectives, 
policies and processes for managing those risks. The quantitative disclosures required relate to the 
extent to which the entity is exposed to risk, such as the maximum amount of exposure, related 
valuations, and sensitivity analysis. IFRS 7 is an example of a mandatory disclosure; hence, all 
firms required to prepare their financial reports in accordance with the IFRS are required to comply 
with the IFRS 7 disclosure requirements. It is worth noting that, although the BCBS requirements 
on risk disclosure depend on the national bank regulators and supervisors, the IFRS requirements 




3.3.2.1 The degree of managerial discretion within the scope of the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
Under IFRS 7, companies may be involved in more than one financial instrument at a particular 
point in time, which may be managed under different investment strategies and differing risks.  
Much of the risk disclosures made, under IFRS 7, are based on the internal disclosures made within 
the company to key management personnel within the company, which may involve different 
investment decision choices and management approaches (PWC, 2010). For example, if a firm has 
two funds investing solely in stocks and with each fund having a different management approach, 
these would be expected to provide differing risk disclosures as both funds may involve different 
investment decisions and would face different risks (PWC, 2010). Thus, assuming that one fund’s 
management does not utilise any analysis of the investment portfolio by sector and therefore 
focuses solely on each individual investment, and the other fund’s management firstly decides how 
much of the fund’s portfolio to allocate to different industry sectors and then deciding what stocks 
within those sectors to invest in. These two management approaches, chosen at the firm’s 
discretion, would have different risks to them.  
PWC (2010) highlights that in this instance, firms may disclose only the key risks so as to provide 
a common benchmark for financial statement users when comparing risk disclosures across 
different entities. Without providing specific information of the individual fund projects and the 
management of the fund’s portfolio. Thus, some specific information may be left out of the public 
disclosures which may be of relevance to the users and more specific to the disclosing entity’s 
operations. In relation to this, IFRS 7 provides that if an entity prepares a sensitivity analysis such 
as value-at-risk for management purposes that reflects interdependencies of more than one 
component of market risk (for instance interest rate risk and foreign currency risk combined), the 
entity has the discretion to choose that analysis instead of a separate sensitivity analysis for each 
type of market risk. 
Another area with the IFRS 7 requirements where a bank may have the discretion to disclose 
information above the minimum requirement as stipulated in the requirements is that IFRS 7 
allows for disclosures to be presented in be both qualitative and quantitative forms. IFRS 7 requires 
qualitative and quantitative disclosures on the entity’s policies and procedures for accepting risk, 
in addition to those for measuring, monitoring, controlling risk and any changes in the policies and 
processes for managing and measuring risk (PWC, 2010). The qualitative information is to be 
provided on the firm’s exposures to these risks; how these risks arise; and management objectives, 




subjective and management has the discretion to decide how these should be worded and presented 
in their disclosure reports. In relation to this, Bamber and McMeeking (2010) adds that firms have 
the discretion to increase the extent of their disclosures on financial instrument related risks in the 
notes of their financial statements as an incentive to increase legitimacy for instance.  
3.3.3 The UK Companies Act 2006 and the degree of managerial discretion within the 
scope of the Companies Act. 
Section 414A and 414C requires UK companies including banks to prepare a strategic report for 
each financial year of the company (UK Companies Act, 2006). The purpose of this report is aimed 
at ensuring that the members of the company, including its investors, are informed of significant 
undertakings of the business and how the company’s directors have performed the duty in ensuring 
the success of the company. The information provided within the company’s strategic report 
includes a review of the company’s business and a description of the principal risks and 
uncertainties facing the company.  These contents are prepared in the form of both financial and 
non-financial information. As part of its non-financial statement, the company is required to 
provide a description of the company’s business relationships, products and services which are 
likely to cause adverse impacts in the risks identified as well as a description of how the company 
manages its principal risks. The purpose of the strategic report is to facilitate effective internal 
control process. “The purpose of internal control is to help companies identify, manage and 
control risks appropriately in an environment where a company’s objective, its internal 
organisation and wider markets in which it operates are continually evolving and where the risk 
it faces change over time” (LexisNexis, 2020). This is aimed at eventually safeguarding the 
shareholder’s investment and the company’s assets (LexisNexis, 2020). In the preparation of these 
strategic reports, it is worth noting that, the UK Companies Act of 2006 does not specify the extent 
to which the companies should report on their risks and this is within the company’s discretion.  
3.3.4 The UK Corporate governance code and the degree of managerial discretion within 
the scope of the Code. 
The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) sets the UK’s corporate governance code which serves as 
a guide for the effective, entrepreneurial and prudential management of a company in ensuring 
that the long-term success of the company is attained (FRC, 2016, p1). It also places emphasis on 
a firm’s relationship between companies, shareholders and stakeholders, which is very important 




The FRC defines corporate governance as “the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled” (FRC, 2016). UK companies are required to comply with the UK corporate governance 
code which sets standards on good practice in relation to board leadership and effectiveness, 
accountability and relations with shareholders. In particular, the code requires companies to 
provide a viability statement on their principal and emerging risks. 
According to the 2018 code amendments, the FRC requires banks to present information on its 
principal risks and to give a clearer and broader view of solvency, liquidity risk, risk management 
systems and viability of the company (FRC, 2018a). The directors are required to describe the 
risks they face and explain how these risks are being managed (FRC, 2018a). 
In the UK a comply and explain approach is used to allow some amount of flexibility in complying 
with the corporate governance regulation. This emphasises that the code is not a rigid set of rules 
as it consists of main principles, that are mandatory, supporting principles and provisions. The 
code, therefore, allows managers some form of discretion in the disclosure of corporate 
governance-related disclosures. The code recognises that an alternative to following a provision 
stipulated in the guidelines may be justified in particular circumstances if good governance can be 
achieved by other means.   
In relation to this, the code sets out that directors should confirm that they have carried out a robust 
assessment of the principal risks the company faces, including those that would threaten its 
business model, future performance, solvency or liquidity and how they are being managed and 
mitigated (FRC, 2018a). 
 
3.3.5 The International Standard on Auditing 
In addition to the above risk disclosure requirements, company managers are expected to meet 
their responsibilities as outlined in The International Standard of Auditing. The International 
Standard on Auditing (ISA 700 – revised) explains the responsibilities of both management and 
the auditors in the preparation of financial statements in accordance with the applicable financial 
reporting framework (IFAC, 2015). The auditor’s responsibility is to determine key audit matters 
and, having formed an opinion on the financial statements, the auditor communicates those matters 
by describing them in the auditor’s report. The ISA 701 defines key audit matters as those matters 
that, in the auditor’s professional judgement, were of most significance in the audit of the financial 




assessed risk of material misstatement or significant risks identified in accordance with ISA 315 
(revised) (IFAC, 2017).  
As part of the auditing process, management is then responsible for ensuring that their financial 
statements are free from material misstatements and that all significant risks are identified and 
controlled, including key audit matters (IFAC, 2015; FRC, 2020).  
Depending on the key audit matters and risks identified by the auditor, management or those 
charged with governance may decide to include new or enhanced disclosures in the financial 
statement or elsewhere in the annual report in light of the fact that the matter will be communicated 
in the auditor’s report. According to ISA 701, such new or enhanced disclosures, may be included 
to provide more robust information about the sensitivity of key assumptions used in accounting 
estimates or the entity’s rationale for a particular accounting practice or policy when acceptable 
alternatives exist under applicable financial reporting framework (FRC, 2020). 
In addition, the IAS 1 requires management to make a specific assessment of the entity’s ability 
to continue as a going concern (Deloitte, 2020). Management’s assessment of the entity’s ability 
to continue as a going concern involves making a judgement, at a particular point in time, about 
inherently uncertain future outcomes of events or conditions. These uncertain future events or risks 
are disclosed within the company’s annual report and may involve some amount of managerial 
discretion. The following factors are relevant to that judgement: the degree of uncertainty 
associated with the outcome of an event or condition increases significantly the further into the 
future an event or condition or the outcome occurs. And the auditor evaluates management’s 
assessment of the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern according to ISA 570 (FRC, 2016). 
 
 Summary  
This chapter discusses the role and characteristics of banks in the UK as the main context for this 
study. The chapter then provides an overview of the risk disclosure requirements in the UK and 
the degree of managerial discretion in the presence of the regulations when management decides 
what to disclose and what not to disclose. This is an area that indicates the extent to which the 
current research objectives can be explored. Despite the stringent risk disclosure requirement in 
the UK banking sector, bank managers are able to exhibit some amount of discretion when 
deciding what to disclose and what not to disclose. This, therefore, provides the scope for 
researchers to explore the processes enacted by management when making risk disclosure 





Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework 
 Introduction 
The theoretical framework chosen for this study is the Gaps Model of service quality initiated by 
Parasuraman et al. (1985) in combination with concepts from the Disclosure Management 
Framework, initiated by Gibbins et al. (1990). This chapter provides a background discussion on 
the theoretical frameworks and its application in the current study. 
Chapter 2 discusses prior literature on the quality of risk disclosure and highlights the importance 
of addressing user needs as a key antecedent in the disclosure management process. Following on 
from this, the current study draws from the reconceptualised aspects of the Gaps model of service 
quality from Zeithaml et al. (2002; 2016) to explore a set of discrepancies between users’ 
expectations on the quality of risk disclosure and their perception on the quality of the actual 
disclosures they get. The chapter also throws light on how the concept of service quality is 
conceptualised within the context of risk disclosure and its application in order to frame and 
interpret the research findings.  
The background information on the concept of service quality and the Gaps Model is provided in 
section 4.2 followed by a discussion on the link between service quality and disclosure quality and 
how the gaps model would be applied in the disclosure context. Based on the Gaps model one 
important aspect has got to do with identifying and exploring discrepancies associated with 
translating management’s perceptions of users’ expectations into service quality of which 
management’s decision choices is a big part of. However, the Gaps model provides a limited 
approach to examine management ‘internal decision-making process when translating their 
perceptions of users’ expectations into service quality or in ensuring that their perceptions of users’ 
expectations are incorporated in the actual disclosures provided. For this reason, concepts from 
the Disclosure Management Framework, initiated by Gibbins et al. (1990) are applied to discuss 
management’s decision choices. The background information on the Disclosure Management 
Framework is discussed in section 4.3 followed by a discussion of how it would be applied in the 
current study. This chapter, therefore, outlines the main features of the theories chosen for the 
purpose of this study, the reason for the researcher’s choice of theory and its application in the 
context of risk disclosure.  
The chapter is structured as follows, section 4.2 and 4.3 discusses the Gaps Model of service 




on the application of both the Gaps Model and the Disclosure Management Framework within the 
context of risk disclosure. Finally, the chapter ends with a summary in section 4.5. 
 The gaps model of service quality 
The importance of attaining quality in the provision of services drew the attention of Parasuraman 
et al. (1985) to develop the gaps model of service quality. This initiation was based on a thorough 
review of the literature on service quality, and an explorative investigation of the quality of service 
provided by four service business, using interviews. The service quality model serves as a tool for 
identifying and explaining the difference between the customer’s expectation on a service 
performance and the customer’s subjective assessment or perception of the actual service 
performance they get (Zeithaml et al., 2016). This overarching discrepancy is the customer gap 
(Parasuraman et al., 1985) or fulfilment gap (Zeithaml et al., 2002) which stems from a number 
of discrepancies or gaps associated with the provision of a service and the factors that affect the 
size of these gaps (Zeithaml et al., 2002;2016). The underlying concept is consumer expectations. 
The section below discusses this concept. 
4.2.1 Definition and substance of customer expectations 
The authors of the model also refer to service quality as the delivery of excellent service relative 
to customer expectations. Customers’ expectations are believed to be pretrial beliefs about a 
service that serves as standards or reference points against which service performance can be 
judged (Olson and Dover, 1979; Zeithaml et al., 1993). Thus, in relation to the model, quality 
service is mainly determined by customer expectations. Parasuraman et al. (1988) refer to 
expectations as the desires and wants of consumers, i.e. what they feel a service provider should 
offer rather than would offer. However, after a few criticisms from authors, the concept of 
expectations was further clarified as desired and adequate service expectations (Zeithaml et al., 
1993). According to Zeithaml et al. (1993), these two together as the expected service affect the 
perceived service. 
There has been a debate in the literature on the different views of service expectations. However, 
in these debates, a consensus exists that expectations act as standards with which customers 
subsequent experiences are compared resulting in evaluations of quality (Zeithaml et al., 1993). 
The expectation construct, therefore, has been viewed as playing a key role in customer evaluation 
of service quality (Gronroos 1982; Parasuraman et al., 1985, 1988; Brown and Swartz 1989). 
Based on the literature, Zeithaml et al. (1993) identifies and explains the different views on 




4.2.1.1 Predicted service expectations (Zeithaml et al., 1993) 
Expectations here are viewed as predictions made by customers about what is likely to happen 
during an impending transaction or exchange. Oliver (1981, p33) refer to expectations as 
consumer-defined probabilities of the occurrence of positive and negative events if the consumer 
engages in some behaviour. Other authors referred to this view as the objective calculation of 
probability or likelihood of performance (Miller, 1977) and estimates of anticipated performance 
level determined by the customer (Swan and Trawick, 1980; and Prakash, 1984).  
4.2.1.2 Desired service expectations (Zeithaml et al., 1993) 
Existing literature has referred to expectations as the “wished for” level of performance (Miller, 
1977) or desired expectations at which the customer wanted the product to perform (Swan and 
Trawick, 1980). Prakash (1984) referred to this form of expectations as normative expectations, 
i.e. how a brand should perform in order for the consumer to be completely satisfied.  
According to Parasuraman et al. (1988), expectations are viewed as ‘desires’ and ‘wants’ of 
consumers, i.e. what they feel a service provider should offer rather than would offer. These studies 
argue that customer satisfaction or dissatisfaction is more likely to be determined by how well the 
service performed fulfils the customers’ needs, wants or desires rather than how service 
performance compares to predictions made about what is likely to happen. 
4.2.1.3 Adequate service expectations (Zeithaml et al., 1993) 
Adequate service expectations refer to the lower level expectation the customer is willing to accept 
due to the fact that even though customers hope to realise their service desires, they recognise that 
this is not always possible (Zeithaml et al., 1993).  This level of expectation is similar to Miller’s 
(1977) minimum tolerable expectation, the bottom level of performance acceptable to the 
customer, as well as Woodruff et al. (1983, 1987) experience-based norms. 
Woodruff et al. (1983) augmented earlier conceptualizations by proposing that customers rely on 
standards that reflect what the focal brand should provide to meet needs and wants, but that these 
expectations are constrained by the performance customers perceive to be possible based on their 
experiences with actual brands. They called these expectations experience-based norms because 
they captured both ideal (desired) and realistic (predicted) aspects of expectations. Miller (1977) 
also proposed minimum tolerable expectations, defined as the lower level of performance 
acceptable to the customer, and deserved expectations, reflecting the customer’s subjective 




In line with Davidow and Uttal (1989), Zeithaml et al. (1993) identify some key antecedents or 
customer-related factors that could influence the expectation formation process. These are often 
formed from uncontrollable factors from the customers’ experiences and include their past 
experiences, personal needs (i.e. the states or conditions essential to the physical or psychological 
well-being of the customer), personal service philosophy (i.e. the customers underlying generic 
attitude about the meaning of service and the proper conduct of service providers, their self-
perceived service control (i.e. the degree to which customers’ themselves influence the level of 
service they receive) as well as their perceptions on the existence of service alternatives.   
4.2.2 Definition and substance of ‘Gaps’ 
The model positions the key concepts, strategies, and decisions in delivering quality service in a 
manner that begins with the customer and builds the organisation’s tasks around what is needed to 
close the gap between customer expectations and perceptions of the actual service they get.  This 
gap is referred to as the consumer gap (Parasuraman et al., 1985), or the fulfilment gap (Zeithaml 
et al., 2002). According to Zeithaml et al. (2016), this gap can be a major hurdle in attempting to 
deliver a service which consumers would perceive as being of high quality. This overarching gap 
stems from a few other gaps (i.e. the information gap, the design gap and the communication gap). 
4.2.2.1 Listening Gap (not knowing what users expect) or information gap 
To deliver superior service quality, managers must first understand how customers perceive and 
evaluate the service the company provides (Zeithaml et al., 2002). The listening gap, according to 
Zeithaml et al. (2016), refers to the difference between the customers’ expectations in terms of 
service provided by a firm and management’s perception of what the customer expects, also known 
as the knowledge gap (Hoffman and Bateson, 2011). Thus, for management to incorporate 
customer expectations adequately, it is important for management to ensure that the gap between 
customer expectations of a service and management’s perception of what customers expect is 
small. Exploring this gap is important because, when management, with the authority and 
responsibility for setting priorities, does not fully understand customer expectations, they may 
trigger a chain of bad decisions and suboptimal resource allocations which result in perceptions of 
poor service quality (Zeithaml et al., 2016; p94). 
4.2.2.2 Service design Gap (not selecting the right service designs) 
Even though the accurate perceptions of user expectations are necessary, they are not enough to 
implement and deliver quality disclosures (Zeithaml et al., 2016). This leads to examining the 




between management’s perception of what customers expect and the establishment of service 
designs by management to reflect these perceptions. Thus, its focus is on discrepancies identified 
when translating management’s perceptions of customers’ expectations into service quality 
specifications that the firm’s employees can understand and execute. Service designs or standards 
refer to the decision choices made by management regarding how the service is presented. The 
initial design of a service should be informed by the company’s knowledge about features desired 
by users from the information gap or listening gap (Zeithaml et al., 2002, p369). Zeithaml et al. 
(2016) argue that one factor that may increase or decrease the size of this gap is the possibility that 
management wishes to meet user expectations but feels hampered by the existence of insufficient 
methods of measuring quality.   
4.2.2.3 Communication gap (Not matching performances to promises) 
The communication gap, according to Zeithaml et al. (2016), refers to the difference between 
actual quality of the services made by the company and the service the firm promises it will deliver 
through its external communications. Promises here refers to the standards against which 
customers assess service quality (Zeithaml et al., 2016).  
4.2.2.4 Consumer or Fulfilment gap 
This gap represents the overall discrepancy between customers’ expectations and experiences or 
their subjective assessment of the actual service delivered. This size of this gap depends on the 
size of the other four gaps.   In effect, the size and direction of the consumer gap may influence 
the quality of the service delivery which reflects the customer’s unfulfilled desires. This Gap has 
two distinct forms (Zeithaml et al. 2002) including: 
1. One form of the fulfilment gap occurs because of inflated marketing promises made by 
firms that do not accurately reflect the reality of the service design and operation, e.g. 
marketing promises a “money-back guarantee”, when in fact, the service lacks the back-
end infrastructure to receive and process complaints from dissatisfied customers. This is a 
consequence of the communication gap.  
2. The other form of the fulfilment gap is the frustration that users might experience even in 
the absence of external promises. Shortfall such as, in the case of web site service, 
customers inability to complete an e-purchase transaction also are manifestations of the 
fulfilment gap in that they reflect unfulfilled customer desires (Zeithaml et al., 2002, p370). 
This kind of customer frustrations are not as a result of exaggerated external promises but 




failure to fully incorporate customers’ desires. This type of fulfilment gap stems from the 
cumulative effect of the information and design gaps, just as the fulfilment gap triggered 
by inflated promises is the consequence of the communication gap. 
Figure 1 below shows the service quality gaps within the framework initiated by Parasuraman et 
al. (1985). The model comprises Gap 5 (i.e. consumer or fulfilment gap) as a function of Gap 1 
(i.e. a listening gap of information), Gap 2 (i.e. design gap), Gap 3 (i.e. performance gap), and Gap 
4 (i.e. Communication gap) (Parasuraman et al., 1985). The top half of figure 1 below is influenced 
by the customer. This represents the consumer or the fulfilment gap, which is the difference 
between the customers’ expectations of the service and their perceptions of the actual service they 
get.   The arrows show the relationships between the concepts. The figure also illustrates that the 
customers’ expectations for a particular service is influenced by their individual personal needs, 
their past experiences and any word of mouth communications received from the provider. The 
customers expected service then influences their perceptions of the actual service they get.  
The bottom half of figure 1 below is influenced by the provider of the service. It represents the 
provider’s efforts to listen and obtain information on what the customers expect and the degree to 
which their perceptions of what the customer expects are translated and incorporated within the 
provider’s process of designing and delivering the service.  
 
Drawing on Zeithaml et al. (2002), this study focuses on the Fulfilment Gap as a function of the 
information gap, design gap, and the communication gap. The reasons underlying this and the 
application of the model within the context of risk disclosure is discussed in section 4.2.4. Figure 
1 also shows that Parasuraman et al. (1985) identifies word of mouth, personal needs, and past 
experience as the antecedents for consumers expectations. Zeithaml et al. (1993) further developed 
the Gaps Model by specifying three different types of service expectations as discussed in section 
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4.2.3 Developments and criticisms of the Gaps Model of service quality 
After the publication of the first studies by Parasuraman et al. (185; 1988;1991 and 1993) on 
service quality a growing number of scholars have debated on the theoretical underpinnings of the 
model, as well as its constructs.  
4.2.3.1 Comparing expectations and perceptions as two distinct entities 
The model is based on the comparison between customer expectations and perceptions and refers 
to them as two distinct entities, which it refers to as the customer gap (Parasuraman et al. (1985) 
or fulfilment gap (Zeithaml et al., 2002). The size of this gap then affects the other remaining gaps 
in the model.  Parasuraman et al. (1988) outlined a scale named SERVQUAL to measure the 
possible gaps. The scale consists of 44 questions based on five components (i.e. reliability, 
responsiveness, assurance, empathy and tangibles). These characteristics serve as a criterion for 
evaluating customer expectations and perceptions for service quality. 
The first 22-item group of survey questions customer expectations whereas the second 22 item 
group of survey questions deals with customer perceptions of the service consumption. Customers 
are then asked to express an evaluation for each item ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree). This scale has been extensively used in marketing research in different contexts 
and service categories to measure the service quality gaps in measuring service quality. However, 
some authors cast doubts on the analysis of expectations and perceptions as two different entities, 
thus preferring a unified approach perception as a result of the cognitive process of the customer. 
Cronin and Taylor (1992) developed the SERVPERF scale based on the belief that the comparison 
between the perceptions and expectations occurs automatically in the customer’s mind (Carman, 
1990; Cronin and Taylor, 1992;1994; Brown et al., 1993; Teas, 1993; Grönroos, 2007). Brown et 
al. (1993) argue that a double measurement is worthless as in the majority of cases expectations 
exceed actual perceptions. With regards to the predominance of perceptions, Parasuraman et al. 
(2004) reaffirmed their position and confirmed that the comparison between expectations and 
perceptions of performance allows to make a long-term assessment and to gain more information. 
Thus, analysing expectations provides an opportunity to measure these expectations against future 
performances. Zeithaml et al. (2002) further suggest an avenue for research on the Gaps Model 
and in measuring service quality which is the use of in-depth interviews to yield evidence of these 
gaps as well as ways in which successful companies have closed them. However, a study on this 




4.2.3.2 Competition, expectation and perceptions 
Existing literature highlights that, market relations are fundamental for the development of 
expectations and perception, as well as for the identification of service quality standards and the 
firm’s actual performance (Erickson and Johansson, 1985; Martin, 1986; Zeithaml, 1988; Brucks 
et al., 2000). According to critics, (Mauri, 2013), competition was not contemplated in the original 
Gaps Model of service quality. However, it was later introduced by the authors in the 1993 revised 
version, with a limited role of “perceived service alternatives” (Zeithaml et al., 1993). According 
to Zeithaml et al., (1993) such alternatives (i.e. perceived service alternatives) are deemed to be 
able to exert influence on the “adequate service” component of the “expected service”, but not on 
the “desired service”. In that, the customer’s knowledge of perceived service alternatives has the 
possibility to influence their adequate expectations of the service. Mauri et al. (2012) on the other 
hand find that competitors’ offers do have a significant influence on the “desired service” and their 
communication does play a major influence on customers’ perceptions (Mauri et al., 2012). 
4.2.3.3 Minor role of communication 
In the Gaps Model and in relation to external and internal communication, it is assumed that the 
firm is to be in charge of communication flows (firm-controlled information). However, this does 
not include other possible sources of information which the customer may have access to. These 
additional sources, which are not considered by the model, can make their contribution to service 
quality expectation development and affect directly quality perceptions and the level of customer 
satisfaction accordingly (Mauri et al., 2012). 
4.2.4 The motivation behind the use of the Gaps Model of service quality 
There are a number of social theories that could have been drawn upon to examine the phenomena 
and it is therefore important to justify the particular theory chosen for the purpose of this study. At 
the start of developing this thesis, a range of theories were considered in relation to the research 
objective. A theory that would enable the researcher to examine users’ needs for risk related 
disclosure quality and explore management’s decision-making process in providing risk 
disclosures and incorporating these user needs in the process. A few of these theories summarised 
below all have the potential of achieving aspects of the research, however, the Gaps Model of 
service quality is especially suited to dealing with questions that examine how customers assess 
the quality and consider the factors that contribute to determine quality in its various connotations, 
quality expected by customers, quality offered by firms and the potential causes for a gap between 
what users expect and the quality offered by firms. (Mauri, 2013). Thus, the model conceptualises 




according to a sequence which starts from the customer, identifies necessary actions for the firm 
to plan and offer a service and go back to the customer in the hub of the model: the comparison 
between expectations and perceptions. 
Actor-Network Theory (ANT) is another theory that could have been used to achieve aspects of 
the current research objective. However, there are a number of reasons for preferring the Gaps 
Model of Service quality to that of the Actor-Network theory. First, ANT assumes an equivalence 
between human and non-human actors (e.g. technology, discourse). This conflicts with the desire 
for this study to focus on the human actors themselves and their interpretations of a phenomena in 
much detail. According to Greenhalgh and Stones (2010), ANT takes the attention away from the 
actors themselves and focuses on a researcher interpretation at the expense of any account which 
the participants might have given. In choosing the Gaps Model of service quality, the researcher 
focuses more on participants’ views on the phenomena, therefore giving participants a voice from 
the perspective of both the user and the preparer.  
The strong structuration theory is another theory that could have contributed to achieving aspects 
of the current research objective. Even though the strong structuration theory focuses attention on 
both internal actors and external actors, it concentrates on the relationship between the agent or 
actor and structure where actions of agents rely on structure and structure relies on the action 
undertaken by the agent. This concept is termed as the “duality of structure” (Giddens, 1984).  
Structure defined by Giddens (1984) as a process, not a product or steady-state (e.g. an accounting 
process).  
Archer (1995) argued that in the duality of structure and agency, both concepts collapse together 
to the extent that they are inseparable and there is little scope to explore the boundaries of such 
structures. Even though this theory is useful for explaining the features of an agent’s role/ agents 
in relation to a structure, the boundary issues allow for very little scope to explore the relationship 
between internal structures established and the outcomes of these structures (Stones, 2005, p56). 
The Gaps Model provides a scope for exploring users’ expectations on risk disclosure quality 
provided by management as well as management’s perceptions, understanding and response to 
these perceptions. Thus, the model provides a guideline for exploring the outcomes of risk 
disclosure as perceived by users.   
Other theories like institutional theory (Aldelrehim et al., 2017), stakeholder theory, and the 
legitimacy theory (Rimmel and Jonall, 2013) were considered by the researcher. However, 




expectations on the quality of risk disclosure and management’s response to these expectations. 
Therefore, this study argues that the Gaps Model of service quality would be a better theory in 
providing a lens for its research objectives and taking a different perspective in relation to the 
concept of user - expectations (desired and adequate expectations), making a useful contribution. 
4.2.5 Adaptation and application of the gaps model of service quality in this study 
This section discusses how the researcher adapts and extends the service quality Gap Model in the 
context of risk disclosure and aims to explain the basis of applying this model. The study adapts 
the Gaps Model in order to explain its concepts and strategies within the context of risk disclosure 
and reporting. The key concepts of the model explained above subsections of 3.2 are 
reconceptualised within the context of risk disclosure. For this reason and for the purpose of this 
study the concept of a service will be reconceptualised as disclosure and customers as users of 
disclosure information throughout the rest of the study. These would be used interchangeably.  
Zeithaml et al. (2016) identifies different kinds of services, including services directed at people’s 
bodies, services directed at people’s tangible possessions, services directed at people’s minds and 
services directed at people’s intangible possessions. The one form of service that relates to This 
study is the service directed at peoples’ minds.  The services directed at peoples’ minds include 
services such as education, the arts, professional advice, news and information. Such services may 
include consulting, training, maintenance, and other services that may result in a final tangible 
report (e.g. a disclosure report) (Zeithaml et al., 2016). Drawing on Zeithaml et al. (2016) the 
disclosure of risk information to different user groups through different mediums such as a 
statutory report can be classified as a kind of service.  
According to a recent definition given by one of the authors of the model (Zeithaml et al., 2016; 
p6),  
“services refer to all economic activities whose output is not a physical product or 
construction, is generally consumed at the time it is produced and provides added value in 
forms (such as convenience, amusement, timeliness, comfort or health) that are essentially 
intangible concerns of its purchaser”. 
As risk disclosures are mainly geared towards communicating the firm’s performance and risk 
position to its stakeholders in an attempt to support informed economic decisions, the information 
provided can be considered as a service rendered by the management of the firm to its stakeholders. 
In view of this, the current study draws on concepts from the Gaps Model to explain a set of 




of the disclosures they actually get. As discussed in 3.2.2, this overarching discrepancy or gap 
reflects the customers unfulfilled desires and has two distinct forms. The form of the fulfilment 
gap applied here is the one that excludes the communication gap. Once again, the communication 
gap refers to the difference between actual quality of the services made by the company and the 
service the firm promises it will deliver through its external communications. However, since with 
risk disclosures companies do not make external promises with regards to their risk disclosures, 
the second form of the fulfilment gap would be applied which occurs as a result of some 
frustrations users might experience even in the absence of external promises. According to 
Zeithaml et al.  (2002), this form is often due to deficiencies in the design and operations of the 
service in terms of their failure to fully incorporate customers’ desires and expectations. This type 
of fulfilment gap therefore stems from the cumulative effect of the information and design gaps 
(Zeithaml et al., 2002). Drawing on Zeithaml et al. (2002), the study, therefore, focuses on 
adapting and developing the concepts that underlie this form of the fulfilment gap within the 
context of risk disclosure. In order to achieve this objective, the study identifies and discusses the 
desired and adequate expectations of user participants and the degree to which these are 
incorporated when management provides risk disclosures. The intangible concerns for users of 
risk disclosure information on its presentation, transparency and the quality of the information 
provided by management is an area of interest and worth exploring as it provides insights on the 
understanding of user-perceived risk disclosure quality. 
The study also attempts to identify some key antecedents or customer-related factors that could 
influence the expectation formation process (i.e. adequate or desired expectations) in the analysis 
(Zeithaml et al., 1993). These are often formed from uncontrollable factors from the customers’ 
experiences and include their past experiences, personal needs (i.e. the states or conditions 
essential to the physical or psychological well-being of the customer), personal service philosophy 
(i.e. the customers underlying generic attitude about the meaning of service and the proper conduct 
of service providers, their self-perceived service control (i.e. the degree to which customers’ 
themselves influence the level of service they receive) as well as their perceptions on the existence 
of service alternatives.  
4.2.5.1 Listening or information gap  
The listening gap, according to Zeithaml et al. (2016), refers to the difference between the 
customers’ expectations in terms of service provided by a firm and management’s perception or 
understanding of what the customer expects, also known as the knowledge gap (Hoffman and 




or view the users’ expectations. For the purpose of this study, the listening gap has been redefined 
as the difference between the users’ expectations of risk disclosures provided by the firm and 
management’s perception of what the user expects. In order for management to incorporate user-
disclosure expectations adequately in the management process, it is important for management to 
ensure that the gap between user expectation of risk disclosures and management perception of 
what users expect is small. Exploring this gap is relevant because what managers, responsible for 
guiding risk reporting, believe to be an ideal risk disclosure for its target market might be 
incomplete and inaccurate because of insufficient or incorrect information and understanding 
about the risk disclosure features desired by users (Zeithaml et al., 2002, p368). In relation to the 
Gaps Model what users feel management should disclosure, in the context of disclosure, is referred 
to as desired expectations. However, even though these expectations are key to users, users may 
recognise that their expectations may not always be achieved or be possible. Therefore, a minimum 
tolerable expectation is identified for this in the literature as adequate expectation (Zeithaml et al., 
1993). In relation to this, the researcher intends to analyse the findings by identifying both the 
desired expectations and adequate expectations for quality risk disclosure. Users’ expectations 
would be categorised as either desired or adequate expectations based on their responses in relation 
to their level of tolerance on a particular quality of risk disclosure. 
4.2.5.2 Design gap 
The service design gap is the difference between management’s perception of what customers 
expect and the establishment of service designs by management to reflect these perceptions. The 
service design gap has been redefined as the difference between management’s perception of what 
users expect and the establishment of disclosure designs by management to reflect these 
perceptions. Disclosure designs, therefore, refer to the decision choices made by management 
regarding how the disclosures are presented. This gap presents the researcher with the opportunity 
to identify and explore discrepancies associated with translating management’s perceptions of 
users’ expectations into disclosure quality specifications, either from within or outside the firm, 
that the bank’s employees can understand and execute.  
It is worth noting that the extant literature on the Gaps Model have used the SERVQUAL 7-point 
Likert scale as a measure of the possible gaps. In applying the scale, customers are often asked to 
express an evaluation for each item on the scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree). Even though applying the SERVQUAL in measuring service quality is useful in identifying 
the degree of some service quality determinants in a particular service category, it is however 




service quality also allows little scope for exploring customer identified service quality 
determinants as well as the extent and potential causes of the gaps. In response to this, and a call 
from Zeithaml et al. (2002) This study uses in-depth interviews to provide evidence of these 
service quality gaps as well as the ways in which management or service providers have responded 
to them. 
 The Disclosure Management Framework initiated by Gibbins et al. (1990) 
Section 3.2 above provides a detailed overview of the Gaps Model of service quality and how the 
researcher reconceptualises risk disclosure as a service within the constructs of the Gaps Model. 
Even though the Design Gap construct as discussed earlier can be useful in identifying users’ 
expectations for quality disclosures and management’s response to users’ expectations, the model 
does not provide a clear approach to examine management’s decision choices. The model does not 
provide a clear approach for examining the internal decision -making process undertaken by 
management in translating their perceptions of users’ expectations or the degree to which their 
perceptions of users’ expectations are incorporated in the actual disclosures provided. For this 
reason, concepts from the Disclosure Management Framework would be adapted to provide an 
explanation on how internal decision -making process is undertaken by management in translating 
their perceptions of users’ expectations into disclosure quality specifications and the degree to 
which user expectations are incorporated in the process. This section, therefore, introduces the 
Disclosure Management Framework initiated by Gibbins et al. (1990) and discusses it in more 
detail. 
Gibbins et al. (1990) explored the management of corporate financial disclosures in Canada and 
developed a disclosure management framework using a grounded theory qualitative approach. The 
Disclosure Management Framework offers an understanding of financial disclosure as a managed 
phenomenon, using different perspectives (i.e. institutional theory and resource-based theory) to 
propose and develop a theory about managing financial disclosure, and the motivations, events, 
processes, structures and people behind the financial disclosures made by organizations (Gibbins 
et al.,1992). According to Gibbins et al. (1990) the process of corporate disclosure is essential to 
the relevance of the disclosure itself and defines the disclosure process as all activities and 
procedures, the individuals or groups involved, the alternatives considered, the timing and 
sequence of events, as well as the thread and connections among people and events. Thus, the 
disclosure process involves producing disclosure outputs in response to external and internal 




In order to examine the management of corporate financial disclosures, Gibbins et al. (1990) 
identified key components to describe the process of how disclosures are managed and to identify 
relations between these components. These components formed the basis of the framework they 
developed and are shown in figure 2 below. The main components of the disclosure framework 
developed by Gibbins et al. (1990) include the disclosure outputs as a dependent variable and 
disclosure position, disclosure antecedents, disclosure issues, disclosure norms and opportunities 
as independent variables. 
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Figure 2 highlights the components of the disclosure management framework and the relations 
between the different components. The findings from Gibbins et al., (1990), as shown in figure 2 
above, suggests that;  
‘When management perceives an issue as having disclosure implications, any disclosure 
norms and opportunities are (or may be) identified. Disclosure position, mediators, and 
structures may influence the identification of these issues and their perceptions of 
associated norms and opportunities. Disclosure outputs are then generated as a function 
of these perceived norms and opportunities (disclosure issues) as well as any existing 
structures. p 128). 
4.3.1 Disclosure position 
The disclosure position is defined as a relatively stable preference for the way disclosure is 
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managers in a particular firm. This position determines an average response to disclosure issues 
under normal circumstances for a given firm (Gibbins et al., 1990). Gibbins et al. (1990) identified 
two dimensions to a firm’s disclosure position. These dimensions include ritualism and 
opportunism. Gibbins et al. (1990) highlights that these may exist within the same firm for 
different kinds of disclosure. Gibbins et al. (1990) also highlight that the emergence of the firm’s 
disclosure position along the two dimensions reflects that various internal and external factors 
which they term as disclosure antecedents. Studies that have adopted the Disclosure Management 
Framework add that the way disclosure is managed is based on the companies and manager’s 
disclosure experiences termed as the disclosure position (Holland and Stoner, 1996). A firm’s 
disclosure position is influenced by their experiences in relation to a particular disclosure context 
and helps to shape its existing disclosure structures (Gibbins et al., 1990) or response structures 
(Holland and Stoner, 1996).  According to Trabelsi et al. (2004), these two dimensions can coexist 
in the same firm but on average, the firm could either be geared more towards either a ritualistic 
position or an opportunistic position. The two dimensions to a firm’s disclosure position are 
explained below;  
4.3.1.1 Ritualism (Ritualistic disclosure position). 
The ritualistic dimension to a firm’s disclosure position has been defined as a firms’ propensity to 
adhere to prescribed norms for the measurement and the disclosure of financial information 
(Gibbins et al., 1990). Norms are defined by Gibbins et al. (1990) as the formal and informal rules, 
procedures, and standards believed by the firms’ managers to apply to a particular disclosure issue. 
A firm that behaves in a ritualistic manner is said to exhibit a largely passive, adherence to 
perceived disclosure norms and does so using routinized, often repetitive, bureaucratized 
procedures (Gibbins et al., 1990). In this instance, even though the disclosure will employ 
processes that are well known and standardised, these processes arise from external disclosure 
regulations such as mandated accounting standards or securities regulations. Gibbins et al. (1990) 
highlight that the processes established by firms that exhibit a ritualistic behaviour are firms that 
have long-lasting internal patterns such as a corporate history of routines and bureaucratic 
behaviours and not necessarily the external patterns such as compliance with regulations, standards 







4.3.1.2 Opportunism (Opportunistic disclosure position) 
In contrast to ritualism, the opportunistic dimension of a firm’s disclosure position is the propensity 
to seek firm-specific advantage in the disclosure of financial information (Gibbins et al., 1990). 
Thus, opportunism if generally compatible with both the internal conditions of the firm such as 
incentives for individual managers. Opportunism is also a managerial predisposition to behave in 
a particular way, but through active stances in which disclosures are seen as opportunities to reap 
specific benefits by managing the disclosure process (Gibbins et al., 1990). This behavioural 
pattern involves the active participation or commitment of management in the disclosure process. 
4.3.2 Disclosure Antecedents 
Gibbins et al. (1990) highlighted that the emergence of the firm’s disclosure position along the 
two dimensions reflects various internal and external factors which they term as disclosure 
antecedents. Thus, a firm’s disclosure position is understandable in terms of a set of internal and 
external antecedent conditions. Mayorga (2013) adds that disclosure antecedents differ across 
disclosure settings and they, therefore, change in relation to the present structures, norms and 
readiness to disclose information. Table 4-1 below highlights the disclosure antecedents identified 
by prior studies who have adopted the disclosure management framework. 
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Table 4-1 Disclosure Antecedents 
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Gibbins et al., (1990) identified, legislation, the existence of inter-organisational networks and 
industry norms as external antecedents, and corporate history, corporate strategy and internal 
policies as internal antecedents in relation to corporate financial disclosures. These external 
antecedents are then classified into both institutional and market factors (e.g. Mayorga, 2013 and 
Trabelsi et al., 2004). The institutional factors include, legislation, standards, regulation, inter-
organisational networks, and industry norms. The market factors include equity market access, 
product market and competition. Holland and Stoner (1996) developed the framework established 




external antecedents, and corporate strategy, financial policy and corporate defence against take 
over as internal antecedents in relation to Price Sensitive Information. Holland and Stoner (1996) 
did not find evidence on the effect of corporate history, internal policies, and industry norms but 
did confirm the importance of corporate strategy, legislation and the existence of inter-
organisational networks as identified by Gibbins et al., (1990). Mayorga (2013) and Johansen and 
Plenborg (2018) on the other hand, found evidence for corporate history and corporate politics. 
Mayorga (2013) then identified, traditions, companies disclosure experience, management 
disclosure experience and management’s and board’s preferences as key internal antecedents, and 
ownership structure, perceived regulatory and litigation risks, analyst expectations, the 
involvement of third parties, exposure to environmental uncertainties and complexities, media 
sensitivity of issue to the local community and the effect on company’s competitive position as 
external antecedents in relation to continuous disclosures. 
4.3.3 Disclosure issues 
Disclosure issues are issues perceived by the firm’s managers during their decision-making 
process. Gibbins et al. (1990) establish that disclosure processes are activated by specific 
disclosure issues according to the disclosure norms and disclosure opportunities perceived by 
managers. Thus, the disclosure issues reflect the norms and opportunities or disclosure antecedents 
(Gibbins et al., 1990) perceived by managers. Disclosure norms are defined partially by externally 
driven disclosure issues-imposed disclosure requirements, regulations and partially by factors 
internal to the firm. The disclosure opportunities are perceptual, not objective, they are the benefits 
and costs believed by the firm’s managers to be associated with specific disclosure issues. 
These disclosure issues could either be internally or externally driven. Disclosure issues 
highlighted in prior studies include assessing materiality, contingent claims, contract settlements, 
line of business reporting, loss of provisions, inventory valuation, managing expectations and 
determining timing and content.  
4.3.3.1 Relation between disclosure position and disclosure issues 
An interaction between opportunities and the firm’s disclosure position is likely, given that 
opportunities are more likely to be perceived given an opportunistic disclosure position (Gibbins 
et al., 1990). In turn, an opportunistic disclosure position is more likely to be adopted where many 
issues with opportunities are present. The relation between disclosure position and disclosure issue 
applies also to ritualistic disclosure. Ritualism is activated by the perceived presence of existing 




behaviour. Therefore, depending on the disclosure issue in question it could either increase a firm’s 
propensity to a ritualistic behaviour or its propensity to an opportunistic behaviour. 
4.3.4 Disclosure structures 
Gibbins et al. (1990) identified two main disclosure structures. These include the internal 
disclosure structure and the external disclosure structure. Internal structures are the extent to which 
the responsibility for managing disclosures is assigned to particular positions within a company 
and is guided by clearly understood policies and procedures (Gibbins et al., 1990). A similar study 
that developed the framework established by Gibbins et al. (1990) defined internal structures as 
the formulation of general communication policies and the setting up of responsive systems or 
structures of tailored decision processes, investor relations functions and internal controls (e.g. 
setting up a new network of analysts, financial institutions and press controls) (Holland and Stoner, 
1996). The paper by Holland and Stoner (1996), will be discussed later in this section. External 
structures refer to the extent to which external demands for information are channelled through 
organisations that claim to represent third party interests (Gibbins et al., 1990). There would be 
more disclosure activity for a given issue or given disclosure position if structures are in place 
(Gibbins et al., 1990).  
In line with Mayorga et al. (2013) and Holland and Stoner (1996) this study focused only on the 
internal structures as it is believed external structures are less relevant to understanding how most 
companies manage continuous disclosure. Both studies also provide alternative ways of viewing 
these structures. Mayorga et al. (2013) is also another paper that developed the framework 
established by Gibbins et al. (1990). The paper by Mayorga (2013) would be discussed later in 
this section. The disclosure position, which could be opportunistic or ritualistic, helps shape the 
disclosure structures and both the disclosure position and structures are influenced by internal and 
external antecedents.  
Table 4-2 below highlights the disclosure structures identified by prior studies who have adopted 
the disclosure management framework. 
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Table 4-2 Disclosure Structures 
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General communication policy and the setting up of an 
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Setting up an investor relations function with the 
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The network of contacts with financial institutions and 
analysts as a boundary response system (Corporate 
to market communication structures). 
Setting up a network of analysts, financial institutions 
and press contacts 
Responsible parties for 
managing CD. 
 
Use of various processes and 
training practices. 
 
Use of different types of 
professional and external 
guidance. 
 
Employment of external 
mediators. 
Individuals or groups involved 
in the CD process. 
 
 
 Application of the theoretical frameworks within the context of risk disclosure 
In an attempt to examine user-perceived expectations for disclosure quality, the Gaps Model is 
adapted as a lens to explain the difference between users’ expectations (i.e. expected disclosure 
quality) and their perceptions (i.e. perceived disclosure quality) on the actual disclosures delivered. 
This overarching discrepancy has been referred to as the fulfilment gap (Zeithaml et al., 2002) and 
it is expressed as a function of the information gap, design gap and the communication gap as 
discussed in section 4.2.2. For the purpose of this study, the concept of a service will be 
reconceptualised as disclosure and customers as users of disclosure information. These would be 
used interchangeably throughout the rest of the study. 
Drawing from Zeithaml et al. (2002), the components of the fulfilment gap or user gap 
(Parasuraman et al., 1985; Zeithaml et al., 2016) of service quality have been adapted apart from 
the communications gap which refers to the difference between the actual quality of the service 
provided and the service the firm promises to deliver through its external communications. Due to 
the complex and forward-looking nature of risk disclosures, firms do not make promises regarding 




to the possible outcome of a service through advertisements and signed contracts, disclosure of 
risk-related information as a service directed at people minds is not subject to external promises.  
The listening gap provides guidelines for identifying users’ expectations for service quality, 
managements understanding of these expectations, and explaining any discrepancies between the 
two. The disclosure design gap then looks at the discrepancies between management’s 
understanding of what users expect and the establishment of disclosure designs to reflect their 
understanding of what users expect. It is believed that the disclosure design gap is very much 
dependent on the disclosure designs established by management. The disclosure design gap 
provides the researcher with an opportunity to identify any issues embedded within the firm’s 
disclosure designs which may cause management not to meet the users’ expectations. These issues 
are identified as potential causes for a disclosure design gap. 
Even though the authors refer to disclosure designs as the decision choices made by management 
in relation to how the disclosures should be presented, the Gaps Model of service quality does not 
provide a clear approach to examine these decision choices and the internal decision - making 
process undertaken by management when translating their perceptions of users’ expectations into 
service quality specifications. For this reason, this study adopts concepts from the Disclosure 
Management Framework to provide an explanation on how the internal decision - making process 
is undertaken by management when translating their perceptions of users’ expectations into 
disclosure quality specifications. Thus, elaborating on the concept of disclosure designs by 
applying the concept of disclosure position and disclosure structure to the Gaps Model as shown 
in figure 3 below.  
The Disclosure Management Framework provides a lens for understanding the broad drivers and 
components of corporate public disclosure behaviour. However, this framework has been criticised 
for its oversimplified nature as it does not allow for an adequate change in dynamic interaction 
between the components of its model and fails to indicate some of the reciprocity of the 
relationships (Holland and Stonner, 1996; Holland, 2005). In the light of this limitation, this study 
focuses on users’ expectations, which has been identified in prior studies as a key disclosure 
antecedent within a firm’s disclosure management process, in an attempt to provide a detailed 
explanation on the degree to which user expectations are managed and incorporated within the 
disclosure management process (Mayorga, 2013). This allows for an examination of the interaction 
between user expectations for quality risk disclosures and the disclosure structures established to 




In order to examine this, the Gaps Model of service quality is adapted, in the first instance, to 
explore user expectations for risk disclosure and management’s understanding of these 
expectations. This is aimed at identifying any potential causes for a discrepancy between what user 
expectations are for risk disclosure quality and management’s understandings of these 
expectations. Secondly, the study sheds light on the construction of disclosure designs and the 
degree to which the bank’s risk disclosures are constructed to incorporate user expectations by 
taking both the Gaps Model of service quality and the Disclosure Management Framework.  The 
researcher, therefore, develops a disclosure management framework that provides a lens for 
explaining the degree to which user expectations are incorporated a firm’s disclosure management 
process. 
Findings from the Disclosure Management Framework initiated by Gibbins et al. (1990, p128) 
suggests that;  
“When management perceives an issue as having disclosure implications, any disclosure 
norms and opportunities are (or may be) identified. Disclosure position, mediators, and 
structures may influence the identification of these issues and their perceptions of 
associated norms and opportunities. Disclosure outputs are then generated as a function 
of these perceived norms and opportunities (disclosure issues) as well as any existing 
structures”. 
Drawing on the Disclosure Management Framework, the main disclosure issue (Gibbins et al., 
1990) explored within this study is the issue associated with the idea of incorporating user 
expectations within management’s disclosure process. It is worth noting that, disclosure issues 
have an important influence on the firm’s disclosure output as they activate the use of specific 
activities and procedures as well as influences the individuals and groups involved in the disclosure 
process. Drawing from Gibbins et al. (1990, p132) the current study contributes to the Gaps Model 
by identifying disclosure issues at both the listening and design stage of the disclosure process. It 
identifies these disclosure issues as potential causes for a listening and a design gap as shown in 
figure 3 below. It is worth noting that these may depend highly on management’s knowledge about 
the features and the specifications for quality risk disclosures as desired by users (Zeithaml et al., 
2002, p369).   
This study believes that, when deciding whether to disclose or not to disclose information that may 
reflect these expectations, management may identify some disclosure norms and opportunities 




(i.e. disclosure position) (Gibbins et al., 1990). The firm’s disclosure position may then influence 
the degree to which disclosure norms and opportunities are adapted in the disclosure decision-
making process. These norms and opportunities determine how the firm’s disclosures structures 
are developed. The final output of disclosure and its delivery are then generated as a function of 
these perceived norms and opportunities as well as management’s response to the existing 
disclosure issues.  
Figure 3 below schematically shows the new framework developed from concepts and constructs 
employed from both the Gaps Model of Service Quality and the Disclosure Management 
Framework. The study argues that in order to provide quality risk disclosures, any discrepancy 
between what the user expects and their perception of the actual disclosures provided should be 
kept to a minimal.  This overarching discrepancy is termed as the fulfilment gap. As discussed 
earlier, the extent of a fulfilment gap (i.e. Gap 5) depends on users’ expectations for risk disclosure 
and the degree to which management’s understandings of what the information user expects aligns 
with what the user actually expects. Any misalignment here is said to lead to a listening gap (i.e. 
Gap 1). 
In the first instance, the current study identifies user expectations for quality risk disclosure as 
either desired or adequate depending on the user’s response. The researcher identified a quality of 
risk disclosure as an adequate expectation if the user participant makes sense as to why a particular 
quality might not be met and therefore has a minimum or lower tolerable expectation. If user 
participants do not make sense as to why a particular quality might not be met, then the researcher 
assumes no minimum level of tolerance in relation to that particular disclosure quality specification 
and it is identified as a desired expectation. Following on from that, this study discusses 
management’s understanding on these user expectations and any potential causes for a listening 
gap. 
Secondly, the Gaps Model argues that the extent of a fulfilment gap also depends on the disclosure 
designs established by management and the degree to which the users’ expectations for risk 
disclosures are reflected in disclosure designs established. Once management establishes an 
understanding of what the user expects, any issues embedded within the firm’s disclosure designs 
which may cause management not to meet these expectations are identified as potential causes for 
a disclosure design gap. This is where the study starts to combine the Gaps Model and the 
Disclosure Management Framework to provide an in-depth explanation on the disclosure designs 




may be incorporated. The study approaches this by exploring the process of risk disclosure design 
and reporting in light of users’ expectations and other disclosure antecedents that may be identified 
by participants. Even though the fundamental disclosure antecedent explored in this study is the 
user expectations, the study intends to acknowledge any other disclosure antecedents identified by 
the participants throughout the study. The study also explores the bank’s disclosure position by 
identifying areas where the bank may exhibit either a ritualistic or opportunistic behaviour. It is 
worth noting at this point that the researcher’s objective is to use the newly developed model as a 
lens to give some structure to my findings. This will enable the researcher to make sense of the 
finding through the newly developed model. 
Figure 3 below illustrates the fulfilment gap (Gap 5) of service quality as a function of both the 
listening gap (Gap 1) and the design gap (Gap 2). Figure 3 also illustrates the potential causes for 
either a listening gap or a design which are eventually the potential causes for a fulfilment gap. 
Figure 3 illustrates some potential causes for a listening gap (i.e. Gap 1) that may affect 
management’s understanding of the users’ expectations, which may in turn cause preparers to 
provide information based on what their preference is rather than what the user expects. These 
potential causes may activate the preparer’s use of specific activities and procedures as well as 
influence their individual decisions when deciding whether to disclose or not disclose a particular 
risk-related information. Drawing from Gibbins et al. (1990, p132) these potential causes are 
identified as disclosure issues that may have an important influence on the firm’s overall disclosure 
output. Management’s response to these disclosure issues may either reflect a propensity to either 
adhere to existing norms (ritualistic disclosure position) or a propensity to seek a firm-specific 
advantage (opportunistic disclosure position), as a result of an existing disclosure issue. This is 
illustrated in figure 3 below. Management’s preference then determines the degree to which the 
bank’s disclosure structures are shaped to respond to these disclosure issues (Gibbins et al., 1990; 
Lantto, 2013; Johansen and Plenborg, 2018). 
The researcher believes that both mandatory and voluntary disclosures can be captured by the 
New Disclosure Management Framework. Whereas, the framework may be more suitable for 
studies on voluntary disclosures, in that it allows the researcher to explore the decision choices 
of preparers when disclosing information on risks that are not standardised or regulated. It also 
allows for an exploration of disclosure decisions made around the mandated disclosures where 




In relation to mandatory disclosures, in particular, the new disclosure management framework 
helps to identify any potential causes for a listening gap or a design gap that might have come 
from the regulators’ influence in the risk disclosures process.
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Figure 3 Adapted Service Quality Model (i.e. Gap Model) within the domain of the 
Disclosure Management Framework 
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This chapter provided the theoretical frameworks employed by the current study. Prior studies 
have emphasized the importance of risk disclosure quality and the degree of managerial discretion 
in the risk disclosure process. In an attempt to contribute to existing literature and potentially 
develop a theoretical framework for the management of user expectations in the disclosure 
management process, this study combines both the Disclosure Management Framework and the 
Gaps Model of Service Quality. This was to enable a discussion on users’ perceptions and 
expectations for risk disclosure quality and the degree to which risk disclosures are managed to 
incorporate these. Both theories have been used extensively in different fields and contexts. 
Although the Disclosure Management Framework identifies users’ expectations as a key 
antecedent to the way disclosures are managed, its simplistic nature provides limited scope in 
exploring the degree to which these are incorporated in the disclosure process. The Disclosure 
management framework was therefore used in combination with the Gaps Model which serves as 
a tool for examining the discrepancy between what users expect and how they perceive the current 
disclosures. The Gaps Model assumes that the way disclosures are presented and therefore 
managed influences this overarching discrepancy. Since this was the first study to adapt the Gaps 
Model within the context of accounting, its concepts were therefore reconceptualised within the 
disclosure context. The next chapter sets out the methodological and philosophical approach 














Chapter 5: Research methodology and philosophical stance 
 Introduction 
The methodological approach a researcher adopts depends on a range of factors including the 
purpose of the research; the process of the research; and the logic and philosophical stance 
underpinning the research. This chapter discusses in detail the methodological approach chosen 
for this research and justifies the critical assumptions underpinning the research. Specifically, it 
explains why a qualitative case study approach is considered appropriate for this study. Most 
studies in the risk disclosure literature have mainly used a quantitative approach, a content analysis 
and survey (e.g. Hussainey and Barakat, 2013; Linsley et al., 2006; Woods et al., 2009; Elshandidy 
and Neri, 2015; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Ryan 2012 and Dobler 2008). These studies have 
examined the incentives and informativeness of risk-related disclosures by developing associations 
between some variable such as company size, profitability, and risk levels, as well as analysing 
risk information content usually narratives being communicated in risk disclosure reports. Prior 
research has also focused on the effects of risk reports once it is released, with little focus as to 
how disclosure choices are made within organisations, or as to how disclosure is managed. The 
overarching objective of the current research is to examine the management of risk disclosure from 
the perspective of both managers and users to reflect user expectations on the quality of risk 
disclosures and the extent to which risk disclosures are managed to meet these expectations. In 
relation to this, qualitative research approach would be most applicable in understanding users’ 
interpretations on their expectations of the risk disclosures provided by a UK listed bank and 
managers perceptions on the extent to which risk disclosures are managed to reflect these 
expectations. This method is in line with prior studies on the management of disclosures (e.g. 
Gibbins et al., 1990; Holland and Stoner, 1996; Mayorga 2013) and contributes to this stream of 
research and literature.  
 Research paradigm 
The starting point in every research design is determining the research paradigm. The research 
paradigm is the philosophical framework that guides how the research should be conducted based 
on the researcher’s philosophy and assumptions about the world and the nature of knowledge 
(Collins and Hussey, 2014, p43). The philosophical framework consists of both the researcher’s 
ontological assumptions and epistemological stance (Collins and Hussey, 2014, p49). 
According to Richie and Lewis (2003), the methodological approach a researcher adopts is 
determined by the researchers ontological and epistemological stances which explains how the 




deciding how to study the social world has always raised a number of key philosophical debates 
and issues which include both ontological and epistemological issues.  




2. Materialism - a variant of realism. 
3. Subtle realism/ critical realism - a variant of realism influenced 
by idealism. 
4. Idealism 
5. Subtle idealism – a variant acknowledging collective 
understanding 








The researchers’ beliefs about the nature of the world and what can be known about it as well as 
its reality is referred to as his/her ontological assumptions (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003, p11; Collins 
and Hussey, 2014, p47). Assumptions about ontology are concerned with what there is to know 
about the world.  
The decision as to how to study the social world has over the years raised a number of philosophical 
debates. One of the key ontological debates relates to whether there is a captive social reality and 
how the social world should be constructed (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003, p12). In general terms, there 
are three distinct ontological positions; realism, materialism and idealism. These terms, over the 
years, have been modified and grouped into six different ontological positions to aid in 
understanding the social world in less extreme terms (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003, p13). These are 
explained below; 
Realism 
An external reality exists independent of our beliefs or understanding. Under realism, a clear 
distinction exists between beliefs about the world and the way the world is. According to Ryan et 
 




al. (2002), this belief is concerned with the construction of existence in objects. Thus, reality 
subsists within objects. 
Materialism 
An external reality exists independent of our beliefs and understanding. Only the material or 
physical world is considered real. The researchers’ beliefs and mental phenomena arise from the 
material world. 
Subtle realism/ critical realism 
An external reality exists independent of the researchers’ beliefs and understanding. Reality is only 
knowable through the human mind and socially constructed meanings.  
Idealism 
No external reality exists independent of our beliefs and understanding. Reality is only knowable 
through the human mind and socially constructed meanings. Thus, reality exists within the mind 
of the subject (individuals). 
Subtle idealism 
Reality is only knowable through socially constructed meanings. Meanings are shared and there is 
a collective and objective mind.  
Relativism 
Reality is only knowable through socially constructed meanings. There is no single shared social 
reality, only a series of alternative social constructions.  
In this thesis, the researcher takes a subtle realistic approach accepting the view that, external 
reality exists independent of the researcher’s beliefs and understanding. Reality is only knowable 
through the human mind and socially constructed meanings. Thus, it looks at what there is to know 
about users’ expectations for risk disclosure based on their beliefs and understanding resulting 
from their experiences. 
In addition, and with regard to the phenomenon in this study, namely the management of risk-
related disclosures, the researcher believes that her interpretations of the data are based on 
participants views and understanding of the phenomenon. She, therefore, focuses on how users 
and providers of risk reporting perceive and interpret risk and the way risk reporting is managed, 




• How is risk defined from the perspective of both preparers and users of risk disclosures? 
• What are the users’ expectations for risk disclosure quality and how do managers learn 
about and manage their responses to users’ expectations?  
• What are the processes preparers enact for the design and development of risk disclosures 
and the challenges faced in this process? 
 
5.2.2 Epistemology 
Epistemology refers to the nature of knowledge and how knowledge can be acquired (Ritchie and 
Lewis, 2003; Ryan et al., 2002). Thus, how it may be possible to know about the world. 
Epistemology involves investigating the relationship between the researcher and that which is 
researched (Collins and Hussey, 2014, p47). 
Positivism 
The world is independent of and unaffected by the researcher. Facts and values are distinct, thus 
making it possible to conduct objective value-free inquiry and observations are the final arbiter in 
theoretical disputes (Collins and Hussey, 2014, p47). The methods of the natural sciences (e.g. 
hypothesis testing, causal explanations and modelling) are appropriate for the study of social 
phenomena because human behaviour is governed by law-like regularities (Collins and Hussey, 
2014, p47). 
Interpretivist 
Interpretivist researchers reject the belief that human knowledge is external. According to Win and 
Kofinas (2019, p344), truth and meaning do not exist in an externalised world but are created by 
people’s interactions with the world. 
In an interpretivist research, the researcher explores and understands the social world through the 
participants’ and the researcher’s own perspectives, and explanations can only be offered at the 
level of meaning rather than the cause (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003, p 23). Thus, facts and values are 
not distinct, and findings inevitably influenced by both the participant and the researcher’s 
perspective and values, thus making it impossible to conduct objective, value-free research, as the 
researcher can declare and be transparent about his or her assumptions (Collins and Hussey, 2014, 
p48). Interpretive researchers also seek to provide deeper and richer insights into the social nature 
of accounting practices, and attempts to locate these practices in their organisational, economic 




In this thesis, the researcher takes an interpretivist view on epistemology, as to how knowledge 
can be acquired about the world. The researcher believes that facts and values are not distinct, and 
findings are inevitably influenced by the researcher’s perspective and values and that the social 
world is mediated through the understandings and meanings of both her view and the participants’ 
views (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). Therefore, the methods of the natural sciences may not be 
appropriate to some extent because the social world is not governed by law-like regularities but is 
mediated through meaning and human agency; consequently, the social researcher is concerned to 
explore and understand the social world using both participants’ and the researcher’s 
understanding (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). 
Ryan et al. (2002, p145) state that the role of research is to derive universal laws or theories about 
the world. It is largely accepted, especially in the social sciences, that it may be necessary to regard 
such universal laws and theories as statistical generalisations. Thus, statements about the 
likelihood of particular occurrences in a population (Ryan et al., 2002, p145). However, statistical 
generalisations tend to simplify our understanding of empirical observations and therefore do not 
provide explanations of individual cases (Ryan et al., 2002, p145). Ryan et al. (2002, p145) 
highlight that an alternative to this would be to provide explanations on empirical observations in 
their specific context by developing theories that explain individual observations. This approach 
is usually known as the holistic approach. The holistic approach is based on the belief that social 
systems develop a characteristic wholeness or integrity and it is inappropriate to study their 
individual parts taken out of context (Ryan et al., 2002). The holistic research method seeks to 
explain and locate a particular social system in their practical context and case studies do play a 
role in this type of research, studying accounting as part of the broader organisational and social 
systems of which it is part (Ryan et al., 2002, p145).  
In relation to this, the table 5-2 below highlights the potential of case study research, by 
differentiating these between the positivists and the interpretivist research approaches. This study 
adopts an interpretive case study research epistemological approach.  
 98 
Table 5-2 Differences in case study research 
Type of Research Positivist Interpretivist 
View of the world External and objective Social Construction 
Types of study Exploratory Explanatory 
Nature of explanation Deductive Pattern 
Nature of generalisation Statistical Theoretical 
Role of theory Hypothesis generation Understanding 
Nature of accounting Economic decision making Object of study 
 
Reference: Ryan et al. (2002, p146) 
 
5.2.2.1 View of the world 
Interpretivist researchers believe that social systems are socially constructed and, as such, can be 
changed by human actions and the activities of individuals located within a specific social context. 
Thus, the purpose of an interpretivist researcher is to develop a theoretical framework that is 
capable of explaining the holistic quality of observed social systems and the practices of human 
actors. 
The positivist researcher, on the other hand, seeks to identify relationships between variables in a 
world that is seen to be objective and external to the researcher. In positivist research, case studies 
are inevitably exploratory, as the core of this form of research programme entails the empirical 
testing of hypothesis. 
 
5.2.2.2 Pattern versus deductive modes of explanation 
For interpretivist researchers, the relations between the various parts of a particular social system 
being studied and the system’s own relationship with the larger system of which it is part (that is, 
its context) serves to provide some explanations of the social system. 
This type of explanation is what Kaplan (1964) termed the “pattern model of explanation”. With 
the pattern model of explanation, the researcher seeks to identify a pattern in the case and uses 
theories to explain the observed relations. Where existing theories do not provide convincing 
explanations, then new theories may have to be developed or existing theories modified (Ryan et 




According to Ryan et al. (2002, p147), the traditional scientific mode of explanation in the social 
sciences, especially in economics and accounting, relies on a process of deduction where a 
particular occurrence or a relation is explained by deducing it from one or more general laws. This 
approach is mainly used by positivist researchers.  
Ryan et al. (2002, p147) posit that, although the deductive model of explanation provides 
predictions of occurrences at the empirical level, based on more abstract general laws or theories, 
it does not provide explanations of those occurrences. This is because statistical generalisations do 
not explain, they only indicate the statistical regularities that may or may not apply in specific 
cases (Ryan et al., 2002, p148).  
5.2.2.3 Generalising from case studies 
The purpose of the positivist researcher is to determine the extent of particular occurrences in a 
given population and this in comparison to an interpretivist research causes the interpretive 
researcher to apologise that the size of their sample creates difficulties in generalising their 
findings (Ryan et al., 2002, p148).  
In research, the researcher usually selects a sample from a population and attempts to draw 
inferences. From that perspective, Ryan et al. (2002, p151) highlight that a case study is a small 
sample from which it is difficult to make a statistical generalisation about the population from 
which it was selected.  
Statistical generalisations are therefore problematic in interpretivist research, where the findings 
of a case study are inherently context-specific. However, the objective of such research is to 
develop theoretically informed understandings that provide explanations of the observed 
phenomena. In relation to this, Yin (1984, p39) supports the view that researchers should not be 
concerned with producing statistical generalisations, but should rather be concerned with 
theoretical generalisation. Theoretical generalisation attempts to generalise theories so that they 
explain the observations that have been made, whereas, statistical generalisation is concerned with 
statements about statistical occurrences in a particular population. 
In this case, the researcher comes to the case with knowledge of existing theories, and these will 
assist in the pattern modelling process. In analysing the case, the researcher will then examine 
whether the observations can be explained by the existing theory and if not, the theory will have 




5.2.2.4 Role of theory 
As discussed above, the interpretivist researcher believes that reality is not independent of the 
social world. Rather, the social world is constructed and given meaning by human actors (Bryman 
and Bell, 2015). In interpretive research, especially in case study research, theory plays a central 
role as both the input and the output of the research process. Thus, the existing theory is initially 
used to make sense of case study observations, but through these observations it may be found that 
the theory needs to be refined, verified, modified or even rejected (Ryan et al., 2002, p150; Welch 
et al., 2011, p755). In doing this, the researcher adopts a deductive research approach at the early 
stages of the research by using existing theory and literature to give a richer picture of the field 
and to guide the data collection process. After which an inductive approach is used to accumulate, 
analyse and connect relationships between verified facts identified from the data in a coding 
process. There has been also an epistemological debate about the relative merits of induction and 
deduction. Induction looks for patterns and associations (theory) derived from observations of the 
world. Deduction generates propositions and hypotheses theoretically through a logically derived 
process. Although qualitative research is often viewed as a predominantly inductive paradigm, 
both deduction and induction are involved at different stages of the qualitative research process 
(Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). 
Using a qualitative case study approach, this study employs this interpretivist approach to research 
and uses the chosen theoretical framework as a lens to guide the construction of the interview 
question in the first instance. This enables the researcher to make sense of the field, questioning 
the theories and combining them into one that explains and provides insights into the research 
objectives much better than any one of them can produce on their own.  
In line with Alvesson and Sandberg (2011), the current study uses problematization as a 
methodology to construct gaps underlying existing literature and theory, starting with specific 
metatheoretical position (i.e. epistemological and ontological stance) (Tsoukas and Knudsen, 
2004). Based on this, the researcher uses this methodological approach to challenge existing 
theoretical assumptions in order to construct novel research questions in an attempt to lead to the 
development of a more influential theory. Abbott (2004, p87) states that: 
The problematization methodology supports a more reflective scholarly attitude in the 
sense that it encourages the researcher not only to use his or her own favourite theoretical 




combining them into far more complex forms of questioning than any one of them can 
produce alone.  
The researcher believes that adopting such an approach would present an opportunity to explore, 
in a reflective manner, new ways of thinking about organisations (Daft and Lewin, 2008; 
Alversson and Sandberg, 2014). 
 
 Research methodological approach 
5.3.1 Qualitative research approach 
According to Denzin and Lincoln (2000, p3), “qualitative research is a situated activity that locates 
the observer in the world consisting of a set of interpretive, material practices that makes the world 
visible”. These practices turn the world into a series of representations including field notes, 
interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings and memos to the self. Qualitative research 
gives the researcher the opportunity to study people in order to understand and interpret their social 
reality (Bryman, 1988, p8).  
Qualitative research is directed at providing an in-depth and interpreted understanding of the social 
world of research participants by learning about their experiences, perspectives and histories for 
rich, in-depth and extensive data. (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003, p3). This method allows for a close 
contact between the researcher and the research participants, which are interactive and 
developmental and allow for emergent issues to be explored in detail (Richie and Lewis, 2003, 
p3). Boeije (2010, p11) states that, “The purpose of qualitative research is to describe and 
understand a social phenomenon in terms of the meaning people bring to them.” Therefore, the 
qualitative researcher is able to describe an issue or a phenomenon in their own words and as such 
this method is appropriate for addressing research questions that require explanations to a social 
phenomenon and their context (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003, p7; and Boeije, 2010, p11).  
However, qualitative research has its limitations just as any other research method. In qualitative 
research, it is difficult to generalize because the data are based on local, particularistic data. 
Another weakness is that different qualitative researchers might provide very different 
interpretations of the phenomena studied. This is because qualitative research is often subjective 
and interpretive in nature. Nonetheless, qualitative data can provide a useful complement to 
quantitative data and are very useful when the research purpose if exploratory and descriptive 




The qualitative research would be appropriate for this study, as the quantitative approach does not 
recognise the perceptions and experiences of respondents (Langdridge, 2004, p21). This research 
approach will also provide rich insights into examining the management of risk reporting and the 
different user expectation and how these are incorporated in risk reporting practices.  
According to Ritchie and Lewis (2003, p1), there is no single, accepted way of doing qualitative 
research. Thus, how researchers carry it out depends on a range of factors including their beliefs 
about the nature of the social world and what there is to know about the social world (ontology), 
the nature of knowledge and how it can be acquired (epistemology). According to Oppenheim 
(2005), the different techniques for generating and collecting data under the qualitative approach 
to research include; questionnaires, interviews, observation, case studies and focus groups. This 
study intends to employ a qualitative case study approach, in the form of semi-structured 
interviews and documentary evidence. 
5.3.2 Case studies and justification for selected qualitative research approach 
According to Yin (1984, p23), a case study is an empirical inquiry which investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in-depth within its real-life context. A case study often involves data 
collection through sources such as documentary evidence, interview data, direct observation and 
participant observation (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2010, p109; and Smith, 2003, p136).  
According Ryan et al. (2002, p142) case studies usually refer to a single unit of analysis (e.g. an 
individual, a group, a company, an organisation, an event, a problem or an anomaly), but it could 
also be a more aggregated unit of analysis (Burawoy, 2009). Fiss (2009) highlights that, the 
potential advantage of a single case study is often seen in the detailed description and analysis of 
the case where the researcher gains a deeper understanding of how and why things happen. Thus, 
single case studies strengthen the possibility of context-related rich descriptions. 
Case studies offer the researcher the opportunity to understanding the nature of accounting in 
practice; both in terms of the techniques, procedures, and systems used, as well as the way in which 
these are used (Ryan et al., 2002, p142). The use of case studies in accounting can be linked to 
considering accounting as social and organisational practices rather than transactions and 
techniques (Ryan et al., 2002, p142). 
The objectives of the current study are in line with the case study research design by Stake (1995, 
2000, 2005), which is based on constructivist assumptions to explore the social construction of 
reality and meaning (Schwandt, 1994, p 125). This is in line with the philosophical approach 




beliefs and understanding. Reality is only knowable through the human mind and socially 
constructed meanings. 
Ryan et al. (2002, p143) identifies five different types of case studies in accounting: 1) descriptive 
case studies; 2) illustrative case studies; 3) experimental case studies; 4) exploratory case studies; 
and 5) explanatory case studies.  
5.3.2.1 Exploratory case studies 
This type of case study allows the researcher to look for patterns and ideas to develop the reasons 
for particular accounting practices and to generate hypothesis about the reasons for particular 
accounting practices rather than to test a hypothesis (Ryan et al., 2002, p144; and Collins and 
Hussey, 2014, p4). Collins and Hussey (2014, p4), states that an exploratory research is conducted 
into a research problem or issue when there are very few or no earlier studies to which we can 
refer for information about the issue or problem. This type of research assesses which existing 
theories and concepts can be applied to the problem and whether new ones should be developed 
and rarely provides conclusive answers to research problems or issues but gives guidance on what 
future research should be conducted (Collins and Hussey, 2014, p4). In exploratory research, the 
focus is on gaining insights and familiarity with the subject area and generating a set of hypotheses 
for more rigorous investigation at a later date (Collins and Hussey, 2014, p4).  
5.3.2.2 Descriptive case studies 
Descriptive case studies are used to describe accounting systems, techniques and procedures used 
in practice (Ryan et al., 2002, p143). Collins and Hussey (2014, p4) posit that descriptive research 
is usually used to identify and obtain information on the characteristics of a particular problem or 
issue. Unlike exploratory research, descriptive research goes further to examine the problem by 
ascertaining and describing the characteristics of the pertinent issues (Collins and Hussey, 2014, 
p4). 
5.3.2.3 Illustrative case studies 
Illustrative case studies are used to illustrate new and possibly innovative practices developed by 
particular companies and illustrating what has been done and achieved in practice (Ryan et al., 
2002, p143).  
5.3.2.4 Experimental case studies 
Experimental case studies are used to develop new accounting procedures and techniques that are 
intended to help accounting practitioners, usually developed from existing theoretical perspectives 




5.3.2.5 Explanatory case studies 
Explanatory case study focuses on a specific case and explains the reasons for a particular 
accounting practice. With this type of case study, the theory is used to understand and explain the 
specific case, rather than to produce generalisations. In the case where the theory/theories do not 
provide such explanations, it will be necessary to modify the existing theory or develop a new 
theory (Ryan et al., 2002, p144). 
The current study intends to employ an explorative case study approach, in the form of semi-
structured interviews and a documental analysis to study the management of risk disclosures in a 
UK listed bank and the relationship between different elements of risk disclosure. According to 
Collins and Hussey (2014, p 133), interviews are a method for collecting data in which selected 
participants are asked questions to find out what they do, think, or feel. Under an interpretivist 
paradigm, which is the paradigm adopted in this study, interviews are concerned with exploring 
data on the understandings, opinions, attitudes, and feelings of those interviewed (Arksey and 
Knight, 1999, p2). 
Ghauri and Gronhaug (2010, p126) identifies three types of interviews: a) structured interviews; 
b) semi-structured interviews; and c) unstructured interviews. Structured interviews are usually in 
a standard format with an emphasis on; fixed response categories; systematic sampling and some 
statistical methods (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2010, p126). With unstructured interviews, on the other 
hand, the interviewer gives lead questions and the respondents are given almost full liberty to 
discuss reactions, opinions, and behaviour on a particular issue (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2010, 
p126). According to Collins and Hussey (2014, p133), unstructured interviews are usually in the 
form of asking questions that are not prepared beforehand but tend to evolve during the course of 
the interview.   
Ghauri and Gronhaug (2010, p133) and Sekaran (2003, p225) points out that semi-structured 
interviews differ from unstructured interviews, in the sense that the topics and issues to be covered, 
sample sizes, people to be interviewed and questions to be asked have been determined 
beforehand. With semi-structured interviews, the researcher prepares some questions to encourage 
the interviewees to talk about the main topics of interest and develops other questions during the 
course of the interview (Collins and Hussey, 2014, p133). In order to gain in-depth and rich data, 
this study intends to use a qualitative case study approach, in the form of semi-structured 




The current study uses a single case study approach, where a single company is explored in detail 
in an attempt to gain a deeper understanding of how and why things happen (Ryan et al., 2002, 
p142). This approach is particularly important for this study because by investigating a 
phenomenon around a particular case, it allows the researcher to identify key constructs of the 
phenomena which would guide the development of the new framework questioning. The 
framework, once developed, could then be applied and tested in a multiple case study.   
5.3.3 Limitations of the use of case studies 
One problem with case studies is the difficulty in drawing boundaries around the subject matter of 
the case. According to Ryan et al. (2002, p159), the interpretive perspective emphasises the 
importance of locating accounting practices within the context of the wider organisational, 
economic and social systems of which they are a part of. But the issue here has to do with how far 
the researcher has to expand the case in studying interrelations with other and broader systems. 
Case study researchers, therefore, place limits on the subject matter or area of study so as to permit 
a detailed study of the area and allow other researchers to extend the work into other areas. 
Secondly, another weakness of case study stems from the nature of the social reality which is being 
researched. Unlike natural systems, social systems cannot be understood independently of human 
beings, and the researcher cannot be regarded as a neutral independent observer. The researcher 
interprets the social reality, and this emphasises the problem of researcher bias. According to Ryan 
et al. (2002, p159), it may be possible to reduce such bias in the collection and assessment of 
evidence by using a team of researchers with different backgrounds 
Thirdly, the ethical issues of the researcher’s relationship with his or her subjects is another 
weakness in case study research. In most cases, access may only be secured if confidentiality is 
assured. In addition, subjects may be much more open in their dealings with the researcher if they 
are confident that the information disclosed will be treated in confidence. This raises particular 
problems in writing case reports. For instance, it may be necessary to disguise the identity of the 
organisation studied in order to obtain detailed confidential information. Furthermore, in a study 
of the relationship between members of an organisation, it may be necessary to guarantee the 
confidentiality of information received within the organisation.  
Maintaining such confidence within an organisation may prevent the researcher from checking the 
validity of evidence through feedback to the subjects. Other means of checking must then be found, 
for example, observing the subject’s actions, examining documentations and appropriate 




 Data collection and analysis  
This study combines empirical evidence from the data collected with theoretical explanations from 
both the service quality model initiated by Parasuraman et al. (1985) and reconceptualised by 
Zeithaml et al. (1993; 2002;2016), as well as the Disclosure Management Framework initiated by 
Gibbins et al. (1990) to provide a new understanding of how risk disclosures are managed to 
incorporate user expectations in the case of a UK listed bank.  
Despite the growing interest for risk disclosure in the accounting literature on the importance of 
risk disclosures to different risk disclosure audiences (e.g. Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley 
and Shrives, 2006; Moumen et al. 2015; Al-hadi et al., 2016 and Scannella and Polizzi, 2017), the 
extant studies have neglected the perspectives of preparers in the management of risk disclosures.  
The semi-structured interviews were used as the main tool for data collection. Whilst there have 
been studies on the management of disclosure in relation to price-sensitive information and 
corporate disclosures, there is a gap on the management of corporate disclosures to incorporate 
user expectations (Holland and Stoner, 1996; Mayorga 2013). Research on this area is important 
because even though prior studies on the management of disclosure do not examine user 
expectations, their findings show that managing the disclosure of material information reflects the 
nature of learning how to identify user expectations and how to meet the different audience 
disclosure expectations (Holland and Stoner, 1996; Mayorga 2013). Thus, the management of 
user-expectations plays an important role in the management of corporate disclosures. 
In an attempt to address this gap, the current study seeks to explore the process for managing risk 
disclosures and the challenges faced by management in the process. It also aims to investigate user 
expectations for risk disclosure quality, management’s response to these and the degree to which 
these are incorporated into the risk disclosure management process. The users chosen for this study 
includes mainly equity research financial analysts who follow the case bank, UK bank regulators 
and fund managers from institutional investment companies of the case bank. Data collected from 
risk information users such as credit analysts, lenders and auditors would have provided insights 
into the research objectives for this thesis. However, the participants who responded to the 
researchers call to participate in this study were sell-side equity research analysts, fund managers 
from institutional investors and the regulators. For this reason, the study focused on these three 
risk information user groups. 
Financial analysts were chosen because their main activities as analysts relate to conducting 




more detailed understanding of the company’s value creation process, strategy and business model 
(Nielson, 2008). Equity research analysts are also responsible for assessing the motives and merits, 
as well as providing coverage, for security offerings (Cox and de Goeij, 2020). It is believed that 
security offerings are characterised by asymmetric information between management and its 
investors whose informationally disadvantaged position may compromise their ability to assess 
the credibility of an offering (Cox and de Goeij, 2020). Prior research argues that as financial 
analysts, their assessment of the bank’s risk through its disclosures is economically important in 
influencing the investor’s perception on the bank’s risk profile (Hope et al., 2016). 
Institutional investors were also chosen because they are often interested in the disclosures in order 
to improve their understanding of the company’s risk profile and increasing their ability to 
anticipate and access the company’s future economic performance. Regulators also play a vital 
role and are key influencers in the provision of risk disclosures and are responsible for establishing 
regulatory requirements on these to facilitate financial strength and to pressurise and encourage 
companies to provide adequate risk disclosures. In relation to this, it is therefore believed that 
discussions with these agents on their experience on risk disclosures will provide detailed insights 
into an understanding of their expectations and perceptions on the risk disclosures provided by the 
bank. Table 5-3 below shows a list of interviews, roles of participants, length of interview and type 






























Actor Category Role Reference Type of interview Length of Interview 
Bank in focus Head of risk reporting, governance 
and delivery (line 2 management). 
HoRGRD Face-to-face 103 mins 
 Director of risk and investments 
(Line 1 management). 
RD Face-to-face  51 mins 
 Audit committee member and risk 
committee. 
ACM Face-to-face   43 mins 
 Director, risk assurance and internal 
audit (Line 2 management). 
DRA Face-to-face  58 mins 
Regulator Member of the prudential 
regulation committee 
R1 Face-to-face   56 mins 
 Regulator for accounting 
disclosures at the PRA. 
R2 Telephone  51 mins 
 Financial data specialist at the PRA R3 Face-to-face  52 mins 
 Senior risk specialist, capital 
management at the PRA 
R4 Telephone  46 mins 
 Project Director of the Financial 
Reporting Lab at the FRC 
R5 Face-to-face 58 mins 
 Lab Director of the Financial 
Reporting Lab at the FRC 
R6 Telephone 50 mins 
 Director of Financial Reporting 
Policy, member of the IFRS 
interpretations committee 
R7 Telephone 42 mins 
 Director of financial reporting R8 Telephone 58 mins 
Financial analyst Equity research analyst  EA1 Face-to-face 40 mins 
 Equity research analyst EA2 Face-to-face 32 mins 
 Equity research analyst EA3 Telephone 52 mins 
 Audit analytic EA4 Telephone 37 mins 
 Equity research analyst EA5 Face-to-face 45 mins 
 Managing director and equity 
research analyst  
EA6 & EA7 Face-to-face 75 mins 
Fund Manager Investment Director, Fixed Income FM1 Face-to-face 45 mins 
 Head of Financial Research, Credit FM2 Face-to-face 59 mins 
 Global Banks and Financials 
Analyst 
FM3 Face-to-face 62 mins 




5.4.1 Data collection 
The case study approach chosen for this research focuses on a single UK listed bank (Bank A), in 
the FTSE 250, and the establishment of their risk disclosures within their annual report and pillar 
3 disclosures.  In the sample selection process, the researcher started with a detailed record of all 
the UK banks listed in the FTSE 100 and 250 as at September 2018. This comprised a sample of 
about ten banks. The study then included users of the risk disclosures provided by Bank A, 
including financial analysts, fund managers, auditors and regulators. However, the researchers got 
responses mainly from equity research analysts, fund managers of the institutional investors of 
Bank A, and the regulators. The financial analyst reports produced on the case bank (Bank A) were 
used to obtain the contact details of equity research analysts who follow Bank A. These reports 
were obtained from the Thompson one database. The names of the bank’s key institutional 
investors were obtained through an online search in the investor relations section of Bank A’s 
website. The contact details of fund managers within the institutional investment banks that had 
investments in Bank A were then obtained from their company’s website. They were then 
contacted through email, LinkedIn and letters. 
The regulator participants were also selected from the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) and 
the Financial Reporting Council (FRC). However, a few other participants were chosen from the 
IFRS Interpretations Committee and a member of the European Financial Reporting Advisory 
Group (EFRAG). These bodies were considered because of their active role in providing some 
guidelines and standards on the risk reporting practice in the UK. The names and contact details 
of the regulators were obtained from the website of the PRA and LinkedIn. They were then 
contacted through email, LinkedIn and letters. 
All user participants who participated in this study had an interest in the risk reports provided by 
the bank in focus one way or another. This was the primary criterion for selecting participants. Of 
these, seven regulators, seven equity research analysts and four fund managers from two of the 
bank’s main institutional investors found the study interesting and decided to partake in it. 
All the corporate managers who participated in the study had an active involvement in the risk 
disclosure process. In selecting preparer participants, emails and letters were sent to all the listed 
UK banks within the sample. However, a response was received from one bank and the researcher 
was connected to the bank’s Head of risk reporting, governance and delivery. Other participants 
such as the Member of the Audit Committee, the risk director and the director of risk assurance of 




of their unique role in the corporate reporting process and in ensuring that the corporate disclosures 
provided are true and free from any material misstatements. However, all attempts failed after a 
number of messages and follow up messages were sent to external auditors, and it was very 
difficult to get external auditors to agree to participate in the study. 
To ensure anonymity and data confidentiality, pseudonyms are used to represent the names of 
participants and the bank used.  In relation to the research objective, user participants were 
interviewed first in order to understand their views and expectations on risk disclosure quality. 
After which, preparer participants were then interviewed to obtain their responses to the 
information obtained from users as well as the processes associated with managing risk 
disclosures. 
A semi-structured interview protocol was developed for both the risk reporting managers and users 
of the disclosures provided. A variety of questions were constructed including; how important risk 
disclosures to participants are and what are their expectations; the decision choices associated with 
managing risk reporting and deciding what to disclose and what not to disclose; the parties 
involved; and how these are managed to reflect user expectations on the quality of risk disclosures. 
Before commencing each interview, the researcher introduces the research topic, aims and 
objectives. Following on from this, the participant’s written and verbal consent was sought.  
In addition to the semi-structured interviews, data was also collected from documents including 
Bank A’s annual report, pillar 3 risk disclosure reports and the risk disclosure regulatory 
requirements. The researcher drew upon these multiple sources of evidence in an attempt to seek 
convergence with the data collected from the interviews (Yin, 1994).  
5.4.2 Data analysis 
Information from previous literature and documentary evidence was used to support the 
construction of the interview questions. The documents gathered were reviewed in-depth to inform 
the researcher’s knowledge of the case Bank and its risk disclosure regulatory environment. These 
included, pillar 4 risk disclosure reports, annual reports and the regulations around the preparation 
of these reports. Also, other documents were obtained from the case company’s website. As 
mentioned earlier a semi-structured interview-based case study was used as the research method. 
Once the interviews were conducted, each interview data was transcribed by the researcher. After 
which the transcribed interviews were then recorded and listened to several times by the researcher 
to facilitate understanding and familiarity. The transcribed interview scripts were read several 




Nvivo qualitative software program that was used to organise the data. The transcribed interviews 
were uploaded onto the NVivo software programme after which the researcher manually coded 
the text by reading each interview transcript line by line and categorising relevant sentences and 
paragraphs into themes and sub-themes. The transcribed material from the interviews and the 
coding process was validated by the researcher’s supervisors. The themes and sub-themes 
generated from the interviewed data was submitted to supervisors for validation. 
According to Suddaby (2006, p638), qualitative software programs can be used in organising and 
coding data, but there are not suitable for interpreting the data. Therefore, all the case data 
transcriptions were manually analysed, coded and classified into themes and concepts by the 
researcher using an interpretive process.  
In the initial stages of the coding process, the categories and concepts of the gaps model (i.e. 
listening gap, design gap and the fulfilment gap) as well as concepts from the Disclosure 
Management Framework (DFM) (i.e. disclosure structures, disclosure position), served as 
guidelines from which themes were identified and developed. The overarching category of themes 
was on user expectations. Under this category, different themes unfolded from the interviews, 
mainly from user participants, on their expectations for risk disclosure quality. There were a few 
predetermined themes that form part of the interview questions. In the initial stages, risk disclosure 
quality themes were predefined based on the Bank for International Settlements (2015) main 
principles for the pillar 3 risk disclosure best practice, other regulatory guidelines, prior literature 
and the theory. It is worth noting that these regulatory descriptions of disclosure quality are 
publicly available and therefore have the tendency to underpin what users regard as a norm in 
relation to risk disclosure, together with users’ experiences.  
A specification for risk disclosure quality was categorised as an expectation based on the number 
of times it was raised by different participants and the concerns raised by interviewees regarding 
that quality. Once the initial themes were developed, the researcher identified links and relations 
between the themes. 
Further to this and in relation to the listening gap, management were asked their views and 
responses to these expectations and the degree to which user expectations were considered during 
the disclosure management process. In relation to this, interviewees were asked their expectations 
and perceptions on disclosure quality based on the concepts of the model; the qualities identified 
from the literature and the other qualities identified by the interviewees themselves.  These 




expectations based on users’ responses and in relation to Zeithaml et al. (1993). According to 
Cadotte et al. (1987) and Zeithaml et al. (1993) experience is a key source of adequate expectations 
or the experienced based norms (Woodruff et al., 1983). Thus, user experiences also have a high 
tendency to increase what users are willing to accept in relation to risk disclosure. This is a key 
reason why the researcher uses semi-structured interviews to help capture these experiences from 
participants through face to face and phone interactions. A summary of the research instrument for 
each of the participants is provided in the appendix and outlines the main interview questions. 
 Ethical considerations 
Social research in recent years emphasises the importance of considering the way in which 
individual researchers constitute legitimate and justified knowledge of the social life, as well as 
the way in which other participants involved are treated. Thus, researchers are expected to apply 
ethical principles including, informed consent, and the avoidance of deception as ways of 
governing their research activities (Kovalainen and Eriksson, 2008). These principles affect the 
way the research is conducted and collated, as well as the way participants’ views are quoted and 
published. It is believed that research ethics should be considered throughout the whole research 
process. Starting with the relationship between the researcher and the research object, and ending 
with the writing up and the published report (Kovalainen and Eriksson, 2008). 
The data collection process research is crucial, especially in qualitative research.  This is because 
qualitative research involves the engagement of human participants and the discussion of research 
ethics often centres around obtaining an informed consent which can sometimes be problematic. 
According to Smith (2003) participants would often need to be convinced that there is ‘something 
in it for them’ before granting permission to participate in the research (Smith, 2003) 
In the current study, the researcher intends to guard the anonymity of informants by considering 
the ethical issues that may emerge in the research. Deception, the invasion of privacy, lack of 
anonymity as well as confidentiality could cause harm to informants. An irreversible process is 
used in this case whereby the researcher removes anything that might identify with the participant 
and replaced names and institutions with pseudonyms. 
Considering the sensitive nature of discussing risk, it was expected that participants would feel the 
need not to share some sensitive thoughts with the researcher. In relation to this, the research 
clearly outlined the aims and objectives of the research in a participant’s information sheet and 
highlighted areas to be covered in the interviews. The participant information sheet was distributed 




consent in order to assure them that they have a choice to either participate or not to partake in the 
study. This was all part of the ethical approval process the researcher had to undertake prior to the 
start of the data collection process for the primary data. Samples of these forms are provided in the 
appendix. 
Another fundamental part of the research is the issue of trust created between the researcher and 
the research community. Researchers are therefore expected to create and maintain a relationship 
of trustworthiness between themselves and the research community that would not be violated 
during the research process (Creswell, 2013; Schwandt, 2001). 
 Summary 
This chapter provides details into the researcher’s philosophical stance, the methodological 
approach, chosen data collection and analytical methods.  
The researcher takes a social constructivist approach in accepting the view that, no external reality 
exists independent of our beliefs and understanding. Reality is only knowable through the human 
mind and socially constructed meanings. An interpretivist theoretical stance is adopted. This is an 
appropriate approach to address the research question, with providing insights into users’ 
perceptions and expectations for quality risks disclosure and the degree to which management 
incorporate these. This provides an opportunity to explore the understandings of both users and 
preparers about risk disclosure. 
This study utilises a qualitative case study which involved semi-structured interviews with a top 
UK bank and users who had some interest in that particular bank.  
The above chapters have provided details on how the research would be undertaken. Chapter 6,7, 
and 8 below provide an analysis of the findings gathered.  
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Chapter 6: The definition of risk within the context of Bank ‘A’. 
 Introduction 
In order to examine the quality of risk disclosures, it is important to define risk. The chapter 
presents findings on the definition of risk from the perspectives of the different stakeholder groups 
who have an interest in the risk disclosures provided by Bank A. This is an important chapter as it 
provides a starting point to understanding the different perspectives of the individual participants 
with regards to risk and risk disclosure.  
Prior studies provide several definitions for risk ranging from risk as a loss or any uncertainty with 
negative outcomes (Lupton, 1999; Horcher, 2005), to risk that carries the potential of either a gain 
or a loss (Hodder et al., 2001, Mokhar and Mellet, 2013).  Despite the different perspectives on 
the definition of risk in the literature, there is currently no agreed definition of risk. In an attempt 
to respond to the varied views on the concept of risk and its definition, the researcher explores the 
concept of risk from the perspectives of the different interviewee participants in order to 
conceptualise and distinguish their views on risk.  
The definition of risk from the perspective of different user groups is an area which would provide 
insights into the usefulness of risk disclosures. However, this is currently lacking in the risk 
disclosures literature. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 some finding on participants perceptions on the 
concept of risk and section 6.3 ends the chapter with a conclusion.  
 Preparer’s perspective on the definition of risk 
From a manager’s perspective “risk is anything that could potentially affect the bank’s financial 
performance and its ability to continue as a bank” HoRGRD. The HoRGRD claims that, when 
thinking of risk, the bank would always start by considering anything that could affect its financial 
performance and strategy.  She states that;  
“risk is always a downside but we might be willing to take a bit of that downside in order 
to get a higher reward and what the risk management function that I work with has to do 
is to make sure we’re balancing that risk and reward appropriately so we will have to take 
risks because you can’t ever mitigate against all of them but what risks are we willing to 




According to HoRGRD, the effect of this uncertainty on the bank’s financial performance is 
considered to have a negative outcome in the first instance. However, she argues that the ability 
of the bank to manage this risk could determine whether this effect would result in a positive 
outcome which she identifies as the reward. In this instance, the negative effect of the uncertainty 
is considered as a risk, and the positive effect of the uncertainty is considered as a reward. 
Thus, even though risk is referred to as the occurrence of an event that could negatively affect the 
bank’s objective, strategy, or result in a financial loss, it also acknowledges the potential of a 
reward resulting from that event. Hence, referring to risk as “the probability of an event occurring, 
which could either positively or negatively impact the bank’s ability to achieve a strategy” DRA. 
This definition is provided by the Director of Risk Assurance in Bank A.  
“So, in the bank, we usually talk of risk to be the likelihood of something happening and 
the impact of it happening” DRA. 
This definition of risk is similar to the modernist view which refers to risk as both the negative and 
positive outcomes of events (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Mokhtar and Mellet, 2013; Ibraham and 
Hussainey, 2019). The modernist view of risk concentrates on the fact that the concept of risk 
could involve either a positive effect (i.e. opportunity, prospect and potential gain) or a negative 
effect (i.e. harm, hazard, danger, damage, threat or potential loss) (Schrand and Elliott, 1998; 
Solomon et al., 2000; Hodder et al., 2001; Elmiger and Kim, 2003; Abraham and Cox, 2007; 
Damodaran, 2008; Elshandidy, 2011).  
Additionally, management refers to risk as anything that can cause the bank to do something 
different from which it originally planned, which could either result in a positive or a negative 
effect on the business (RD, DRA). In an attempt to respond to risk, management would often take 
measures either from within or outside of their original plan to control the risk. However, the 
measures taken by the bank to address a potential risk could determine whether it would have a 
positive effect or a negative effect (RD). Thus, the ability of the bank to manage this risk could 
determine whether this effect would result in a positive or a negative outcome.  
According to the Risk Director, this is very important for the bank because, if a bank is able to 
identify a potential risk early, it can then become a competitive advantage as some risks have the 
potential to turn into an advantage for the bank over other competitors (RD).  
“…Risk to me is any kind of event that can be both commercial, regulatory or from an 




negatively impact your business but perhaps have some impact on your business and cause 
you to do something different which may result in a positive…” RD 
“Risk is effectively the probability of an event occurring, which could either positively or 
negatively impact the bank’s ability to achieve a strategy. So in the bank, we usually talk 
of risk as the likelihood of something happening and the impact of it happening...” DRA. 
This perspective on risk is linked to the definition of risk as a function of likelihood and impact. 
Where impact refers to the extent to which a risk event might affect the business (Deloitte and 
Touche LLP, 2012). From the above analysis, the impact of risk is highly dependent on the ability 
of management to control and manage the direction of the impact an uncertain event may have. 
According to the Risk Director (RD), the bank’s ability to control the impact of a risk, especially 
for new and emerging risks could provide the bank with a competitive advantage if done in a 
timely manner (RD). The direction of these measures will determine whether the risk would have 
a positive effect or a negative effect on the business and what it does. 
6.2.1 The taxonomy of risks within Bank A 
The management of Bank A highlights that, once the likelihood and impact of a risk on the bank’s 
financial performance has been identified, it is important for the bank to then categorise this within 
their existing risk landscape. The bank’s risk landscape identifies the bank’s emerging and 
principal risk at a point in time. In the instance of an uncertain event the risk landscape is reviewed 
to record the impact of such an event of the bank’s risk landscape. According to the management 
of bank A this is exercise is often performed on a monthly basis. 
To enable a better understanding of how Bank A categorises its risks, this study obtained some 
information on Bank A’s emerging and principal risks from the bank’s annual reports. At the time 
the interview was conducted, the management of Bank A identified their emerging risks as risks 
associated with changes in the regulations, risks relating to geopolitical events, cybercrime, and 
the macroeconomic environment (e.g. Brexit), as well as the bank’s exposure to competition (RD, 
HoRDRG). The principal risks faced by Bank A were obtained from the bank’s annual report and 
are summarised below.  
6.2.1.1 Credit risks 
Credit risk is referred to as the loss resulting from a borrower or counterparty failing to pay 
amounts due or default in loan payments. Bank ‘A’ provides residential and buy-to-let mortgages 
and credit cards to customers across the UK and there is the risk that any adverse changes in the 




of borrowers results in additional defaults and impairment losses, thereby reducing profitability. 
Additionally, wholesale exposures arise through the liquid asset portfolio and the use of derivative 
instruments to manage interest rate risk. 
6.2.1.2 Market risks 
Market risks is the risk of loss arising from unfavourable market movements in interest rates, 
exchange rates and other prices of securities and instruments which leads to a reduction in earnings 
or value of the firm’s assets. Interest rate risk in the banking book is the only material category of 
market risk for Bank ‘A’.  
6.2.1.3 Operational risk 
Operational risk is the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal systems, people, 
processes, and/or from external events, including issues around legal risk. This includes the risk 
that systems and processes relating to technology, audit, and other support systems may 
malfunction or break down. The management of third-party relationships, cybercrime and 
information security remains a key focus for Bank A’s operational risk exposures. 
6.2.1.4 Conduct and compliance risk 
Conduct and compliance risk is defined as the risk that our operating model, culture or actions 
result in unfair outcomes for customers. This could result in regulatory sanction, material financial 
loss or reputational damage if we fail to design and implement effective operational processes, 
systems and controls which maintain compliance with all applicable regulatory requirements. 
6.2.1.5 Strategic and Financial risk 
Strategic and financial risk covers the strategic risk, the risk of significant loss or damage arising 
from business decisions that impact the long-term interests of stakeholders or from an inability to 
adapt to external developments and financial risk which is focused on concentration risk. Credit 
concentration risk is managed for retail and wholesale credit exposures at portfolio, product and 
counterparty levels. Financial performance can be impacted by adverse changes in customer 
behaviour.  
6.2.1.6 Balance sheet and prudential regulation risks 
These are the risks which cover a number of categories of risk which affect the manner in which 
the group can support its customers in a safe and sound manner. The risks include the need to 
accommodate liability maturities and withdrawals, fund asset growth and otherwise meet 
contractual obligations to make payments as they fall due (liquidity risk), the inability to raise and 




(funding risk) and the risk that the Group has a sub-optimal amount or quality of capital or that 
capital is deployed inefficiently across the group (capital risk). 
As explained earlier, once the risks are identified, they are then categorised within the bank’s risk 
landscape and the previous risk landscape is updated to reflect the bank’s current risk profile. Table 
6-1 below is an example of Bank A’s risk landscape adapted from the bank’s annual report.  
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 The user’s perspective on the definition of risk 
In addition to the investigation of management’s view on the definition of risk, this section 
explores the definition of risk from the perspectives of the users of risk disclosures provided by 
Bank A. This would allow for a detailed comparison of the different views expressed by 
participants around the concept of risk. The main user groups include UK regulators, institutional 
investors and equity research analysts.  
6.3.1 The definition of risk from the perspective of the regulator 
When asked to define risk, most of the regulators define risk in consideration of what risk means 
for management or the companies they regulate. Even though the regulator is responsible for 
requiring banks to disclose risk information within certain risk categories, the ultimate decision 
for the identification and management of risk lies with management. R3 refers to risk as “the 
potential for the expected outcome, strategy or objective of the bank not to come into place the 
way it’s intended”. It is believed that very often it is easier for management to account for and 
make provisions for the risks that are expected to happen or to have an impact on the business than 
to account for those that are unexpected. Therefore, the risks often disclosed within the bank’s 
public disclosures are those that the banks have some level of expectation of its occurrence. 
However, there are the unexpected risks which banks have to make provisions for.   
R1 refers to risk as “things that happen to make your plan or objectives not to happen one way or 
another”. His definition of risk focuses on the negative effects of risk and is associated with the 
possibility of not achieving the intended or set business objective, plan, or strategy.  
R1 adds that risk is “often any uncertainty in the sense that it is often outside managements 
control”. However, there is the risk that management is aware of and can take measures to reduce 
them and sometimes remove them with the help of a lot of history and experience (R1).  R1, 
therefore, highlights three categories of risk; 
“Risks you are aware of and can control 
There are the risks that management are aware of and can take measures to mitigate them 
and sometimes remove them. 
Risks you are aware of, but you can’t control 




Risks that you have no awareness of but can occur 
There are the risks that you haven’t even thought of that occur surprisingly. And these are 
usually the worst to handle. It’s difficult to disclose things you don’t know about. Some 
modern risks they don’t have much experience of and it is very difficult for them to know 
what to do and indeed how to disclose”. FM1 referred to these as unexpected losses. 
R1 refers to both expected and unexpected risks. From his perspective, an expected risk is referred 
to as any uncertainty of an event that can either be controlled or not controlled. Whereas, 
unexpected risks are those events that management have no awareness of and therefore, cannot 
take any measures to control or reduce them.  It is believed that the business’s expected risks for 
which provisions are made, are easier to control as opposed to the unexpected risks.  
The views of regulators from the prudential regulation were more geared towards risk as an 
unexpected loss. These regulators focus more on the capital adequacy of individual UK banks in 
ensuring that the banks hold enough capital to withstand any loss resulting from an economic stress 
or pressure. R5 highlights that as bank supervisors, they assess the bank’s balance sheet to 
determine if there is a potential for the bank to make any losses and they want to be able to ensure 
that banks hold enough capital to survive through that loss or stress. R5 refers to unexpected losses 
associated with the bank’s inability to withstand economic pressures. This could then include 
unexpected losses resulting from the bank’s risk of default.  
“…Well for me risk is the risk of default, and that is my primary interest, and that is 
everyone’s interest so at the very top you have got the risk of default. That is where the 
shareholder’s interest is, where the creditors’ interest is, it is what the company’s 
management is interested in. Because if the bank defaults, the managers will lose their job. 
There is the legal risk which is the risk of being sued if you didn’t disclose something 
properly or you failed to disclose something. Credit risk comes from the risk of default, 
interest rate risk, market risk, these are all forms of default risk”. R5 
6.3.2 The definition of risk from the perspective of the institutional investor 
The views of fund managers from institutional investment companies who have investments in 
Bank A were also sought. When asked about their views on the concept of risk and its definition, 
fund managers refer to risk as “the possibility of an unexpected loss” (FM2), and “anything that 
could potentially go against the objectives of the bank (i.e. business strategy, or to increase 
shareholder wealth and enhance financial performance)” (FM1). The definition provided by FM2 




risk of default and “the possibility of the bank to avoid its default situations” FM2. It is worth 
noting that both FM1 and FM2 work with credit risk. Credit risk is the risk resulting from a 
borrower failing to pay amounts due or default in loan payments2. This is reflected in their views 
expressed above. The views expressed by FM1 and FM2 are in line with the pre-modern view of 
risk which refers to risk as something bad (i.e. negative outcomes) (Ibrahim and Hussainey, 2019, 
p130).   
FM3, a global banks analyst, refers to risk as “any deviation from the bank’s share price and 
anything that affects the business or has the potential to affect its share price”. He refers mainly 
to the impact of cyber risk, liquidity risk, capital risk and other risk types (i.e. strategic risk, 
regulatory risk) on investor returns and hence the bank’s overall financial risk3.  
“In its simplest form, risk is the potential deviation from the share price. I’m here to pick 
good investments. Because if it is a risk that affects the business then it has the potential to 
affect the share price”. FM3 
FM4, on the other hand, is the head of compliance of an investment firm responsible for investing 
the money of their clients and rendering services such as financial planning. FM4 highlights that 
when it comes to risk, even though their views on risk depends on their client’s perspective on 
risk, risk is the “risk of the investment itself and where it sits on the whole range of investments 
they have available”. This could range from derivatives and options which are considered high 
risks “where you can invest more than the money you already have and your losses could be bigger 
than what you have invested”.  This is still referring to the idea of risk as the possibility of 
unexpected losses. There are also investments in the equity of small companies which are mostly 
listed on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) and other smaller markets around the world 
(FM4). FM4 finally refers to the low risk investments such as corporate bonds which are unlikely 
to result in any unexpected losses.  
“We would categorise our clients into not just risk but also what the objective is as to 
whether they are looking for growth from the investment or the income from the investment 
and allowing that money to provide their income. Then we’ll look into a portfolio of 
investments for them based on their risk attitudes and their objectives. And we’ll look at 
that. And that doesn’t mean to say that all the investments within their portfolio will have 
the same level of risk. Some may be higher, or some may be lower, but the average or the 
 
2 This definition is from Bank A’s definition for credit risks taken from its annual report.  




overall composition will be then in line with what the client needs. So, for our firm the risk 
is tailored to the individual client” FM4. 
6.3.3 The definition of risk from the perspective of an equity sell-side analyst  
Another stream of literature refers to risk as the variations or fluctuations around a target value at 
a specific time horizon (Elshandidy, 2011, P.34). Abraham and Cox (2007) also use risk in three 
texts: risk as variation, risk as uncertainty and risk as an opportunity. Where variations could either 
have a positive or a negative effect on the business. This definition is similar to that provided by 
the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS 4 – Insurance Contracts), defining financial 
risk as the risk of a possible future change in one or more of a specified interest rate, financial 
instrument price, commodity price, foreign exchange rate, index of prices rate, credit rating, credit 
index or other variables.  
Equity research analysts are often responsible for preparing research-related reports on a target 
company’s financial performance, earnings growth, equity value and share price (Campbell and 
Slack, 2011). Their role is to provide recommendations on an entity’s stock and offer a more 
detailed understanding of the entity’s value creation process, strategy and business model (Nielsen, 
2008). It is therefore believed that investors are the main users of financial analysts reported 
information. 
In defining risk, most fund managers and equity research analysts refer to variations in the bank’s 
risk profile, assets, asset holdings, and share prices (EA1, EA2, EA3, FM3). FM3 for example, 
refers to risk as default situations and variations in the bank’s risk profile including its balance 
sheet or its capital asset quality, liquidity, and earnings. Volatility here is linked to the numerical 
aspects of the disclosures made as they can be measured. Equity research analysts refer to risk as 
variations in specific risk categories mainly credit risk, market risk and operational risk.  
“I will define risk as volatility in general”. EA1 
“I will define risk as mainly credit risk for Bank ‘A’ as a bank, and some operational risk 
as well. And certainly, market risk, the changes in their holdings of say UK government 
bonds, changes in price can negatively affect their operations but again the key focus is on 
credit risk especially on these mortgages”. EA2  
“I think there are several different ways to think about risk. I mean we think about market 




risks, so for specific companies, how good are the risk management procedures, what kind 
of controls and check balances do they have” EA3.  
According to EA3 operational risks are said to be qualitative in nature and it is often difficult for 
analysts to measure and determine any volatility or variation these risks may exhibit (EA3). Thus, 
it becomes difficult to estimate future volatility and related variations on these risk types. In the 
conversation with sell-side analysts, they pointed to the significance of operational risk as one of 
the biggest risks they focus on. This is because examples of such risk types including business 
malpractices and money laundering could have a huge impact on the business as a whole should 
they occur. EA4 refers to these operational risks as internal risks, such as risk relating to the 
effectiveness of the bank’s risk management procedures, controls, check balances and compliance. 
“…We measure risk in several different ways, some of it in terms of what I’ve described 
about internal risks and controls, these are qualitative and so we can’t measure it. But in 
terms of comparing companies and their risk appetite, we look at their impairments for 
example. So, for a lender like ‘Bank A’ for example, we would look at impairments over 
average loan book. So what percentage of the loans they have written are 3 months in 
arrears and what percentage has been written off. Obviously, the higher that percentage 
is the more risk you can deduce that the company is taking. Therefore, that will make you 
think, do I want to invest in it and if I do want to invest in it then what do I want to pay for 
it. If its high risk, am I prepared to spend as much in terms of valuations to make that 
investment” EA4. 
“…I think the biggest risks that we focus on are those to do with malpractices and money 
laundering. The bank’s behaviour in the last 20 years, has been utterly disgraceful. I think 
it is the absence of morality amongst senior management, which was certainly not the case 
when I worked for the bank” EA6. 
“For a bank, the primary ones that we focus on are the credit risk (we try to measure how 
that is going to go, at the moment it could be okay but clearly it is going to change) which 
is the key one, but then we also have the operational risk (malpractices, money laundering, 
fraud) and market risk (volatility and prices, moves and capital market movements and the 
gaps against that)” EA5.  
It is evident that equity research analysts view risk in different ways. However, considering their 
role in making comparisons among firms and providing recommendations on the volatility of a 




and related impairment provisions (i.e. credits risks and market risks) in order to determine any 
variations and fluctuations. These variations could then be as a result of an unexpected loss or the 
potential for an unexpected loss in the future. 
From a user’s point of view, risk is always perceived as a default or a negative outcome. However, 
from management’s point of view whereas risk is initially perceived as the occurrence of an event 
which has the potential to result in a negative outcome, there is also the potential for that event to 
result in a positive outcome (i.e. reward) and this is what drives management’s incentive to take 
on risks and provide measures to control and mitigate its effects.  
The findings also show that, whereas institutional investors refer to risk as unexpected losses 
associated with a deviation from the bank’s share price and their investment in the bank’s equity, 
financial analysts, on the other hand, refer to risk as mainly variations or fluctuation in the bank’s 
risk profile, asset holdings, asset quality, liquidity position and earnings which ultimately affect 
the banks share price.  
 Summary 
The concept of risk has developed over the years in prior literature from a pre-modern view of risk 
as any uncertainty of an event covering only the negative outcome to a modernist view which is 
the uncertainty of an event covering both the negative and positive outcomes. In an attempt to 
contribute to this stream of literature, this chapter provides insights into the different perspectives 
of preparers and information user groups on the concept of risk. In summary, participants refer to 
the uncertainty associated with both expected and unexpected events that could result in either a 
positive or a negative outcome. In addition to this, management highlights that their ability to 
control for the risk could determine the degree of the impact of the risk on the bank and the 
business. However, management posits that it is easier for companies to account for and make 
provisions for the risks that they are aware of, as opposed to those that are unexpected. The findings 
in chapter 6 also serve as a starting point to understand the perspectives of both preparers and users 
on risk disclosure quality as it offers insights into how they classify and view risk.  
Chapter 7 below discusses users’ expectations for risk disclosure quality through the 
understandings of stakeholder groups as well as management’s understanding of these 
expectations. Drawing from the Gaps model of service quality, disclosure quality is measured by 
user-perceived disclosure quality. The model gives the researcher the opportunity to explore and 




understanding of these expectations which could impact the degree to which disclosures are 
designed and developed to reflect these user-perceived quality specifications. 
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Chapter 7: User expectations for risk disclosure quality and the management’s 
response to these expectations 
 Introduction 
Risk disclosures play a role in both the stewardship responsibilities of management and the 
decision-making process of key stakeholders. It is believed that risk disclosure quality can be 
assessed through the processes enacted by management and the understandings of the information 
users on the quality of the risk disclosures they receive. Prior studies identify a number of 
disclosure quality specifications such as; readability, informativeness, quantity and reporting style 
(Beattie et al., 2004; Ryan, 2012; Kravet and Muslu, 2013; Abraham and Shrives 2014). However, 
very little is known about the current expectations for disclosure quality specifications from the 
understandings of the information users themselves with the exception of Solomon et al., (2000) 
and Bean and Irvine (2015). Despite the role of management’s involvement with the risk disclosure 
process and the impact of their disclosure decision choices, there is little research on how risk 
disclosures are designed and developed in order to convey risk information to its users.  
This chapter is the beginning of a detailed analysis on the management of risk disclosure with 
particular focus on user expectations, as a key antecedent in the disclosure management process 
and the degree to which users’ expectations are then incorporated within the risk disclosure 
management process. The chapter uses the Gaps Model as a lens to provide an understanding of 
users’ expectations and perspectives on the current risk disclosures provided by Bank A, as well 
as management’s understanding and response to these expectations in an attempt to identify the 
potential for a listening gap. In applying the Gaps Model of service quality, the concept of service 
will be reconceptualised as disclosure and customers as users of disclosure information throughout 
the rest of the study. These would be used interchangeably.  
This chapter is therefore structured as follows. Section 7.2 discusses users’ expectations for risk 
disclosure quality. Following on from this, section 7.3 provides some details on the different 
avenues used by management in obtaining information on users’ expectations. Subsequently, 
section 7.4 discusses management’s response to the user expectations highlighted in section 7.3. 
Finally, the chapter ends with a summary in section 7.5.  
 
 What are the users’ expectations for risk disclosure quality?  
Chapter 2 discusses the importance of disclosure quality for providing a better understanding of 




informed financial and investment decision making (Solomon et al. 2000; ICAEW, 2011; Ryan, 
2012; FRC, 2015,2017). For the purpose of this study, these factors are referred to as disclosure 
quality specifications (Parasuraman et al., 1985). Prior literature identifies some of these 
disclosure quality specifications (i.e. risk disclosure informativeness, the quantity of risk 
information disclosed, and the provision of mandatory and voluntary risk-related disclosures) 
(Beattie et al., 2004; Ryan, 2012; Kravet and Muslu, 2013; Abraham and Shrives 2014). Despite 
different attempts made by standard setters and academics to ensure good risk disclosure practice, 
little is known on users’ expectations for quality risk disclosures and the degree to which these are 
incorporated in the management of risk disclosures.  
In an attempt to contribute to this stream of literature, This study draws on the notion that 
customer-perceived quality service is mainly determined by customer expectations based on their 
experience with the particular service (Zeithaml et al., 2016). This section, therefore, describes in 
more detail expectations for disclosure quality from the understandings of different user groups 
including equity analysts, institutional investors and regulators from both the FRC (Financial 
Reporting Council) and the PRA (Prudential Regulatory Authority). Each disclosure quality 
specification is discussed firstly by comparing similar or contrasting views among the different 
user groups and identifying this disclosure quality specification as either adequate or desired 
drawing on concepts from the Gaps model of service quality. The study then goes further to 
provide insights into management’s understanding of users’ views on these specifications and the 
gaps (Zeithaml et al., 2002) and limitations faced by management when meeting them.  
The responses gathered from user participants on their expectations for risk disclosure quality falls 
within two main categories. The first category focuses on the expectations relating to the actual 
content of the disclosures provided and includes perceptions of disclosure quality specifications 
relating to informativeness, clarity and comprehensiveness, linking narratives to financial 
statement items, access to regulatory reporting, the volume of information provided and the 
balance between mandatory and voluntary information. The second category then focuses on 
information reliability. This section discusses each disclosure quality specification in the light of 
users’ expectations and management’s response to them. The researcher obtained responses from 






7.2.1 Content of the disclosures provided 
7.2.1.1 The provision of informed and specific risk disclosures 
Majority of user participants (EA4, EA5, EA3, R3, R5) had expectations for a more informative 
and specific disclosure of risk, especially in linking the risks that the banks identify in their 
disclosures to the banks business model and strategy. This is in line with evidence from prior 
literature on the quality of risk disclosures (i.e. Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Linsley, 2011 and 
Kravet and Muslu, 2013). These studies find that companies provide a large amount of risk 
disclosure which are generic rather than specific. According to research undertaken by the FRC, 
their findings suggest that investors are of the view that understanding the company’s principal 
risks and how this links back to the company’s business strategy and model is important for their 
investment decisions (FRC, 2017). Nevertheless, most users expressed the view that the 
disclosures are often uninformative in the sense that they tend to be generic and boiler plated.  In 
relation to this, a study conducted by Abraham and Shrives (2014) shows that companies provide 
larger amounts of risk disclosure that is generic rather than specific and therefore the substance of 
the risk discussed is less informative and hence remains the same over time. This study contributes 
to the existing literature by providing a discussion on the disclosure quality specifications from the 
understanding and perspective of different user groups and management response to these as 
discussed in section 7.3 below. 
Equity research analysts for instance, highlight that the non-financial risk disclosures provided 
often include generic definitions of what the risks are instead of what the risks identified mean for 
the business and how they can link that back to the banks business strategy and model. This could 
be as a result of the fact that equity research analysts are more experienced and trained to know 
the basics and foundations of what these risks mean. Therefore, information on the definition of 
risk for example, would be considered uninformative. According to Flostrand and Strom (2006), 
financial analysts find risk-related disclosures as important when such information is value 
relevant. In that, it is forward-looking and informative. Even though the pillar 3 disclosure 
requirements for instance, require banks to avoid disclosing information that does not 
communicate useful information to users, sell-side analysts highlight that most of the non-financial 
information (i.e. operational risk) provided, especially, at the back of the pillar disclosure 3 reports 
tend to be less useful in conveying informed and specific information. EA3 refer to these 
uninformed disclosures as ‘fluffy stuff’. However, EA4, posits that such disclosures made are 
helpful when putting together their analyst reports because it serves as useful material to put into 




As a result of this analysts highlight that they would only be prompted to go through the pillar 3 
report if the profile of the bank’s business changes. This is because they believe that most of the 
time, unless the business profile of the bank changes, their risks are not going to change very much 
and thus the risk information provided is more likely to be uninformative (EA4).  
“I don’t think anybody reads them. I mean, I go through the numbers sometimes like the 
loan exposures. But what I can’t understand is what is that text which makes up the 60-
page document. I have never read it. It is not interesting and neither is it comprehensive 
the things they write” EA5. 
“So, in the reports, they just give us the risk definitions of the non-financial risks which we 
already know, and we cannot model these" EA3. 
“…If you read through the reports from the bank its copy and paste from last year”. EA3 
“I will say most of the risk disclosures are very generic, and a lot of them includes things 
we already have. Are they really specific to the company? I don’t think so”. R7 
The expectation for informed and specific risk disclosure can be classified as a desired expectation 
based on the findings gathered (Zeithaml et al., 1993). Drawing from Parasuraman et al. (1988), 
desired expectation here refers to “what users feel management should offer rather than would 
offer”. Unlike adequate expectations where a lower level of performance may be expected due to 
the fact that even though users hope to realise their service desires they recognise that this is not 
always possible, users have zero level of tolerance for desired expectations (Zeithaml et al., 1993).  
The findings show that participants ‘want’ a higher level of performance in relation to the provision 
of informed risk-related disclosures and do not make sense as to why this quality might not be met. 
Thus, a zero-level of tolerance for uninformative risk-related disclosures. EA3, comments that “it 
would be good if the banks disclose especially in the fluffy stuff on non-financial disclosures, like 
what is specific to Bank A in operational risk which is different to the other banks, which could be 
interesting, but I don’t think they do that because that could expose their weakness” EA3. 
Participants responses were unanimous in relation to concerns regarding the informativeness of 
the risk disclosures provided. Participants also added that what matters to them is for the bank to 
identify how the risks they identify, especially those expressed in non-financial terms, affect the 
bank specifically and the strategic decisions taken by management to control and mitigate them. 
Also, the banks should be able to demonstrate good prioritisation of the risks in highlighting the 




The regulator (R5), when asked about their expectations for quality risk disclosure, highlights the 
importance of disclosing key risks and the prioritisation of risk, specifically on the firm’s effective 
conveyance of its risk management, risk mitigation, as well as the risk mitigation approaches 
undertaken and how effective these have been. The regulator adds that more clarity about what the 
overall potential risk impact is and how it relates to their business and their business model as well 
as their strategy should be laid out and discussed (R3 and R5). 
Prior studies support the view that, despite the continuous increase in the complexity of the Basel 
risk disclosure requirements for instance especially in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, 
their effectiveness in reflecting a bank’s actual portfolio risk and in predicting their financial health 
is limited (Baule and Tallau, 2016). In line with this, the regulator (R3) highlights that, as part of 
their job in speaking to investors on their expectations on risk disclosures, they find also that 
investors often do not think that the principal risks companies have identified are going to be the 
principal risks that would impact the business. The regulator (R3) adds that even though the current 
risk-related disclosures provided are somewhat clear, it might be useful if UK banks highlight in 
their disclosures, not just what the risks are and how they are mitigating them, but also what the 
overall potential impact is and how it relates back to the bank’s business model and their strategy. 
The findings above support the argument that investors need to be provided with informed and 
specific disclosures as this enhances their ability to identify the different risks faced by the firm 
and also assess and estimate the amount and timing of future cash flows (Abraham et al., 2012, 
Linsley and Shrives, 2005). It is believed that risk information users find risk disclosures that are 
specific and informative as incrementally valuable to their assessments of the bank’s accounting 
information (Hope et al., 2016). 
7.2.1.2 Providing clarity and comprehensiveness  
One of the principles of ensuring risk disclosure quality is to assess whether the disclosures are 
clear, comprehensive, and understandable (Bank for International Settlements, 2015). However, 
in line with prior studies (Abraham et al., 2012), This study finds that there is still evidence that 
users are dissatisfied with the clarity of the disclosures they receive.  Participants perceive the 
current risk disclosures provided by Bank A as not being as clear as they would like them to be, 
as a result of the complex nature of the banking system and the high standardization of the practice 
(EA2, EA1, R5). EA2 comments that some risks are often very difficult to quantify. Risk 
disclosures on operational risk for instance, which is one of the major risk banks face, are usually 
provided in the form of voluntary disclosures. This is because it is difficult for standard setters to 




to quantify and most of the regulations around these are very abstract. However, when banks 
provide some form of transparency on these risk types, that are often outside the scope of what the 
regulators require, participants express the view that it increases their trust and perceptions on the 
soundness of the bank.  
“There is currently very limited transparency as to how operational risks are reported, 
the standardisation of such risks and there are currently no clear-cut rules on how to 
disclose these. Most of the rules around operational risk disclosure are abstract in nature” 
(FM2). 
“Also, I think that when banks disclose information beyond the compulsory disclosures 
(voluntary disclosures), the clearer its communicated and the more I tend to trust the entity 
on the soundness of the business”. FM2 
Following on from this, participants also mention that the size of the firm affects the quality of the 
disclosures they provide. Thus, smaller banks will have less quality risk disclosures as compared 
to bigger banks. According to FM1, ‘Bank A’ is a challenger bank and happens to be a smaller 
bank and therefore its disclosures lack some amount of clarity and can be less comprehensive, and 
this may be attributed to the fact that the bank does not have as many resources as the larger banks 
to ensure this. 
Thirdly, participants expressed the view that it takes some amount of training for users to 
understand the risk disclosures provided in the pillar 3 disclosure report for example. This is 
attributed to the complex nature of a banks’ operations and the risks they are exposed to. Financial 
analysts and institutional investors are usually skilled, and they undergo some form of training to 
understand the technical aspects of the risk disclosures, so as to make an analysis of the bank in 
focus.  
"…I wouldn't consider them as being entirely clear. In many cases, the disclosures are 
pretty standardized, and it takes some experience and skill to understand these 
disclosures.” EA2 
Interestingly, some equity analysts viewed their ability to comprehend the complex disclosures 
and to build through the unclarity of the disclosures provided as a competitive advantage for them 
against other equity research analysts. This is because it presents them with an opportunity to 
conclude on the target company’s performance which may not have been explicitly provided 




“Not as comprehensive and clear as we would like but this is by design I think, and you 
have to know what you’re looking for and how to find it and then it is in there but they do 
their best to hide it and they don’t highlight it. Which is fine for us because for analysts 
that is our competitive advantage” (EA6, EA7). 
Overall, participants expressed the view that the corporate disclosures are not as clear as they 
would like them to be. Participants highlighted the reason for this could be as a result of the fact 
that the person within the bank writing the disclosures and the person reading the disclosure within 
the bank tends to usually have a much fuller understanding of the process than an external person 
to the firm. Therefore, when they write the disclosures, it makes a lot of sense to them but when it 
is read by someone external to the bank, who has got very little information about the bank or the 
risks it faces, it tends to read as being more complex or it does not make as much sense to them as 
it does to those internal to the bank. Participants expressed a desired expectation for clarity and 
comprehensive risk disclosure provided within the bank’s risk disclosure reports (i.e. annual report 
and pillar 3 report). Even though participants expressed views that reflect the fact that risks are 
complex and therefore the design of the disclosures provided around these may lack some clarity, 
they highlight the importance of clarity in ensuring the usefulness of the risk disclosures and 
suggest that management should make every effort to provide risk disclosure that is clear and 
comprehensive. 
7.2.1.3 Linking narratives on risks identified to the financial statements  
Most users expressed the view that the linkage between the risk banks identify in the narratives 
and the numbers disclosed in their financial statements is key for providing insights into the bank’s 
risk profile. This is true, especially for those risks identified on a contextual basis on operational 
risks for instance, in both the annual reports and the pillar 3 disclosure reports. The regulator (R5) 
mentions that it is often challenging when making a coherent view of the risks the banks identify 
in their pillar 3 disclosure reports links back to the financial statements based on the financial 
information provided.  
“…It makes it a challenge to see the forest from the tree (to see the bigger picture) so to 
speak.”. R5 
Equity Analyst 3 highlights that being able to quantify and calculate risk is essential to explaining 
what the impact of that would have on the numbers and the bank's financial position. However, 
operational risk-related disclosures and other non-financial risks are often difficult to quantify, and 




with Power (2004, p30), even though the concept of operational risk may be appealing to users, 
"it characterizes new risk management in which the imperative is to make visible and manageable 
essentially unknowable and incalculable risks. Nevertheless, equity analysts mention that, in 
carrying out their role as analysts, being able to quantify risks identified in relation to the bank is 
key as it serves as evidence when making recommendations on the bank’s performance. EA3 adds 
that it is often very fluffy to say there may be a risk of the payment system falling and a cyber-
attack without actually showing evidence on how that relates to the bank’s financial position and 
performance. Participants (EA3) suggest that it would be better if management reports on how a 
cyber-attack (non-financial risk) could result in a potential loss and amount lost by the bank to a 
cyber-attack and that sort of detail. Fund manager 1 seemed to agree that the non-financial 
disclosures can be helpful, however, they tend to be quite complex in terms of how they are 
measured and quantified.  
“…From my experience with bank managers, some banks say it is impossible to estimate 
this, they don't quantify any provisions against conduct risks for instance". FM1 
Although guidelines such as the introduction of the strategic report by the FRC in 2013 was aimed 
at ensuring that firms provide a linkage between their business models, strategies risks and 
performance, within the disclosures they provide, the findings provide evidence that more needs 
to be done by companies to improve their narrative reporting by providing key links between the 
narratives and the numbers provided in their disclosures in the financial statements (FRC, 2017; 
FRC, 2018a; R7). 
“What is interesting also I think if you read the narratives provided on their risk 
disclosures, you are looking at risks that are not disclosed in the financial statements and 
it makes you wonder why they are not there”. R7 
There are also concerns about the linkages between the different numbers provided in the 
disclosures and not just linking the narratives to the numbers. For example, linkages between 
numeric assessments made on different risk types such as on credit risk and market risk, questions 
around how these numerical calculations and assessments are linked as well as linking the 
individual figures that form those concluding figures and how they would affect the overall 
performance of the bank. 
The banking sector is highly risk-oriented and therefore their risk disclosures tend to be a lot more 
complex with detailed credit risk tables, different types of market risk exposures and related 




risk disclosures, especially in linking these disclosures back to the bank’s business model (FM1). 
Participants, however, express the concern that this connection is not evident in the disclosures. 
“…That connection being made is not evident...So why would Bank 1 with credit card 
business has certain types of credit risk tables versus a different business model, why would 
you get differences in the type of risk exposures.” R5 
“…And you get some disclosures that change almost every quarter and you are presented 
with a bunch of different metrics which are potentially non-standard all adjusted numbers 
and are not reflective of the actual accounts to show you it is a fantastic business”. EA6 
It is evident that the expectation for linking narratives on risks identified to the financial statements 
can be classified as a desired expectation. It is believed that once the disclosures are provided it 
should be possible for preparers to provide details on how this affects the bank’s financial 
performance and position (Zeithaml et al., 1993). In doing this it enhances clarity and 
comprehensiveness. 
7.2.1.4 Access to regulatory reporting on company risk information 
From the findings, it is evident that information on non-financial risks such as operational risks, 
for example, are often inadequate and questions around the bank’s operational risks were more 
eminent. However, the findings show that disclosures relating to such risks are often provided to 
the regulators as part of the banks regulatory reporting requirements. It is believed that this 
information is provided internally through the bank’s Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment 
Approach (ICAAP) and there is a document produced by the bank to the regulator on this. 
However, other users in the public domain such as analysts and investors do not have complete 
access to this information.  
As part of their risk disclosure requirements, UK banks are required to provide disclosure under 
three main pillars; the pillar 1, the pillar 2 and the pillar 3 Basel requirements that relate to their 
capital adequacy. This is explained in more detail in chapter 3. As discussed earlier the Pillar 2A 
as stipulated in the Basel requirements requires firms to carry out an Internal Adequacy 
Assessment Process (ICAAP) which requires banks to assess, on an ongoing basis, the amounts, 
types, and distribution of capital that it considers adequate to cover the level and nature of the risks 
to which it is or might be exposed. These include disclosures on non-financial risks, such as 
operational risk disclosures and those that are subjective and less verifiable. However, users 
highlight a desire for more of such disclosures, especially in relation to how these are linked to the 




and pillar 3 disclosure report). According to the Bank of England (2018b), this assessment should 
cover the major sources of risks to the bank's ability to meet its liabilities as they fall due and 
should incorporate stress testing and scenario analysis. However, the issue is that most of the pillar 
2 disclosures are made to the regulators and the public has no access to this information. The 
regulators carry out regular checks to monitor the bank’s models established for different risk 
categories and to assess the appropriateness of the models applied in assessing these risks. This 
document is provided to the regulator and the regulator has the ultimate say when deciding which 
level of capital as per the bank’s ICAAP is acceptable or not under pillar 2 to support the 
underlying risk exposures.  
Users do acknowledge that such information could be commercially sensitive and are aware that 
these are made to the regulator and therefore emphasise the need to be able to trust that the 
regulator is ensuring that the bank holds adequate capital to render them stable and sound 
especially with those disclosures not made to the public (i.e. pillar 2 risk-related disclosures). In 
this situation, there seems to be an adequate expectation (Zeithaml et al., 1993) for the regulatory 
disclosures. Even though there is a desire for such information, users acknowledge that this may 
not be possible in that providing such commercially sensitive information may be harmful to the 
business (Zeithaml et al., 1993). Participants comment that “even though banks and the regulators 
know about these disclosures, from a market perspective they can't tell us that, because of its 
sensitive nature” EA5. There is an important concept of trust when it comes to assessing the non-
financial risk of the bank. Participants highlight that when it comes to such disclosures they need 
to be able to trust that the regulator is on top of ensuring that the banks are safe and financially 
sound. The user’s access to information, subject to regulatory reporting, is highly driven by 
management and the regulator’s support to ensure the bank’s confidentiality is maintained and at 
the same time protecting users’ interests in ensuring that the banks are financially sound. 
In relation to this, participants were also asked whether having access to this information will add 
any value to the work analysts do or in influencing investors investment decisions. Fund manager 
3 posits that, not having access to this information will lead to an inefficiency in the market and 
hampers on their ability to access and anticipate properly the banks performance. 
 
"I think what would also help in terms of the pillar 2, the pillar 2 is split between A and B, 
we have no insights as to what goes into the B requirements and I think that is perhaps 
wrong. The pillar 2B requirement might be included in the management buffer in terms of 




and it is a driver of that, I still think having a regulatory capital add-on which isn't 
disclosed to the market will potentially lead to an inefficiency within the market or the risk 
that we can't assess the bank properly, which is wrong as a lender to these banks". FM3 
Fund manager 3 highlights that, even though they may not have access to the pillar 2 disclosures, 
they would like to know, in the instance where the pillar 2 requirements are to change, why the 
pillar 2 requirements are being adjusted or are changing and the causes for the change. This would 
offer them the opportunity to assess the risks properly. Nevertheless, users believe that this issue 
of non-disclosure is mainly driven by the regulator and not the bank itself.  
 
“…I don’t think that is necessarily driven by the banks not wanting to provide this 
information, I think it is a regulatory-driven thing and perhaps it is something perhaps it 
is something the regulators don’t want the banks to disclose in case again it goes back to 
this concept of the market having too much information”. FM2 
EA3 mentions that when it comes to the bank’s operational risks for instance they are forced to 
assume figures in order to run their models. For this reason, having access to the breakdown of 
these regulatory disclosures would be informative. In response to these, the regulator highlights 
that “the public and the regulator are two different audiences and therefore the information set 
required for these two categories would be in a sense different and should be different” R4. R5 
posits that information provided to the regulator in the ICAAP, for instance, is often commercially 
sensitive and there should be constraints in place to manage all confidential information. 
On the other hand, R6 highlights even though it makes sense for management to withhold 
commercially sensitive information from the public, it is important for there to be some yardsticks 
of testing that information or a criterion of establishing what is commercially sensitive information 
other than self-proclamation by management, which often is the case. 
 
“…when it comes to providing such information, management is prone to say that they 
concern about interest risks disclosures or disclosing some other type of risk which are 
quite reasonable when you look into it, but these are quite a blanket statement or is it a 
situation that if your peers are providing it then you’re all providing it at the same time 





7.2.1.5 The volume of the risk disclosures provided 
Users also expressed a number of varying views on the level of performance in relation to the 
volume of the risk disclosures provided by the bank. Sell-side analysts for example highlight that 
the key information that they need when it comes to the pillar 3 risk disclosure report for example 
can be reduced to about 2 pages. However, this document tends to be about 50 to about 100 pages 
long. The pages for Bank A’s 2016 pillar 3 risk disclosure report, for instance, were about 92 pages 
long. Week 4   
“…Pillar 3 which will give me all the information that I require, and I believe more than 
all the information that all the analysts require in the market may be two pages. But most 
pillar 3 documents are about 60 to 70 pages and can I find that information? 9 times out 
of 10 I can’t even get it.” EA 6. 
Equity analysts rely on the information provided in the bank's annual reports and its pillar 3 
disclosure reports for risk-related information. EA1 highlight that, as equity analysts, they tend to 
look for the same kind of information, especially in the pillar 3 risk disclosure reports every year, 
and this makes it easier for them to pick up any changes in the disclosures made on this 
information. However, the length of the reports makes it difficult for some equity analysts to go 
through the disclosures in detail in order to spot what might have changed in the reports in the 
current period from the previous years’ disclosures, especially within their limited time frame. 
Annual reports for instance are 100s of pages long and it becomes difficult to look find key 
information in the reports.  Participants posit that looking for information in the reports is like 
finding a ‘needle in a haystack’. As a result of this analysts highlight that most often, they would 
look for information they already know and have the experience on where to find these within the 
reports. In relation to the above findings, FM1 who used to be an equity analyst; highlights that 
sell-side analysts do not really look at the risks properly unless something goes wrong and there is 
a need to go back to the disclosures. 
The researcher finds that sell-side analysts, who are more experienced in the role of analysing 
company information, are much more interested in certain key numbers when it comes to the pillar 
3 risk disclosure report and they know what they are looking for when they pick this report. EA4 
highlights that, “for them as analysts its more important to assess any impairments on the bank’s 
assets and the financial risk disclosures associated with these”. There is less attention on the non-
financial disclosures because of the difficulty associated with modelling these risks and relating 




model. EA6 highlights some of the key information they look out for when they pick up a risk 
disclosure report;   
“…If I take the pillar 3, what do I want from the pillar 3 document? I want to know by 
country and by portfolio by key loan book, what is the total loan exposure, what the risk-
weighted assets are against those loans, I want to know what their Non-performing loans 
(NPL) are and I want to know what the interest rates are, that is what I want. I can put that 
on one page or two pages and I can design them.” EA 6 
He highlights that sell-side analysts are much more interested in the numbers on earnings and 
profit. 
“…From a more general observation, because I used to be an equity analyst. I don’t think 
equity analysts look at the risks in banks properly, I think they are much more driven by 
what the earning are going to be and what the profits are going to be the end of this year 
or two years in advance” FM1 
As mentioned earlier, it is perceived that sell-side analysts do not look at the risks properly unless 
something goes wrong and there is a need to go back to the disclosures. This could be attributed 
to the fact that because they are time-constrained and often find information in the rest of the report 
(i.e. non-financial risk disclosures) as uninformative they would only really look at the risk if 
something goes wrong or if there is a need to go back to the disclosures. 
“…Many of their research I see and their analysis of the balance sheet, unless the bank is 
in trouble or there is some issue with the bank, then they’ll just ignore it.” FM1 
One sell-side analyst (EA4) gave a good example of an instance where she had to go back to the 
disclosures as a result of issues associated with a particular bank’s similar to Bank ‘A’ in size. 
EA4 expressed a view from experience by giving an example with a bank she was following 
“where the management of the bank had a change in strategy and they didn’t properly assess the 
risks and they completely messed up the whole business. And I wrote a note to sell the share and I 
was the only analyst who did that, saying that what management is saying is not achievable 
because the risks are x, y and z. My colleague and I got to understand these risks by actually 
having a clear understanding of what the operations of the business are, i.e. what part of the 
business involves people, what the operations of the business are in making sure that the 
relationship between me as the collector and you as the client (i.e. operational risks). If you start 




apparently, it wasn’t obvious to the management team at the bank at the time. So those are risks 
you get to understand not by reading the reports really but by understanding the business and 
understanding what drives the industry. I guess to find out what drives the industry, you have to 
read industry papers.” EA4.  
Analysts mention that most of these non-financial risk disclosures are not clear within the risk 
reports provided, and this could be attributed to the fact that management themselves may be 
facing some difficulties in grasping the complexities of the risk disclosures they are expected to 
provide and as an analyst the industry papers and other external sources become more useful in 
this case than the annual reports and pillar 3 report. Participants posit that despite the volume of 
the risk disclosures provided, the disclosures are not specific and detailed enough to enable users 
to understand the banks principal risks, especially when the bank undergoes an operational or 
change in business strategy.  
Unlike sell-side analysts, most institutional investor participants on the other hand highlight that 
they do read all the information in the pillar 3 risk disclosure document in order to ensure that they 
do not miss anything that could cost them some money on their investment. And also, as 
established investment firms, they tend to have the resources including the time available to them 
in ensuring that they go through the disclosures.  
“…I look at a lot of disclosures personally and I will take all of them and see how best I 
can use them to inform my decisions…I only focus on the credit risks and I tend to have 
time on my hand to go through all these disclosures. And we have other departments that 
look at the other types of risk.” FM1 
As a sell-side equity research analyst, it is more of a competition and what matters is if they have 
the same information as other sell-side analysts within their scope of work. Unlike investors, equity 
researchers do not have money riding on their use of the risk disclosure reports they do not care as 
much if they do not get the disclosures.  
“…For us at the end of the day we do not have money riding on that, but actually if you 
are an asset manager and you’re running a pension scheme for example… then actually if 
Bank As’ shares were to fall of the cliff and you felt you hadn’t had the adequate disclosure, 
then that is a real problem. What worries me more is, it is not that we don’t get the risk 
disclosure. I don’t really care because it is a competition for us. As long as we get the same 
as everybody else I don’t really care. Because it is only a game for EA5 and I, and as long 




not at all actually, I’m afraid to say. I would like to say its super important but it is not. 
Because I’m just fighting against somebody else”. EA5 
The other important factor that differentiates the perception of sell-side analysts and institutional 
investors in relation to the volume of risk disclosures received is the availability of resources such 
as time and people. EA1 highlights that they are often time-constrained when preparing their 
research related reports and making a financial recommendation on the evidence they have 
obtained from the targeted bank and therefore it becomes difficult going through all the disclosure 
reports from start to finish, especially to spot what might have changed in the disclosures from the 
previous disclosures.  
On the other hand, FM1 highlights that as a fund manager of a big institutional investment firm 
they tend to have different teams available and responsible for different aspects of the bank’s risk 
profile (e.g. credit risks, fixed income related risks). They have more time and resources to look at 
the risk disclosures provided by the bank in detail and to ensure they do not miss any vital 
information.  
“…I think the risk disclosures are a bit too lengthy but then it depends on the number of 
disclosures an investor has to look at. I only focus on the credit risks and I tend to have 
time on my hand to go through all these disclosures. And we have other departments that 
look at the other types of risk. I think some investors don’t have the recourses to allocate 
these separately to different departments and probably will feel that the disclosures are a 
bit too length”. FM1 
From the findings, the individual personal needs as well as the existing conditions of financial 
analysts and institutional investors, for example, influences the degree to which they perceive a 
disclosure quality attribute and affect the varying degrees of expectations among these two 
participant groups (Zeithaml et al., 1993). 
Following on from this, participants also highlight that the voluminous amount of disclosures 
provided causes users to lose focus on what the key information in the disclosures are and this can 
cause them to focus on a downside that could constitute a small aspect of the bank’s overall risk 
profile. This has the potential to wrongly drive the valuations made within the equity markets 
(FM2). FM2 mentions that the overload of financial information in the risk reports can be a 
negative and could ultimately cause the user to focus on one part of the risk profile of the bank 




report may constitute a small part of the bank’s overall performance and its impact would not 
dramatically change the banks risk profile. FM2 comments that;  
“We’ll be looking at markets where people have used or advice on turnover volume and 
trading activity, so it is quite easy to pick that negative section or a small piece of 
information and build a case on it…also these risk reports are like 100s of pages long 
which is a lot of information to take into account and actually what I want to know is what 
the most important information is”. FM2 
On the other hand, the impact of that small downside could be huge and could constitute a dramatic 
change in the bank’s performance, and this is where it becomes important for the user to be able 
to assess what the impact of the risks are from the disclosures and relate them back to the bank’s 
business model, financial position and performance. Participant R1 highlights that even though it 
is often difficult to form the words around the non-financial disclosures for instance, and how they 
impact the business, it is important for banks to emphasise in their reports the impact of the risks 
they identify. This is important because a bank could disclose a risk as being very big when in 
actual sense it may be very small and that could shift the users focus to what is actually relevant 
and material. 
When it comes to the non-financial risk-related disclosures, it becomes more difficult to assess its 
impact because these risks are difficult to quantify and classify. R1 argues that it is often difficult 
to form the words around these non-financial disclosures and for this reason a bank could easily 
disclose them as being very big when in actual sense the risk may very small or they may disclose 
them as very small when in actual sense they may be very big and may have a huge impact on the 
business. According to R1, this is a difficult task for banks to carry out and it affects the usefulness 
of the disclosures provided. 
“There is other information included in for example litigation risks…and yes it tells me all 
the risks like there might be a risk of liable fines, but for me to actually understand the 
value of that is very difficult to actually know” FM2.  
Participants, therefore, suggest that it would be more useful for the bank managers if they would 
allow analysts and fund managers to identify a range of potential assumptions in the pillar 3 





In a nut shell even though some users acknowledge that the disclosures have improved in the sense 
that banks now provide a lot more information than they used to years ago, they emphasise the 
issue with information overload causing users to be distracted from what the key risks are and 
what is actually relevant in that period in time.  
Even though some users may desire more informed information, it does not necessarily mean that 
all the information provided in the disclosure reports are informative and also from the findings 
informativeness is relative, depending on the user type and their level of experience. Therefore, 
when it comes to the volume of the disclosures it is evident that there are a few factors that affect 
this disclosure quality specification and users recognise that it may not always be possible to have 
the desired level of disclosure quality in terms of quantity. 
7.2.1.6 The balance between mandatory and voluntary risk disclosures 
A number of users expressed the desire for a balance between mandatory and voluntary risk 
disclosures within the reports that banks publish. Majority of participants express the unanimous 
view that having standardised disclosures are useful in that they tend to facilitate comparability. 
EA5 highlights that it is important at the contextual level to have similar standardised reports 
across the industry to aid comparison. This is because, if there are different parameters of 
reporting, then that in itself hampers analysis and it is hard to tell a story across the industry. 
Even though participants acknowledge the importance of mandatory risk disclosures in improving 
consistency and comparability across banks, they highlight the issue with the disclosures often 
coming across as banks just ticking the boxes and therefore emphasise the importance of voluntary 
disclosure. EA5 suggests that banks should take the initiative and become more creative in 
balancing mandatory and voluntary disclosures by working with what they have. However, he 
adds that the banks have a tick boxing mindset and it will take some time for banks to come out if 
it. EA1 mentions that “the current disclosures provided become more like a dictionary rather than 
a novel”. In view of this, R1 views the voluntary disclosures as most relevant and emphasises that 
there is a real danger with ticking boxes in some of these things. In relation to the above, Kravet 
and Muslu (2013) caution against more mandatory disclosures in that, companies may technically 
comply with the regulations without providing useful and informed risk disclosures. Prior studies 
also raise concerns over the increase in regulations and over the quality of risk disclosure (Dobler, 
2005; 2008; Dobler et al., 2011).  
One example R3 gave relates to disclosures on cyber risk. R3 mentioned that “if disclosures on 




mean that those risks are significant or not significant cyber risk information and whether the 
board have been thinking about them”. However, if the disclosure of cyber risk was not mandated 
and a bank identifies cyber risk as one of its 5 or 6 key risks, then a user would know that cyber 
risk is really important to the business and can read what they have said about that and work out 
whether that is an issue or not or whether or not the user agrees with their approach. Therefore, if 
every bank provides a cyber risk disclosure it would enable the user to compare it across the 
industry, but then it would be difficult to assess whether or not that risk is important to the business 
(R3). 
These findings support evidence from prior literature that a balance between mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure is important as the two forms of disclosure complement each other 
(Einhorn’s, 2005; Bagnoli and Watts’,2007 and Elshandidy et al., 2015). Gigler and Hemmer 
(2001) and Butler, Kraft and Weiss (2007) also find mandatory disclosure to be substantive for 
voluntary disclosure. 
In line with findings from Solomon et al. (2000), the finding shows that most users, especially 
institutional investors, emphasise the importance of voluntary disclosures in providing context to 
the financial statements and serving as ways of coming up with emerging disclosures and issues 
of topical interests (FM4). FM4 emphasises that a lot of the time the risks that they worry about 
are risks that are emerging and the risks that are potentially big liabilities for the business. Thus, 
the poor management of such risks could result in a potentially huge impact on the business’s 
performance. These risks very often tend to be specific to what the business does and are often 
provided in the form of voluntary disclosures, however, they are difficult to locate within the risk 
reports.   
According to FM4, the process of ticking all of these boxes is an approach by management to limit 
the risk disclosures made on the bank and there is a perception that management has an incentive 
to hide information that has the potential to affect its reputation. For this reason, it is often difficult 
for users to identify the risk that could make a difference and that could surprise people or the risk 
which has not been dealt with before and which could be a problem for the bank.  EA5 adds that: 
“…when it comes to the risk disclosures, you have to know what you’re looking for and how to 
find it and it is in there but the managers responsible for disclosing such information do their best 
to hide it and they do not highlight it”. This confirms the findings from Linsley (2011) that, risk 
narratives, for instance, are identifiable in the banks’ disclosures but it is often hidden and it takes 




The regulators posit that the emerging risk disclosures, such as disclosures on climate risk and 
cyber risk, tend to be of temporary interests to preparers and the regulator has no current need to 
require banks to disclose them forever. Regulators highlight that most of these risks are still 
developing and it is not something that regulators can immediately impose regulations on because 
it is not clear what good quality disclosures on such risks should look like. Therefore, providing 
disclosures on these risks on a voluntary basis would help lead to better quality disclosures which 
might become mandatory in good course (R2). 
According to R2, mandating disclosures is necessary when the regulators feel there is an ongoing 
need for such disclosures and it is clear what the relevant information is (R2). Therefore, 
management has the discretion when deciding the extent of disclosures around emerging risks and 
its impact on the bank’s business model and performance. R2 mentions that, when they allow 
banks to voluntarily disclose risk-related information, the banks tend to provide some valuable 
results and these lead to disclosures that are quite a good read within the industry. Therefore, as 
regulators, they tend to encourage banks to voluntarily disclose these emerging risks rather than 
placing requirements on them.  
R2 highlights that even though there is limited regulatory guidelines on how such risks should be 
disclosed (i.e. climate change risk-related disclosures for example) or what the quality of such 
disclosures should look like, they do strongly encourage firms to provide disclosures on these on 
a voluntary basis.  However, there are a few task forces such as the Task Force for Climate Change 
related disclosures (TFCD) who provide some form of guidelines to bank managers on the 
disclosure of emerging risk types. These forces provide guidelines to management of how to 
approach and disclose disclosures that are not regulated or stipulated in the regulatory requirements 
around risk disclosures.  R3 highlights that such task forces play a huge role in providing quality 
risk-related disclosures because they often provide a framework under which such disclosures 
could be provided. This provides the bank with the opportunity to disclose, in an ad-hoc manner, 
material information not necessarily guided by the regulations. 
Despite the importance of providing ad-hoc, unstructured or voluntary risk-related disclosures, 
users highlight that they are often faced with the risk of misinterpretation and there is a lack of 
consistency within the disclosures when banks provide too much voluntary risk related disclosures 
and therefore they emphasise the importance of having a balance between mandatory and 
voluntary risk disclosures. FM1 mentions that, when management provides risk information on an 
issue which is emerging, it might provide a negative read and some users may perceive it as a 




balance between mandatory and voluntary risk related disclosures. Furthermore, even though, it 
makes sense to have a structured disclosure, there are limitations with just ticking the boxes which 
may hamper on the clarity and understanding of the disclosures provided. 
In a nutshell, most users unanimously express a desired expectation (Zeithaml et al., 1993) and 
emphasise the importance of having a balance between providing mandated and voluntary risk 
disclosures as both approaches facilitate best practice and tend to provide a good and a cohesive 
read. However, users suggest that management should take the initiative to be more creative when 
providing their risk disclosures by working with what they have.  
7.2.2 Information Reliability 
Whereas participants perceive the risk disclosures as somewhat reliable, they argue that some of 
the big UK banks in the past 20 years have been subject to bad performance in relation to the 
manipulating and gaming the rules, especially with inadequate anti-money laundering procedures. 
These, therefore, resulted in large fines that investors and analysts knew nothing of beforehand. 
Thus, these were not evident in the disclosures. Participants emphasised that when it comes to risk 
disclosures and assessing its reliability, the history of the bank’s performance in recent years 
becomes a key factor. FM1 mentions that the performance of such banks in the past has left them 
to remain sceptical on the disclosures provided by banks, most especially in recent times. Thus, 
the conduct of banks in the past and the lack of clarity in their risk disclosures prior to a crisis, a 
scandal or malpractice has influenced their underlying philosophy and attitude on how disclosures 
should be in order to regain their confidence. Zeithaml et al. (1993) refer to this as the personal 
service philosophy. 
When asked about the performance of Bank ‘A’, FM1 highlight that unlike Bank ‘A’ which is 
mainly challenger bank and is based mainly in the UK, the larger banks which have multiple 
geographical conditions tend to be susceptible to such manipulations.   
With regards to information reliability, users also acknowledge the fact that the forward-looking 
nature of risk makes it difficult for banks to accurately provide assurance of the information they 
provide on risk in the disclosures. For example, the risk for a 25-year mortgage based on quarterly 
or annual results (FM3). In the scenario given by FM3; “if I want to invest for the medium and 
longer-term, I am not sure that is necessarily consistent with a bank reporting its overall risk 
profile on a quarterly basis or annual basis”.  
Regulator 3, highlights that when they deal with banks, managers are often relatively reticent to 




account for it in the future.  For example, when management declares in their disclosures that a 
particular risk has the likelihood to impact the bank by say 7% of x and if when it happens its 
impact is 12%, then management would be worried and concerned about a damage to their 
reputation.  “When we speak to investors they except the fact that because risks are forward-
looking in nature and therefore the reliability of such information is not necessarily guaranteed” 
R3. 
 
Participants (EA3, EA6, EA7, R3) mention that it is a fast-moving world and because risks are 
often future oriented these risks tend to appear unexpectedly, and the banks have a limited period 
to understand the risks, respond to them and provide some form of assurance over them. In relation 
to this, Linsley (2011) find that even though the Basel Pillar 3 disclosure requirements require 
banks to disclose specific risk information, users should not focus solely on the pillar 3 disclosures 
because risk is fundamentally concerned with unknowable future events. 
Most users, therefore, acknowledge that even though there is a desire for accurate and reliable 
information, the reliability of the risk-related information provided is not always guaranteed 
because of the forward-looking nature of risk (FM3, R3). Building on from Zeithaml et al., (1993), 
this indicates that users tend to have an adequate expectation for the reliability and accuracy of the 
disclosures provided.  
Figure 4 below summarises users’ expectations on the quality of risk disclosures as discussed in 
this section as either desired or adequate expectations based on participants views and perceptions. 
The researcher identified a quality of risk disclosure as adequate expectations if user participants 
make sense as to why a particular quality might not be met and therefore has a minimum or lower 
tolerable expectation. On the other hand, if participants do not make sense as to why a particular 
quality might not be met, then the researcher assumes no minimum level of performance in relation 
to that particular disclosure quality specification. This is important as it is believed that user 
expectations are characterised by a range of levels within the risk disclosures provided and may 
have different tolerant levels (i.e. desired or adequate) for different disclosure quality 
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 How does management obtain information on user expectations? 
To implement risk disclosure practices effectively and efficiently, it is essential for top managers 
to understand users’ expectations and perceptions with regard to the risk disclosures they provide 
(Zeithaml et al., 2016). This is important because when it comes to disclosure every user may 
expect something different and there can be a variety of audiences whose different information 
needs are expected to be met and this can be very difficult from the preparers point of view. In the 
case of Bank ‘A’, the preparers have in place avenues for obtaining users views and concerns on 
the disclosures provided publicly to them. These avenues often include; investor days, analyst 
presentations, Annual General Meetings (AGMs), conference calls, Pensions and Governance 
Forum, and investor roadshows where management is given the opportunity to respond to users 
concerns on the content of the disclosures they have provided. According to Blankespoor (2018), 
once the disclosures have been provided, the first layer of management’s response to users 
concerns about the disclosures they have provided is to listen to users’ comments and questions 
on the disclosures provided. This relates to the investigation of the first gap of the model with the 
context of risk disclosure. Hence, the listening or the information gap.  
This is the gap between user expectations and management perceptions or understandings of what 
users actually expect (Zeithaml et al., 2016). The Gaps Model assumes that when management 
does not acquire accurate information about users' expectations it gives rise to a listening gap and 
managements’ understanding of these expectations may be compromised. Thus, there will be a 
difference between users’ expectations for the disclosures and managements’ understandings and 
interpretations of these expectations. This in turn affects the usefulness of the disclosures provided. 
The Investor Relations (IR) team is primarily responsible for managing the bank's relationship 
with its users on an ongoing basis by obtaining users views and understandings with respect to 
what users would want in relation to the different services provided by the bank, including their 
corporate disclosures. These interactions are outside the formal strategic activity of annual 
reported accounts and could range from formal to an informal conversation between the members 
of the IR team and the stakeholder.  
“…They will be receiving a lot of information on the analysts’ views on our stock and 
doing all the relationship management with them like understanding what they would want 
to be able to influence their views. So, there is a lot of close continuous work that goes on 




The management of Bank ‘A’ obtains this information by interacting with users through investor 
days and analyst presentations, Annual General Meetings (AGMs), Pensions and Governance 
Forum, and investor roadshows. During these interactions, management is under pressure to 
convey significant information on the firm’s risk performance and position and there could be 
costly consequences relating to a loss of stakeholder trust and confidence if the information is 
communicated poorly.   
Nevertheless, this provides an opportunity for users to discuss the content of the disclosures 
provided on earnings, stock and the risks that affect these figures with management personnel and 
representatives. This also gives management an opportunity to gather information about users’ 
expectations on risk-related information, their thoughts on the risk disclosures provided and the 
performance of the bank, and also to address any concerns they may have with the reports 
provided. 
“…so, there would be investor days and they would normally come to discuss earnings 
and half-year annual announcements. In terms of pensions for instance, yes, normally there 
is engagement, but it will usually be through our pensions and governance forum. So, you 
would have representatives there, and some of them are independent, some of them are 
from the workplace pensions themselves and it is their job to act as some kind of trustee 
board because most pensions don’t have trustees. And the only other opportunity people 
have for that direct interaction is if they happen to be shareholders as well and they can 
come along to AGM’s etc. as it is an opportunity for people to do that”. RD  
“…so, the day that we announce our results we have a big investors presentation and each 
member of the board and executive team will have a slide-pack filled with lots of 
information. So, we kind of try to guess what the investors are going to ask and then make 
sure we have got an answer”. HoRGRD  
From preparers views, it appears they presume that user demands for risk disclosure quality and 
anything that investors would need would be embedded in the disclosure requirements as 
stipulated in the regulation. Therefore, to some extent, they rely on the regulatory disclosure 
requirements and will often use the regulations as a starting point which they believe would have 
come from investor feedback through consultations between the regulators and information users 




“I think the regulations come from the capital market as well so if there is something that 
investors really wanted then it will probably end up being embedded in the regulations and we 
will then use that also as our starting point". HoRDRG 
 
 What is managements understanding of these expectations and what are the potential 
causes of a risk disclosure listening gap? 
This section discusses perceptions gathered from management on their responses and 
understanding of the users’ expectations for quality risk disclosures as discussed in 7.2 above. 
Zeithaml et al. (2016, p.94) highlight that when management with the authority and responsibility 
for setting priorities, do not fully understand users’ expectations for disclosure, this may trigger a 
chain of bad decisions and suboptimal resource allocations which may result in the users 
perceiving the disclosure as poor quality. Public risk disclosures are ultimately essential for the 
economic decision-making of investors and other stakeholders. These decisions potentially end up 
affecting the bank’s financial performance and it is therefore important for management to ensure 
that they provide quality risk disclosures. One way of achieving this is by obtaining an 
understanding of users’ perceptions and expectations for the risk disclosures they provide and 
establish measures to address these or incorporate these within their risk disclosure process. From 
section 7.3, it is evident that management does have in place a number of avenues for 
communication with information users and obtaining their views on the public disclosures the bank 
provides.  
In relation to incorporating user expectations within the public risk disclosures, the management 
of Bank A confirms that the main document geared towards addressing different user needs is the 
annual report within which information is structured to address different stakeholder needs. For 
this reason, efforts are made by regulatory authorities and management themselves to ensure that 
as part of the Corporate Governance disclosure requirements companies provide accounts that are 
Fair Balanced and Understandable (FBU). The pillar 3 disclosure report on the other hand, which 
provides a bit more technicalities on the banks’ risk position is still in its development phase and 
at the moment is geared towards more experienced user groups.  
The findings show that, even though Bank A’s management showed some level of awareness and 
understanding of the expectations highlighted by users, they mention some disclosure issues or 




7.4.1 Contents of the disclosures provided 
7.4.1.1 Provision of informed and specific risk disclosures 
Management points out that even though they acknowledge the importance of linking the 
narratives on non-financial risks to the numbers, it is often very difficult for them to quantify them 
in a meaningful way. ACM mentions that, a lot of their traditional disclosures on credit risk and 
market risk are mostly standardised and quantified and it allows them, as a bank, to provide 
financial information on the quality and the riskiness of the related asset for the bank. However, 
“cyber risk and a lot of the operational risks generally can’t be quantified in a meaningful way, 
so banks tend to provide these in the form of narrative disclosures” ACM. 
Management points to the fact that they do model these non-financial risks, into the figures to 
ensure that they do show its financial effect as part of their regulatory reporting requirements which 
is reported to the regulator as stipulated in the ICAAP disclosure requirements. However, the issue 
is most of the ICAAP disclosures made to the regulators are not visible to the public and other 
users have no access to this information. In view of this, users mention that the non-disclosure of 
information that could affect the informativeness of the disclosures is unhelpful.  
Despite users concerns regarding the informativeness of the disclosures, management highlights 
the issue with providing commercially sensitive information and the risk of misinterpretation when 
it comes to giving some level of detail.  ACM posits that when it comes to some operational risks, 
such as cyber risk, for example, providing too much information publicly could result in the bank 
being exposed to hackers. 
 
“Cyber risk is a good example where you would not want to publicly disclose too much 
detail about what you're doing because you don't want to tell cyber hackers how your 
defences work but what you have to do is to explain to your stakeholders that you do have 
a cyber risk management process, policy and that you do have a team working on it. In 
these areas, you really have to rely on your narrative reporting because you can't and there 
is no way you can quantify what the risk is". ACM  
According to the risk reporting manager, it also becomes an issue of concern disclosing 
information that might be misconstrued by the public. This lies especially with the provision of 
ad-hoc and non-financial disclosures that are subject to the preparers judgements and are difficult 
to quantify and verify. The risk reporting manager adds that the risk of misinterpretation prevents 




disclosures. Unless they can provide adequate evidence to support their claims.  
She adds that as a team, they would not report anything that is inaccurate. However, if there was 
something that might be misconstrued, they would potentially factor in how that is going to look 
to the market when deciding what to disclose and what not to disclose. Thus, when deciding what 
to disclose and what not to disclose the probability for risk of misinterpretation could cause 
management to withhold information that might be misconstrued by the public. For instance, the 
HoRGRD explained; 
"… we kind of start with right this is what we need to say but I think actually sometimes if 
the mortgage market and the economy is not going that well, it’s kind of like well do we 
want to be saying that...also you don't want or your customer shouldn't really know about 
your mortgage underwriting. So, it is putting all that stuff into perspective and saying what 
are the things that we shouldn’t be disclosing and its actually right to keep back and what 
are the things that we should be and make sure that we’re right in the middle of doing the 
right thing”. HoRGRD   
Following on from this, the auditors as part of their role, play a major part in ensuring that the 
information provided in the bank’s annual reports are true and fair in that they reflect the truthful 
performance and position of the bank. However, some of the bank’s risk exposures disclosed in 
the annual report and the bank’s pillar 3 reports are not audited because there is no requirement to 
do so. The annual report contains a strategic report within it on the principal and emerging risks 
facing the bank’s business performance and position and this risk report is not audited. 
However, a lot of the pillar 3 information is usually taken from the audited accounts and so quite 
a lot of it might have been audited.  Any additional information that is in the pillar 3 that is not in 
the annual report will not have been audited. These unaudited reports are often then reviewed by 
management (ACM). However, there is the risk of inadequate assurance placed on the information 
unaudited. 
RD suggests that because of the level of subjectivity applied in the preparation of the risk 
disclosure reports, it is important for management to ensure the integrity of members of the banks 
risk divisions as well as those involved in the review process because disclosure is one of those 
tools that would eventually demonstrate their integrity at some point.  
“…I’m all about transparency, absolutely all about transparency. Some people have 




in risk divisions. And disclosure for me is one of those very basic tools that would 
demonstrate those things” RD. 
7.4.1.2 Providing clarity and comprehensiveness 
When speaking to managers, even though management admits to the disclosures, especially the 
narratives, as being boiler plated, they believe that there is a need for there to be more clarity. 
ACM adds that for UK banks it will take a bit of a while for them to get their minds into the 
complexities of banking risks.   
7.4.1.3 Access to regulatory reporting on company risk information 
In relation to the information on the non-financial risk exposures disclosed to the regulator in the 
ICAAP, management stresses that this information is not disclosed publicly because they tend to 
be very sensitive in nature. However, management highlights that the information presented in the 
ICAAP and ILAAP would usually include some key information on how good or bad they are 
controlling their risks and a number of these disclosures are not made visible to the public. As a 
challenger bank, management adds that when it comes to such sensitive information, it only takes 
one of the big banks to be more open on that and the rest of the banks may realise there is really 
an advantage for them to share this information to the public. Once other banks provide disclosure 
on such sensitive matters, management might deem it as important to disclose information in this 
case also. It is believed that when users see other banks publicly disclosing information they 
perceive to have been previously reported the regulator as part of their pillar 2 requirements, it 
affects their expectations and users may start to demand these from the other banks. In this case, 
it then becomes a desired expectation. 
Management also adds that when it comes to the non-financial disclosures, in general, the bank is 
facing some difficulties in quantifying some of these operational risks and as part of their capital 
adequacy calculations they try to model some of these risks. In extreme circumstances, they are 
able to demonstrate to the regulator that they have some kind of controls that will hopefully help 
them see that they do not have to put so much capital aside. Nonetheless, management highlights 
that they try, as much as possible to interact with other users on any concerns they may have 
regarding their capital adequacy (i.e. risk-weighted assets, market guidance and our strategy of the 
risks) during investor days, presentations, AGMs and interactions they may have with their 
investor relations departments and top management.  
7.4.1.4 The volume of the risk disclosures provided  




that the increased length of the reports is a positive in that it gives users a broad range of 
information to make economic decisions. According to the HoRGDR, she does not think 
shareholders are being bombarded. Rather, she believes shareholders are being given all this extra 
information and this gives them a range of information to help them find what they are looking 
for.   
Following on from this, the findings also show that, most users are unlikely to respond to 
consultations carried out by the regulators and they tend to be closed up about their investments 
until something happens and they are almost at the time of withdrawing their investments. Also, 
current risk disclosures focus on a range of different risk types and issues relating to different 
business events, therefore according to R3, it is difficult to get users to participate in consultations 
that are related to generic topics as they may be interested in a particular aspect of risk that is not 
covered. 
“…there will be outreach events generally where you know views will be gathered, there 
might be roundtables etc. Now do people respond? That is a different question and the 
answer is very often it is difficult to get a response from a lot of those people or for them 
to understand the value of it adds to them. It is also quite difficult to get people to so you 
might have a particular situation or interest in but to then say in general I would be 
interested in or this information, you might be a pension trustee in a particular company 
and then be interested in that company’s risk disclosure but you are unlikely to respond to 
the consultation about risk disclosure in general because you’re focused on a particular 
aspect of risk”. R3  
“…And in my experience, most people are very closed up about their pensions in particular 
which is quite sad, you know very sad and they don’t start to look at anything until they 
are almost at retirement age and of course that is a little bit too late. This is because people 
have the view that its complex when really pensions are just another way of saving”. RD 
The degree to which information users are involved in the risk disclosure process influences the 
degree to which their expectations would be heard and incorporated within the process. As much 
as managers have a role to play in ensuring that adequate disclosures are providers, users also have 
to engage by responding to consultations and discussing their concerns with providers and not wait 
until something goes wrong to get involved. The importance of user’s (customers) involvement in 
the provision of risk disclosure (service) has been stressed in previous research in the service 




The above findings have discussed management’s response to users’ expectations for risk 
disclosure quality. Preparers appeared to understand the disclosure quality specifications 
highlighted by the user participants in the study. However, as highlighted in figure 5 below the 
findings show some potential causes for a listening gap (i.e. Gap 1) that may affect managements 
understanding of the user expectations discussed in section 7.2, which may in turn cause preparers 
to provide information based on what their preferences are rather than what the user expects. These 
potential causes may activate the preparers use of specific activities and procedures as well as 
influence their individual decisions when deciding whether to disclose or not to disclose a 
particular risk-related information. Drawing from Gibbins et al. (1990, p132) these potential 
causes are identified as disclosure issues that may have an important influence on the firm’s overall 
disclosure output.  
Figure 5 below also summaries some potential causes or disclosure issues controlled by the user’s 
involvement in the risk reporting process. These include the lack of user responses to consultations 
organised by both management and the regulator and the act of waiting until something goes wrong 
before they find a need to go back to the disclosures. For quality risks disclosures both parties must 
be actively involved in the risk disclosure process. Drawing on the Gaps Model of Service quality 
the discrepancy between users’ expectations for disclosure quality and their perceptions on the 
actual disclosures they get (i.e. Gap 5) depends on the size of the listening gap discussed in this 



















Figure 5 Findings relating to potential causes for a listening gap within the 
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5 Management understanding 
of user expectations 
GAP 1 – Listening gap 
Potential causes for a listening 
gap/Disclosure issues: 
Management:  
• Commercially sensitive 
information. 
• Risk of misinterpretation 
• Investors and market reaction 
• Conflict between risk culture 
and business culture. 
Users: 
• Unlikely to respond to 
consultations. 
• Wait until something goes 
wrong. 
Adapted from the Gaps Model 






To conclude, even though user participants express a desire for an access to the bank’s regulatory 
reporting, reduction in the volume of the disclosures and reliability of the information provided, it 
is evident that they recognise these may not always be possible. However, users express a zero 
level of tolerance for a need to have informed, specific, clear and comprehensive risk disclosures. 
This further includes the need for a clear link between the narratives provided within the banks’ 
disclosures and the numbers as well as a balance between the information required by the 
regulators and information voluntarily provided by the firm. From the findings, it was evident that 
management have in place avenues for obtaining information on users’ expectations for risk 
disclosures and they have an awareness of what the users expect. However, management highlights 
a number of potential causes for a discrepancy between what the user expects and their 
understandings of these expectations. Thereby, leading to a listening gap.  
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Chapter 8: The management of designing and developing risk disclosures  
 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed analysis of the risk disclosure design and 
production process of Bank A, a UK listed Bank among the FTSE 250 organisations. Following 
on from the views expressed by management in response to users’ expectations for risk disclosure, 
this chapter offers a deeper understanding on the risk disclosure process enacted by management 
to ensure that they meet external demands. The chapter explores the degree to which risk 
disclosures may be managed to incorporate user expectations in light of other disclosure 
antecedents. This falls within the scope of the disclosure design gap and it is where the researcher 
merges both the Gaps Model and the Disclosure Management Framework.  
According to the Gaps Model, the disclosure designs established within management to translate 
managements’ understandings of user expectations into disclosure quality specifications are an 
important aspect of disclosure quality. Even though the authors of the model refer to disclosure 
designs as the decision choices made by management in relation to how the disclosures should be 
presented, the Gaps Model of service quality provides little scope for examining these decision 
choices. For this reason, This study adopts concepts from the Disclosure Management Framework 
to provide an explanation on how the internal decision - making process is undertaken by 
management when translating their perceptions of users’ expectations into disclosure quality 
specifications. This is explained in much detail in chapter 4. 
Even though the users’ expectations for risk disclosure is the main antecedent explored in this 
research, This study acknowledges that as part of the disclosure management process a number of 
other antecedents exist which potentially influence the overall quality of the bank’s risk disclosures 
provided. Therefore, the process of designing and developing risk disclosures within the context 
of Bank A4 is discussed in light of any antecedents highlighted by participants throughout the data 
collection and analysis.  
The chapter begins in section 8.2 with an overview of the Bank A’s profile including the 
individuals and groups involved in the bank’s risk disclosure process. Section 8.3 offers insight in 
the design and development of the bank’s risk disclosures. The chapter finally ends with a 
summary in Section 8.4. 
 




 Participant’s profile  
Bank ‘A’ is one of the UK based retail commercial banks, mostly dealing in deposits, mortgage 
lending and credit cards and other financial services such as customer investments, pensions, 
insurance and currency products and services. The bank provides customer services through 
different channels including; digital (online and mobile), intermediaries, contact centres and a 
national network of stores. The organisation’s risk culture is customer-focused and its risk 
management strategy is to embark on a strategy that enables long term growth and profitability 
(Bank A’s Annual report). Bank A recognises the importance of ensuring a successful relationship 
with its stakeholders. In relation to its risk decision making and disclosure, the directors of the 
bank ensure that there is both a current overall risk profile and a forecasted risk profile of the 
bank’s risk exposures (Bank A’s Annual report). 
The design and production of risk disclosures within the management of Bank ‘A’ lies within the 
risk function, and the responsibilities for this are assigned to the following members: Chief Risk 
Officer (CRO), the Head of Risk Governance Reporting and Delivery (HoRGRD) and her team 
(i.e. risk reporting manager, risk reporting consultant, senior risk operating consultant, CRO 
business management and his personal assistants), the Chief Finance Officer and the finance team. 
These roles and the flow of information between the different groups and individuals are 
summarised in figure 6 and discussed in detail below.  
As shown in figure 6 below, the bank uses a ‘Three-Line of Defence’ model which defines clear 
responsibilities and accountabilities for ensuring effective independent assurance activities over 
key business activities. This three-line of defence falls within the bank’s risk management 
committee. The first-line management is primarily responsible for decisions associated with the 
identification of risk, measuring, monitoring and the controlling risks within their areas of 
accountability. First-line managers are required to establish effective controls in line with policy, 
to maintain appropriate risk management skills, practices and tools, and to act within Board-
approved risk appetite parameters. As first-line managers, they are not directly involved in the 
overall reporting process, which represents ‘the bigger picture for the banks’ operations’, however, 
they manage the risks identified and ensure that controls are put in place and then report their work 
and the related numbers to the second line managers. While carrying out these duties, line 1 
managers may also have their own reporting done within their individual branches which are then 
collated and reported to line 2 management. In addition to this and as part of its internal reporting 
responsibilities, the second line management produces templates for first-line managers to comply 




template provided to second line managers. However, the main risk reporting responsibilities lie 
mainly with the second line managers. 
The second-line management (Risk function) within Bank A provides proactive advice and 
constructive challenge on the effectiveness of risk decisions taken by the first line managers.  Line 
2 management is responsible for the design and development of the risk management framework 
and for promoting the implementation of a strategic approach to risk management within Bank A. 
The second-line management, therefore, provides a view of the Group's risk profile while 
proposing and reporting against the risk appetite to the Board as well as overseeing the Group's 
internal stress testing framework and ensuring that a good working relationship is maintained with 
their regulators. In relation to the bank's risk landscape, which identifies the banks emerging and 
principal risk at a point in time, the second line managers aim to provide oversight and challenge 
as to how well the bank was managing and controlling its principal and emerging risks as 
highlighted in the bank’s risk landscape. This is then reported internally to the Chief Risk Officer 
(CRO) and the board on a monthly basis, in addition to the reports that come from the first-line 
managers.  
Within the second-line management in Bank A is a team responsible for risk governance, risk 
reporting, and delivery. The main responsibility for risk disclosure and reporting lies with this risk 
reporting team within the second line management of the risk function as shown in figure 6 below.  
Participants highlight that: “The main responsibility for the annual reports is the finance team and 
the investor relations, but the main responsibility for the risk disclosures within the annual reports 
lies with the risk function and the risk reporting function” ACM. So, when it comes to managing 
the risk disclosure provided with the annual report both the finance team and the risk reporting 
team work hand in hand to provide this report with the Chief Finance Officer (CFO) providing 
oversight. 
Within the risk reporting team specifically, the Head of Risk Governance, Reporting, and Delivery 
(HoRGRD) within Bank ‘A’ has four people reporting directly to her, including; a risk manager, 
a risk consultant, the CROs business manager and the senior risk operations consultant.  The risk 
reporting manager and risk reporting consultant, who both have an accountancy background, are 
responsible for dealing with the individual accounts and all the IFRS reporting disclosed in the 
annual reports working together with the finance team (led by the CFO). The risk reporting 
consultant is then responsible for pulling together all the board committee papers, to and from the 




consulting with them. The HoRGRD will then come at the top and review to make sure that was 
all in line. The team also includes a senior risk operations consultant that does not do any of the 
reporting, they deal with the recruitment of the risk function, training and development, budgets 
recruitment and the like (HoRGRD). As mentioned earlier, the second line manager’s report 
internally mainly to both the CRO and the board monthly. The CRO's business manager serves as 
an intermediary between the CRO and the HoRGRD in delivering information on matters going 
on in the CRO's world, the CRO's major concerns and what the CRO believes the risk reporting 
team should take up to the board committee. The CRO’s business manager deals more with the 
delivery side when it comes to risk and reports directly to the HoRGRD on everything the CRO 
deals with as well as any issues or concerns to risk the CRO would like to put across. The business 
manager then has three personal assistants to help in carrying out his tasks.   
The third-line management (Internal Audit) within the three lines of defence then provides 
independent, objective assurance to improve operations. This line helps the Group achieve its 
objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the 
effectiveness of risk management, control, and governance processes.  (Annual report, 2016). 
Third-line management is responsible for providing a view on how the first-line and second-line 
work together to ensure that risks are identified, managed, controlled and reported accurately. 
These three lines of defence play a vital role in the bank’s risk reporting process. However, the 
overall responsibility for risk reporting lies within the second line management. Figure 6 below 
summarises the different roles involved in Bank A’s risk disclosure process and the flow of 
information between the different groups and individuals. The lines without arrows illustrate the 
decision-making hierarchy and the individual committees under which the senior executives who 
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 The design and development of risk disclosures  
The perspectives of management indicated that with the development of risk disclosures there is a 
big process that goes behind the decision of whether to disclose or not to disclose a particular risk-
related information. This process involves a lot of engagement in which the roles of different 
individuals and groups are involved, not just in the production of the public report (e.g. an annual 
report), but also in the process of internal risk reporting where the actual decisions begin.  The 
degree to which risk disclosure responsibilities are assigned and guided throughout this disclosure 
process has been referred to as the bank’s internal disclosure structures (Gibbins et al., 1990). It is 
argued that even though issues with disclosure implications offer the specific stimulus for 
corporate disclosure, the firm’s disclosure structures are the general activating motivation for 
deciding what to disclose and what not to disclose as well as the identification of the extent of 
disclosure antecedents (Mayorga, 2013). From the findings, it is evident that whenever 
management is confronted with a disclosure issue such as issues relating to the introduction of a 
new regulation or guideline, or even a potential for an increased risk of misinterpretation, the 
disclosure structures and systems are the underlying mechanisms for the way these issues are 
addressed. The bank’s disclosure position is then identified as the bank’s internal preference for 
managing disclosure, which could either be geared towards an uncritical acceptance of rules and 
norms (i.e. ritualistic) or a propensity to seek firm-specific advantages or opportunities (i.e. 
opportunistic) developed as a result of the firms existing disclosure antecedents. This is illustrated 
in figure 7 below for Bank A’s risk disclosure process.   
This section discusses the risk disclosure process and design by looking at the different actions 
and roles involved as well as the degree to which responsibilities for risk disclosures are assigned 
and guided drawing from Gibbins et al. (1990)’s concept of disclosure structures. The degree to 
which the bank’s disclosure structures are then shaped is determined by a number of disclosure 
antecedents (Gibbins et al., 1990; Lantto, 2013; Johansen and Plenborg, 2018). The section 
discusses Bank A’s disclosure antecedents in light of the Bank’s response to disclosure issues and 
their existing structures for managing risk disclosure.  
In line with prior literature (Gibbins et al., 1990; Mayorga, 2013; Johansen and Plenborg, 2018), 
the findings provide evidence that managers’ responses reflected the importance of adhering to 
accepted disclosure practices, including the continuous review of past disclosure reports, the 
review of existing and new regulatory disclosure requirements and guidelines as well as the 




part of this process, the study identifies a number of disclosure antecedents that influence how the 
risk reporting decisions within Bank A are made.  
The corporate history and prior experience of a company is considered as highly fundamental, and 
it is one of the key tools in identifying and categorising risks in the disclosure management process 
(Gibbins et al., 1990; Mayorga, 2013). The history of Bank A’s risk reporting is reviewed on an 
annual basis and it is often used as a starting point through a gap analysis to access the bank’s 
current risk position, and any changes in relation to recent risk-related events and issues are 
adjusted to the previous year’s risk disclosures.  This is reflected in the use of the bank’s risk 
landscape as discussed in chapter 6. Management highlights that the bank’s principal and emerging 
risks identified in the past forms the basis for reviewing and updating its risk landscape. 
 “We would always look back and say okay what did we do last year and we use that history 
as our starting point and do a gap analysis. So, we will say has there been anything that 
has happened during the year that would require us to change it, we would also look at 
how other banks have done things, we would look at the regulations as well” HoRDRG. 
“every quarter we would go through a process of looking at the risk landscape and going 
out to the business and saying to them what are the key risks in your area and then we 
gather that all together and we look at any new regulations going on at the moment as 
well. We have the principal risks which are very much prescribed and then we have our 
emerging risks where we just look at the landscape every quarter and that changes” 
HoRDRG. 
“Like everything in life, you need a little bit of history in order to step forward. Corporate 
history, corporate experience and corporate knowledge is fundamental” RD. 
As much as Bank A’s corporate disclosure history plays an important role on the bank’s risk 
disclosure process, as an internal antecedent, management highlights that the firm’s regulatory 
responsibilities have had the biggest impact and the regulators are the driving force of 
standardising the bank’s risk disclosures. And banks who fail to comply with the regulations face 
huge cost consequences. 
“…there is who scares me most and its always the guys at the regulators, always the guys 
at the regulators.” RD. 
Within Bank A, there is a settled difference between their incidents and breaches and this is 




Bank A has to do with breaching the regulations and the law and incident is doing something more 
against the company’s internal limits and policies. This technique of identifying the banks’ 
breaches and incidents and ensuring that these are controlled have emerged because of the bank’s 
obligation to address the regulators expectations. An example given by the Risk Director was an 
issue of a power outage where the bank would want their system to be out for not more than 30 
minutes for a particular reason and the regulator may require the bank to recover within 2 hours in 
a situation like that. In this situation, if the bank’s system is out for more than 30 minutes it 
becomes an incident internally and the bank would not need to tell the regulator because they have 
still got an hour and a half to meet the regulatory requirements. In this case, the bank is giving 
itself an hour and a half. But also, the bank wants to see how many of those 30 minutes of outages 
there are before it breaches the regulation. This is important because if there are internal reasons 
for why the bank is struggling to recover within that period of time, then there is clearly a root 
cause which the bank would have to clear out in order to prevent any outages. RD further posits 
that, as a bank, we have to look at our complaints, our previous breaches and incidents, and also 
our previous culture, and the present board members and if there was any turnover for some reason.  
Even though the bank may provide within its disclosures its compliance to the regulation by 
recovering with the limit of 2 hours as imposed by the regulator, it has the discretion of deciding 
whether or not to disclose its incidents. However, the disclosure of information relating to the 
bank’s failure to recover within their internal set limits could be informative to understanding any 
potential causes and the bank’s established measures for mitigating against these in an attempt to 
sustain their compliance to the regulations.  
Despite the increase in risk related disclosure requirements, it is evident that management has some 
amount of discretion in the provision of risk disclosures within their published reports, as the 
guidelines tend to be quite vague in some areas requiring some level of subjectivity. Therefore, 
banks have in place internal responsive systems to manage their compliance (Gibbins et al., 1990). 
It is thus, argued that the structures enacted by management in their disclosure process is not just 
shaped by what the regulators require but most importantly management’s response to these 
requirements.   
Management highlighted that their disclosure decisions had become more sensitive to the 
regulator’s expectation for disclosure as compared to other user groups. It appeared that the risk 
of not meeting the regulator’s expectation for disclosure impacted the risk disclosure decisions 




disclosure responses to the regulators’ expectations are considered to a greater extent than the 
expectations of other information users. This is not to say that efforts are not made to meet other 
user expectation for quality risk disclosures. Management mentions that in addressing user 
expectation they often use the regulations as a starting point because they believe the regulations 
come from investor feedback through consultations between the regulators and information users 
(i.e. investors and analysts).   
“I think the regulations come from the capital market as well so if there is something that 
investors really wanted then it will probably end up being embedded in the regulations and we 
will then use that also as our starting point when addressing user expectations". HoRDRG 
In addition, RD highlights that, even though they are mainly influenced by what the regulator 
wants and there is a greater incentive to reduce the bank’s regulatory risk, there is always the 
expectations from other information users (e.g. investors) and management has an obligation to 
them and to act in a fair and truthful manner. 
“Fundamentally for me, at the end of the day it is about, especially in my industry, we deal 
with huge sums of money in large amounts from also institutional investments and we 
forget that at the end of the day every single one of these investments is someone’s pension 
or someone’s ISA. Of course, we’re a company and we have shareholders and we have 
employees to pay and all of those people are stakeholders and need to be remunerated in 
the right way. But when it comes down to it, these are people’s lives and people’s futures 
and we’ve got an obligation in an honest way to protect them and their savings” RD. 
As a result, RD emphasises the importance of integrity within the bank’s risk function and within 
any business’s risk function.  
“Some people have indeed integrity a key sense of justice and if you’re very lucky those 
people will end up in risk divisions. And disclosure for me is one of those very basic tools 
that would demonstrate the integrity of the bank and its management” RD.  
Reflecting on this, the integrity of the bank’s risk function is identified as an internal disclosure 
antecedent impacting the way disclosures may be provided. The integrity of senior risk 
management personnel is particularly crucial considering the amount of influence they exert on 
their teams.  
As highlighted earlier, the risk reporting process of Bank A comprises of two main underlying 




reporting responsibilities. The roles and duties associated with each of these responsibilities within 
the risk disclosure function are assigned and guided throughout the bank’s risk disclosure process. 
Management highlights that Bank A’s internal risk disclosure process begins with an assessment 
of anything the bank is worried about within its operations and in the economy (e.g. interest rates 
spikes) as well as how that is going to affect its business model and products (e.g. mortgages, 
credit cards and savings) and the company as a whole. This may also include any changes in the 
regulatory requirements or an introduction of a new guideline proposed by agencies such as the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC), the Task Force on Climate Change (TCFD), and the Enhanced 
Disclosure Task Force (EDTF).  
The managers of Bank A believe that their risk disclosure decisions are often influenced by the 
uncertainties and complexities within the economy and the environment and therefore an 
assessment is often carried out to assess the impact of these uncertainties. The HoRDRG and her 
team together with the Finance team within Bank A are responsible for reviewing and assessing 
the impact of any economic uncertainty within the industry, and the introduction of a new 
regulation or guideline. 
“So anytime something like that comes out from the TCFD for instance, my team and I 
together with the Finance team will have a look at it and establish whether there would be 
an impact on the corporate disclosures. A lot of the time because finance ultimately own 
the annual accounts they deal with that as well and they have an impact assessment to find 
if there is anything we need to be doing. In terms of a risk such as climate change risk, 
there might be something that might come out specifically on risk reporting and I would 
be involved.  Our impact assessment would often include what the guidelines are, how it 
affects us, what do we currently disclose, what do we need to disclose, what do we not need 
to disclose, and that is the process that we would go through and then it will sit with 
whoever it was linked to” HoRDRG. 
This assessment is often carried out on a monthly basis and is reflected in the bank’s risk landscape 
at the end of each quarter as shown in chapter 6, table 6-1. This assessment is then provided in the 
form of a document which is disclosed internally within management and the board. In addition to 
this, the risk function meets on a monthly basis to ensure that they are calling out the material risk-
related issues and areas the bank is exposed to. Once the material issues are called out and 




a whole, what needs to be done moving forward, and what the bank needs to be aware of 
throughout the period and there are different roles and positions involved in this process. 
Reflecting on their experience, this process involves a ritualistic behaviour (Gibbins et al., 1990) 
carried out within the bank routinely and involves the prescribed norm of ensuring that events that 
may have risk disclosure implications are reviewed and monitored on a monthly basis. 
As discussed above, the internal disclosure process within bank A initially emerges from the 
external antecedents associated with economic uncertainties and emergent regulatory 
requirements. The risks pertaining to these external antecedents are then categorised within the 
bank’s risk landscape. Bank A’s risk landscape is fundamental to the way risk is reported and 
managed. HoRDRG suggests that “risk disclosures can only be improved as long as they keep 
changing with the bank’s risk landscape and they are adapting and responding in line with any 
uncertainties in the market, the environment and the economy.” 
“it is important that we don’t just do the same things because the environment and the 
economy changes. With IFRS 9, the regulations changed after the financial crisis and when 
things happen accounting standards and reporting bodies and disclosure should change 
in reaction to what’s happening in the environment and the world like Brexit for instance. 
And I think as long as that keeps happening its important because you’re getting more 
transparency and disclosures, and this will help stop something like that happening 
again.” HoRDRG 
The disclosures go through a process of identifying the probability and impact of each risk element 
within the bank’s risk landscape and how each aspect of the bank’s risk landscape (i.e. chapter 6, 
table 6-1) falls within or outside the bank’s risk appetite.  According to Bryce et al. (2019), it is 
important for management to obtain reliable and accurate information for any issue or event that 
may have a disclosure implication, regardless of whether such events are simply human errors or 
deliberate actions that could have a harmful impact on the company and its business. The risk 
landscape or framework is reviewed every quarter and it points out the emerging and principal 
areas of risk at a point in time. Thus, the risk landscape could change from time to time.  The 
ritualistic behaviour of reviewing and assessing the Bank’s risk landscape on a quarterly basis is 
the responsibility of the HoRDRG and her team. The propensity of the bank to adhere to this 
behaviour is driven by the need to update its risk landscape with new and principal risks so as to 
ensure that there are not any material risks being overlooked. This determines the scope of the 




Once the bank’s risk landscape has been updated, it is reported to the CRO through her business 
manager and also to the management board (i.e. the bank’s risk management committee and the 
board risk committee) as part of the bank’s internal reporting responsibilities. The use of authority 
within Bank A to review, oversee and challenge how the risks are internally reported and classified 
as either principal or emerging is seen as essential to Bank A’s risk reporting process.  
As the CRO is ultimately responsible for risk management and risk disclosure, there is a monthly 
meeting that takes place among the HoRDRG, her team, the finance team and the CRO which 
enables the discussion of a constructed report called the ‘CRO’s update’. The CRO’s update is a 
report that calls out what the CRO thinks the team should be reporting in a given month. This 
report is developed based on discussion within the team and includes both the disclosure of the 
bank’s principal and emerging risks. The bank’s principal risks are often those stipulated in the 
regulatory requirements and often remain within the bank’s risk landscape every time it is 
reviewed. These principal risks include the bank’s credit risks, market risks, and operational risks. 
The bank’s emerging risks on the other hand are the new types of risks reported to the risk function 
by different departments on existing issues within the bank’s business model.  
“As a bank, we try to make sure there is a distinction our principal and emerging risks. 
Some of these emerging risks may include changes in the macroeconomic environment 
(e.g. Brexit) and how that affects mortgages, new regulations, customer behaviour, 
supplier partnerships and how we deal with our third-party suppliers” HoRDRG.   
“We can look but at regulations that have been put out year on year and how that might 
impact what we do and all of that would be captured in our emerging risks and what we 
do this year might be quite different from what we did last year because different things 
would have happened throughout this year” HoRDRG 
Moreover, management note that a lot of subjectivity goes into the process of identifying potential 
risks, categorising them within the bank’s landscape and potentially reviewing and classifying 
them as either principal and emerging risks. 
All discussions and conclusions made among the HoRDRG, the finance team and the CRO are 
then reported to the management board (i.e. the bank’s risk management committee and the board 
risk committee). These two committees (i.e. risk management committee and the board risk 
committee) are very similar in terms of risk management responsibilities even though they are 
both positioned at different levels of authorities. The risk management committee includes the 




team within the risk management committee. Most of the issues discussed here include the bank’s 
current risk position and how that is going to affect the business’ products (e.g. mortgages and 
savings) and the company as a whole. Any discussions between the members of the risk 
management committee are then reported back to the HoRDRG, her team and the Finance team 
for review, oversight and challenge. The board risk committee on the other hand includes the non-
executive directors who are independent of the bank and therefore do not engage in the day to day 
management of the bank. However, they are involved in policy-making and planning exercises 
within the bank. They are also responsible for reviewing any output submitted to them by the CRO 
within her updated report and to give some feedback on the reports collated.  According to the 
HoRGRD, there are usually different things that the risk reporting team would need approval for 
from either the risk management committee and the board risk committee depending on the kind 
of issue in question. 
Consistent with Gibbins et al. (1990), Mayorga (2013) and Johansen and Plenborg (2018), the 
researcher believes that Bank A’s propensity to either adhere to specific disclosure norms or to 
seek firm-specific advantages when deciding what to disclose or what not to disclose is affected 
by corporate politics. From the findings, it was evident that management’s attitude towards 
disclosure reflected the attitudes of the CRO and the board committees when taking the lead in 
monitoring potential risk disclosure events. The evidence provided further clarification that even 
though the HoRGRD and her team within the line 2 management are responsible for reporting and 
delivering risk-related information, the actual disclosure responsibility for deciding what to 
disclose and what not to disclose lies mainly with the CRO and the Board committees.  
Moving on from corporate politics, the availability and appropriateness of resources necessary for 
the provision of quality disclosures did not seem to be an issue from the perspectives of 
management. Management highlights that when it comes to their risk disclosures, all of the data 
collated and needed for their risk reports relate to the bank’s existing portfolios and business 
activities. Thus, the resources needed to carry out their disclosures are often inbuilt and developed 
internally.  
As part of the bank’s external risk reporting responsibilities the bank is responsible for providing 
in its annual reports, Regulatory News Service, and the Basel pillar 3 report any risk-related issues 
that affect the bank in a given period and the measures taken to manage, mitigate and control these 
risks. These include compliance with accounting standards that relate to risks and the bank has a 




end. Management adds that, whenever there is a new publication of a disclosure requirement the 
risk reporting team would usually meet to discuss and go through the requirements to assess how 
this would affect their current disclosure position of the bank and if their current disclosures will 
have to be adjusted (HoRGRD). Thus, each quarter the risk reporting team and the finance team 
would meet to put the external risk disclosures together. These are then reviewed and approved by 
both the risk management committee and the board risk committee.  
As soon as the key risks have been identified and management has decided how these key risks 
would be managed and mitigated, it is reported internally through the bank’s internal risk reporting 
process. Within this internal risk reporting process management decides what to disclose and what 
not to disclose in the public domain considering the risk of providing commercially sensitive 
information and the risk of misinterpretation that might be subject to the disclosure or non-
disclosure of such information. These findings provide evidence that management does have the 
discretion and the incentive to control information disclosed in the public domain even in the 
presence of regulatory requirements (Gibbins et al., 1990; Mayorga, 2013). 
Management highlights that as part of their external reporting process and in ensuring that the 
accounts are “Fair Balanced and Understandable”, they would always perform an exercise to 
ensure that they provide an adequate background for everything they have made mention of in 
their disclosures. This is to ensure that anyone who has very little knowledge on banking and risk 
would be able to pick up the banks disclosures and understand it.  
According to management, a lot of effort is put into this process of fostering understanding and 
they go through quite a big process to make sure that the numbers in the tables, for instance, are 
explained and clarified and that the narratives are free from unnecessary jargons.   
The HoRGRD was asked by the interviewer what the challenges are in carrying out this task. The 
HoRGRD posits that it is usually quite a difficult task for them. However, in order to get around 
this, the team would usually get somebody who is not involved in the numbers and this individual 
would not read any of the risk disclosures until the last month when all the reports are collated and 
put together into the one document. The individual would then take the whole document and read 
it afresh from start to finish to assess their level of understanding. An example will be somebody 
who is maybe working in the culture department and has nothing to do with the bank’ risk reporting 
(HoRGRD). In relation to this, there is an indication from the findings that, efforts in relation to 




Once the reports are drafted and collated, the related accounts and reports are taken to the risk 
management committee for review and approval and later taken up to the board committee (i.e. 
CRO and CFO) for a second review and approval. Once the risk disclosures have been signed off 
by the CRO and the CFO and there is clarity of what exactly needs to be done, the disclosures are 
then taken back to the risk management committee to say here are the signed disclosures, they do 
not need further approval (HoRGRD).  A member of the audit committee was then asked by the 
interviewer whether there are conflicts in deciding what should be approved and what should not 
be approved when it comes to the disclosures. According to the member of the audit committee at 
the bank, "...Where there is usually a conflict and I don't think we've had one recently, is where 
we might think some information is commercially sensitive, and when the information is 
commercially sensitive and our competitors may use it against us. To be honest, that is quite rare 
that that happens as risk disclosures from banks are mostly standardized in terms of the type of 
information given, however, there is a lot of discussion around the content." (ACM). Mayorga 
(2013) refers to such decisions as subjective disclosure decisions generally made by the board and 
board committees.  
Once the risk disclosure reports are reviewed internally as part of the team’s internal responsibility 
for risk reporting, they are then reviewed by an independent external auditor who will then provide 
a reasonable assurance on the truth and fairness of the disclosures made. However, even though 
the auditors are required to provide some form of assurance on the disclosures made in the annual 
report, the auditors are not required to provide an assurance on the risk disclosures provided in the 
other risk disclosure reports like the Basel pillar 3 reports. Therefore, the auditor’s responsibility, 
in this case, will be to read the Basel pillar 3 report and to confirm that everything in that is 
consistent with the auditor’s knowledge derived from reviewing the bank’s financial statements 
(ACM).    
As part of the bank’s risk reporting process is its business and risk culture. Management highlights 
that the bank’s risk appetite and risk reporting responsibilities play a vital role in expressing its 
overall business culture, which sits at the heart of its business model. Firstly, there is the bank’s 
business culture which is aligned to its EBO, which sits at the heart of the bank’s business model 
and emphasises accountability. The bank’s EBO philosophy is to make “everyone better off” by 
delivering good value to our customers, treating colleagues well, making a positive contribution 
to society, building positive relationships with our partners and sustainable profits to our 
shareholders. Secondly, there is the bank’s risk culture which is founded on a clear articulation of 




According to management, this is key in making good risk disclosures. The HoRGRD highlights 
that the bank’s risk culture is an underlying factor for delivering adequate risk disclosures and as 
a bank, if you have a strong risk culture you would care about finding out more about the risks 
within your risk appetite as well as managing and disclosing them. According to the Audit 
Committee Member, those within the bank responsible for the identification and management of 
the banks’ risks will always ensure that these risks are taken in line with the bank’s well-defined 
risk appetite and will only ever act within the bank’s risk appetite. He highlights that the difficulty 
then lies with deciding what to disclose and what not to disclose in order to meet its business’s 
culture of delivering good value to its customers and making them well aware of what the banks’ 
risks are. However, there is the issue of filtering out information and providing customers with the 
information they actually need and that becomes a difficult task and affects the bank’s business 
culture of providing quality delivery to its customers (ACM). 
In relation to this, management highlights that a lot of work goes into a process of ensuring that 
they have control and disclose only the information that the user needs and avoid disclosing any 
information that might be misconstrued and misinterpreted.  
Management highlights that, there is therefore an incentive for management to withhold any 
information that cannot be supported by sufficient evidence. For this reason, not every information 
that is reported internally is disclosed externally to the public. Nevertheless, HoRDRG highlights 
that they would want to be seen as being legitimate when it comes to their risk disclosures and 
they have an incentive to strive for a competitive edge by providing information to users above the 
minimum requirements mandated by the regulator, that could foster their trust (DRA).  In this case, 
management exhibits an opportunistic behaviour in an attempt to control the information provided 
and at the same time foster trust and confidence through the effective management of the disclosure 
process (Gibbins et al., 1990).  
As part of this external reporting process, the bank is required to face off to their investors through 
investor presentations, Annual General Meetings (AGMs), and investor roadshows, conference 
calls, and Governance Forums once the disclosures are made public.  These avenues give 
management the opportunity to respond to users concerns on the content of the disclosures they 
have provided and then to apply these in the disclosures they provide. However, the findings show 
that even though management is open to direct interactions with users to discuss disclosures, the 




their disclosures and are aimed at providing clarifications to what has already been disclosed and 
not additional information.  
Figure 7 below summarises the key antecedents identified within Bank A’s risk disclosure process 
as both internal and external antecedents. Bank A’s risk disclosure process above are discussed in 
light of these internal and external disclosure antecedents. Drawing from the Disclosure 
Management Framework, it is believed that, once disclosure antecedents are identified by 
management, the degree to which the bank’s disclosure structures are then shaped to respond to 
these antecedents is determined by those disclosure antecedents (Gibbins et al., 1990; Lantto, 
2013; Johansen and Plenborg, 2018). The bank’s disclosure position is then identified as the bank’s 
internal preference for the way they may choose to respond which could either be geared towards 
an uncritical acceptance of rules and norms (i.e. ritualistic) or a propensity to seek firm-specific 
advantages or opportunities (i.e. opportunistic) developed as a result of the firms existing 
disclosure antecedents. 
Figure 7 Key findings on the firm’s risk disclosure structures and the presence of 
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8.3.1 ‘Disclosure issues’ influencing manager’s risk disclosure process 
Despite this internal structured approach within the bank, the ability to get across to all the bank 
(i.e. the different people involved, the different strategies and risks) in order to obtain the relevant 
information needed to represent the overall picture of the bank’s risk position was identified by 
participants as a very difficult task. This is as a result of the bank's complex nature and the fact 
that these will have to go through a thorough review and approval process before being collated 
into one report. Participants refer to this as a huge task because the bank is required to put together 
a massive document that is written by a lot of different people, but it is meant to read and sound 
like it is just been written by one person. However, the ritualistic behaviour of consistent monthly 
reporting made internally helps to facilitate the collation of information from the different units 
within the risk function. According to DRA, the bank undertakes different corporate strategies to 
ensure that the reports are fair, balanced and understandable and that they read well. There is 
usually a team, who is not directly involved in the risk reporting process who will go through the 
disclosures from start to finish to assess the level of understanding. The example HRGDR gave 
was a department from culture. This is to ensure that a user who has limited knowledge of risk and 
the complexity of its concepts would be able to understand the risk report when read from start to 
finish. This shows that attempts are made by management to address participants perceptions on 
the view that; the reason for less clarity in the disclosures could be because those involved in 
putting the disclosures together usually have a much fuller understanding of the process than an 
external person to the firm and therefore when they write the disclosures it makes a lot of sense to 
them but when read by someone who has got little information about the bank or its risks, it reads 
as being more complex.   
Management adds that there is also a team responsible for setting the tone and ensuring that there 
is a balance between formal and informal or “chatty” statements in the risk disclosures provided. 
Management believes that if a particular information is disclosed twice in different statements, one 
as being formal and the other informal, it would read differently and could be interpreted 
differently by the reader. Therefore, efforts are made within the bank to ensure that information 
that is to be reported formally, based on what management aims to put across, should be interpreted 
as a formal statement and the same should be for informal statements to reduce the risk of 
misinterpretation. 
Moreover, a lot of work goes into the process to ensure that management has control over the 




provided. This is to ensure that such information is not loosely interpreted by the user.  
Management highlights that, there is therefore an incentive to withhold any information that cannot 
be supported by sufficient evidence and thus might be loosely interpreted if disclosed. 
On the statutory reporting, there is the minimum stipulated regulatory requirement for banks to 
report, which is often boiler plated. However, there is no maximum stipulation and a number of 
companies can decide to either go above and beyond (DRA). DRA adds that: 
“So, we can start with your boilerplate (i.e. this is what we have to disclose) and then what 
we think we should report and that could be quite different. And I think at ‘Bank A’ we 
were more at the end of the spectrum in terms of what do we have to report and also, we 
do not want to give away too much about our strategy…” DRA. 
According to DRA for every assertion of information provided in the banks’ disclosures, there is 
a team that has to check back to the evidence before that could be signalled to go through. For this 
reason, DRA adds that whatever information the bank puts out to the public is well controlled and 
supported with sufficient evidence to ensure that as a bank they are not contradicting themselves. 
This is important because if a clever analyst is able to pick that information and realises a 
contradiction it could throw the bank’s credibility ‘under the water’.  
“… so we have to be very very careful that we produce that you only make objective 
statements that are verifiable and that those statements are carried through all the 
statements at different times and we report every quarter and so if we are updating our 
statements we need to make sure that if we’ve said something slightly different it can be 
evidenced that year on and so it requires a very very careful coordination, verification and 
evidential based disclosures to the market”. DRA 
The Director of risk assurance highlights that there is also the challenge with being able to 
differentiate between the day to day risks that are really controlled by the bank and those risks that 
have the ability to threaten what the business does as well as the materiality levels of these risks 
and their impact on the business and the bank as a whole (DRA).  
 
 “…So, businesses take risks every single day and that is absolutely fine and there will be 
issues every single day. Risk control is to have a Laser-sharp focus on what worries us and 
so we are going to deep dive on that a bit more so we can give assurance to the board that 
this is not going to affect our strategy or cause the business or this is not going to cause us 




understand all the different aspects of the bank, being at the right place at the right time to 
challenge that and then pull that all together. It doesn’t necessarily scare people that there 
is an issue with the envelopes in the mailroom today but there is a customer conduct issue 
that has the ability to threaten banks existence. Like PPI for example, you must be able to 
understand the materiality and all that falls behind that to be able to challenge it is vital…. 
But it also means that at times you struggle to keep your head above water to make sure 
you are doing a good job” DRA. 
In summary, the findings from section 8.3 and 8.3.1 discusses the bank’s disclosure process and 
design by looking at the different actions and roles involved, as well as the degree to which 
responsibilities for risk disclosures are assigned and guided. The findings show that even though 
management may have a structured approach and process in place to ensure adequate risk 
disclosures are provided in line with their objectives and the disclosure requirements, there are a 
few challenges which may be considered by management as a hindrance to facilitating risk 
disclosure quality as discussed in Section 8.3.1. These are identified as disclosure issues and are 
the challenges which could impact the degree to which management incorporates their 
understanding of users’ expectations for disclosure quality into their risk disclosure process.  
Drawing from the Gaps model of service quality, Figure 8 below also shows these challenges as a 
potential cause for a discrepancy between management’s understanding of the users’ expectations 
and the degree to which risk disclosures are designed to reflect these expectations. 
The analysis also identified management’s preference for the way they may choose to respond to 
identified disclosure issues. This preference was identified as either ritualistic or opportunistic in 
supporting depending on the disclosure issue or case approached by management (Gibbins et al, 
1990; Trabelsi et al., 2004) Thus, the disclosure position is an average response to disclosure issues 
(Trabelsi et al., 2004). 
Figure 8 below identifies a number of disclosure issues as potential causes for both a listening gap 
(Gap 1) and a design gap (Gap 2). The potential causes for a listening gap identified below also 
influences the degree to which risk disclosures are designed to reflect the users’ expectations. 
Management’s response to these disclosure issues may either reflect a propensity to adhere to 
existing norms or a propensity to seek a firm-specific advantage as a result of an existing disclosure 
issue. Management’s preference then determines the degree to which the bank’s disclosure 
structures are shaped to respond to these disclosure issues (Gibbins et al., 1990; Lantto, 2013; 
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This chapter provides detailed insights into the development and management of risk disclosures 
within the context of a UK listed bank (Bank A). Drawing on the perceptions and expectations of 
users for risk disclosure quality as well as management’s response to these, the case study uses 
concepts from both the Disclosure Management Framework and the Gaps model of service quality. 
The management of risks disclosure was seen as a big part of banks’ activities. In line with the 
Disclosure Management Framework, users’ expectations for risk disclosure is a key antecedent to 
the disclosure management process. The findings suggest that even though users may have an 
expectation for a particular quality, they believed that some disclosure quality specifications may 
not always be possible and they would therefore have some level of tolerance for such qualities. 
Drawing on the Gaps Model of service quality as a guide to investigation management’s response 
to users’ expectations, the case study identifies a few potential causes for a discrepancy between 
users’ expectations and management’s understanding of these expectations in the first instance. 
The findings suggest that even though management had an awareness of the qualities raised by 
users, they mention issues associated with the disclosure of commercially sensitive information 
and the risk of misinterpretation when it comes to incorporating users’ expectations in the 
disclosure process.  
The study also identifies potential issues associated with the disclosure process itself including 
management’s ability to get across to all of the bank’s risk systems and processes as well as their 
ability to actively differentiate between their day to day risks and the significant risks that have the 
potential to damage what the business does. There was also the issue associated with disclosing 
risk information that falls within the banks business culture which includes delivering good value 
to its customers and making them well aware of what the banks’ risks are. However, there is the 
issue of filtering out information and providing customers with the information they actually need 
and not what they want which becomes a difficult task and affects the bank’s business culture of 
providing quality delivery to its customers.  
 180 
Chapter 9: Discussion  
 Introduction 
This chapter provides a discussion of the primary finding presented in chapter 7 and 8 in an attempt 
to bring it in line with the Disclosure Management Framework and the Gaps Model of Service 
Quality. Section 9.2 discusses the findings relating to participants’ views on the concepts and 
definition of risk. Section 9.3 then discusses users’ expectations for risk disclosure quality. The 
study focussed on management’s understanding of these expectations and their responses to the 
points raised by participants on their expectations for quality risk disclosures. These findings are 
discussed in section 9.3.1. The findings reveal the potential causes for a discrepancy between 
users’ expectations and management’s understanding of these expectations in their attempt to 
address these. It also revealed issues associated with translating management’s understanding of 
users’ expectations into disclosures quality specifications. Building on the Disclosure 
Management Framework, section 9.4 discusses the findings on the process of designing and 
developing risk disclosures within the context of Bank A. The chapter then concludes in section 
9.5. 
 Discussing the definition of risk from the perspective of both the preparers and users 
of risk disclosure 
The findings in chapter 6 suggest that in order to understand the views of preparers and users on 
risk disclosure, it is important to identify what they refer to as risk. This provides an opportunity 
to identify any varied views expressed by the participants on the concept of risk and its definition. 
The findings relating to the different views expressed by participants on the definition of risk 
serves as a starting point to understanding their expectations for risk disclosure which is an 
important aspect of the study. 
The current study finds that, users often refer to risk as a default or a negative outcome. However, 
from a management’s point of view risk is initially perceived as the occurrence of an event which 
has the potential to result in a negative outcome but there is also the potential for that event to 
result in a positive outcome (i.e. reward). Thus, management’s ability to control for the risk could 
determine the degree of the impact of the risk on the bank. This is what drives management’s 
incentive to take on risks and provide measures to control and mitigate the potential of the event 
resulting in a negative outcome.  
The findings also show that, whereas institutional investors refer to risk as unexpected losses 




financial analysts, on the other hand, refer to risk as mainly variations or fluctuation in the bank’s 
risk profile, asset holdings, asset quality, liquidity position and earnings which ultimately affect 
the banks share price. Drawing insights from the discussion above, section 9.3 below discusses 
users’ expectations for risk disclosure quality. 
 Discussing users’ expectations for risk disclosure quality 
Prior studies on the Disclosure Management Framework identify a number of antecedents, which 
drive the disclosure of corporate information, including user expectations (Gibbins et al,1990; 
Mayorga, 2013;). However, the Disclosure Management Framework provides a limited scope for 
exploring the degree to which these antecedents may be managed. Focusing on user expectations 
for risk disclosure, as a key antecedent to the management of risk disclosure, the current study 
builds on the Gaps model (Parasuraman et al., 1985; Zeithaml et al., 2002; 2016). The Gaps Model 
serves as a tool for examining the discrepancies between what users expect and how they perceive 
the current disclosures. The concepts assume that the discrepancy between these two depends on 
the degree to which the disclosures are designed to reflect user’ expectations. It is worth noting 
that this is the first study to reconceptualise and adapt the Gaps Model within the context of 
corporate disclosure. The Disclosure Management Framework was therefore modified to explain 
the analysed data and findings. This also allowed the researcher to identify disclosure antecedents 
specific to the management of risk disclosure and potential causes for any discrepancies between 
what users expect and their perceptions of the actual disclosures they get. 
The study identifies managements’ perceptions on constraints which prevent them from delivering 
on what the users expect. The Gaps Model serves as a tool for examining the discrepancies between 
what users expect and how they perceive the current disclosures. The concepts assume that the 
discrepancy between these two depends on the degree to which the disclosures are designed to 
reflect user’ expectations. It is worth noting that this is the first study to reconceptualise and adapt 
the Gaps Model within the context of corporate disclosure. 
This study finds that both users and prepares have a role to play in ensuring that this discrepancy 
is minimal. The degree to which information users are involved in the risk disclosure process may 
influence the degree to which their expectations are incorporated within the process. As much as 
managers have a role to play in ensuring that adequate disclosures are providers, users also have 
to engage by responding to consultations and discussing their concerns with providers and not wait 
until something goes wrong to get involved. The importance of the user’s (customers) involvement 
in the provision of risk disclosure (service) has been stressed in previous research in the service 




The adaptation of the Gaps Model enables the study of user expectations within the context of risk 
disclosure and shed light on management’s understanding of these expectations. 
Within the context of risk disclosure, most of the disclosure quality specifications users expect 
were considered critical to management. However, management shed light on some constraints 
including the disclosure of commercially sensitive information, the risk of misinterpretation and 
embedding risk disclosure within the bank’s business culture. The study finds that, in an attempt 
to deliver adequate disclosures, these issues may serve as hurdles in management’s attempt to 
deliver (Zeithaml et al., 2016).  In the interviews conducted with user participants, the researcher 
identified seven main themes constructed from users’ expectations and perception on risk 
disclosure quality and include: informed and specific disclosure, the clarity and 
comprehensiveness of the disclosures provided, providing a link between narratives and numbers, 
balance between mandatory and voluntary disclosures provided, access to regulatory reporting, 
the quantity and volume of the disclosures and the reliability of the information provided within 
the disclosures. A number of these are broadly consistent with prior literature (Ryan, 2012; 
Abraham and Shrives, 2014; Beattie et al., 2004; Baule and Tallau, 2016; Leuz and Wysocki, 
2016). Users’ expectations are characterised by a range of levels which are bounded by desired 
and adequate service and may have different tolerant zones rather than a single level of 
expectations (Zeithaml et al., 1993). Interestingly, the findings show that even though user 
participants express a desire for access to the bank’s regulatory reporting, reduction in the volume 
of the disclosures and the reliability of the information provided, it is evident that they recognise 
these may not always be possible.  
In the conversation with interviewees, equity research analyst and institutional investors had 
different views in relation to the informativeness and volume of disclosures provided particularly. 
Due to concerns regarding the un-informativeness of the risk disclosures, especially on the non-
financial information often provided at the back of the pillar 3 risk report and other narratives, 
equity research analysts highlight that they would only be prompted to go through the narratives 
in the pillar 3 report if the profile of the bank’s business changes. This is because they believe that 
most of the time, unless the business profile of the bank changes, their risks are not going to change 
very much and thus the risk information provided is more likely to be uninformative. Also, equity 
analysts are much more interested in certain key numbers when it comes to the pillar 3 risk 
disclosure report. Unlike equity analysts, most institutional investors on the other hand highlight 
that they do read all the information in the pillar 3 risk disclosure document in order to ensure that 




for this, drawn from Zeithaml et al. (1993)’s antecedent for an adequate expectation, is the 
individual personal needs as well as the existing conditions of both equity research analysts and 
institutional investors which influences the degree to which they may perceive a disclosure quality 
attribute and their varying levels of expectations.  
9.3.1 Management’s response to users’ expectations for risk disclosure quality 
Drawing upon Zeithaml et al. (2016), This study supports the view that in order to deliver quality 
risk disclosures, management must first understand how users perceive and evaluate the risk 
disclosures they provide. The findings indicate that management is aware of most of the disclosure 
quality specifications users pointed out during the interviews and they have in place avenues for 
obtaining this information. However, there are still concerns regarding the quality of the 
disclosures provided. Within the broader concept of the listening gap, This study explores the 
current constraints within management and identifies potential reasons why management may not 
meet these expectations.  
Even though the head of risk reporting and her team does not specifically have any interactions 
with users, the annual report process includes an investor and analyst presentation which involves 
interaction and question and answer sessions between big investors, analysts, each member of the 
board and the executive team. As part of this process, the head of risk reporting and her team would 
try to guess what the investors are going to ask to ensure that they have got an answer for them. 
Within the risk reporting division, the CRO is responsible for facing off to the users during these 
presentations. However, the CRO’s presentation pack would often be prepared by the head of risk 
reporting, and she is kept up to date with discussions between the users and the organisation. 
Beyond the CRO’s involvement, the Investor Relations team within the bank is primarily 
responsible for managing the bank's relationship with its users on an ongoing basis by obtaining 
users views and understandings with respect to what users would want. Drawing upon Zeithaml et 
al. (2016) the study believes that IR, as front-line employees, may know a lot about what users 
would want when. Therefore, if management is not in contact with the investor relations team on 
a regular basis to understand what they know the listening gap widens.  
Prepares appeared to presume that user demands for risk disclosure quality and anything that 
investors would need are embedded in the disclosure requirements and have been obtained by the 
regulators through investor feedback and consultations. As a result, the regulations are used as a 
starting point when thinking about what users may want and expect. When standards reflect what 




However, management is largely responsible for conveying information to users in a way that is 
clear, concise and informative.  
The case of Bank A showed that management experiences some difficulties in establishing links 
between the risk that are often difficult to quantify, to those that are expressed numerically. This 
is because even though a lot of effort is put into modelling these risks into numbers that reflect 
their financial effect, it is often a challenge. Interestingly, the study finds that when it comes to 
providing these within the public disclosures a lot of discussions are made regarding its 
commercial sensitivity. In response to these management exhibits an opportunistic behaviour to 
control the information provided and at the same time foster trust and confidence through the 
effective management of the disclosure process. However, it is evident that in an attempt to ensure 
that the banks are financially sound to withstand their risks these disclosures are provided to the 
regulators as part of the bank’s regulatory reporting responsibilities. 
Management also highlights that there are additional concerns regarding these non-financial risk 
disclosures and in providing context to the financial disclosure made which are often provided in 
the form of voluntary disclosures. These include the issue with disclosing information that might 
be misconstrued by the information users and the risk of misinterpretation and therefore may 
prevent management from elaborating on issues that are highly subjective any further. It was 
gathered from the conversations that, unless they can provide adequate evidence to support their 
claims, the disclosure would not be made.  
Zeithaml et al. (2016) suggest that delivering service quality particularly becomes difficult to 
describe and communicate when the service is new. Participants suggest that disclosure on some 
risk types such as cyber risk and climate change risk are currently developing and it is not 
something that the regulator can immediately impose regulations on. This is because it is often not 
clear what good quality disclosures on these should look like. In this instance, management is 
recommended to provide these on an ad-hoc basis and voluntary disclosures on these are 
considered very helpful.  
Drawing upon the Gaps Model, Zeithaml et al., (2016, p95) which suggests that in service delivery, 
the degree of variability inherent in service defies standardisation. Additionally, setting standards 
on its own will not achieve the desired goal and service quality (Zeithaml et al.,2016, p95). This 
study shows that the differing nature of risk types banks face poses limitations on the extent to 
which the regulation could go in ensuring disclosure quality.   
In an attempt to ensure that disclosures are clear and understandable, the management of Bank ‘A’ 




disclosures to read the risk disclosure drafts from start to finish to assess their level of 
understanding. They would also try setting the tone in ensuring that there is a balance between 
formal and informal or “chatty” statements in the risk disclosures provided. Despite various 
attempts, participants highlight that considering the complexities of bank risks, they do not think 
disclosure quality would ever be perfect but it is always important to have the processes and 
strategies in place. When responding, not only to external demands for disclosure but also to 
management’s incentives for the strategic value of risk disclosure, there is an existing process 
which is subject to constraints. These shortcomings are moulded by the organisation’s position on 
disclosure and the decision choices associated with their internal structures. 
 The process of designing and developing risk disclosure 
Whilst risk disclosure has developed over the years to include the regulatory requirements and 
demands for best practice, there is a widely held view that the current risk-related disclosures fail 
to convey real meaning on the bank’s actual risk profile and its implications (ACCA, 2008). 
However, adequate risk disclosures are important for the well-functioning of the capital markets 
(Deumes, 2004). 
In an attempt to address these demands, there has been an increase in the number of regulatory 
reforms. Within the context of risk disclosures, the disclosure requirements on IFRS (IFRS 1, 7 
and 9), the Pillar 3 Basel Accord of risk disclosure requirements, and the Corporate Governance 
Code. However, there still exists some form of managerial discretion and as long as the information 
originates from within the organisation, the disclosure may first and foremost be made at the firm’s 
initiative, before there is an external request or requirement (Gibbins et al., 1992; Amel-Zadeh et 
al., 2020). As a result, it is therefore important to understand disclosure in the context of a large 
number of related managerial activities.  
Drawing from the Disclosure Management Framework initiated by Gibbins et al. (1990), This 
study explores the management of risk disclosures within the context of Bank ‘A’. It identifies the 
degree to which risk disclosure responsibilities are assigned and guided within the Bank (i.e. the 
internal disclosure structures), disclosure antecedents, and disclosure issues associated with these 
through the perception of preparers. The preparers demonstrated that there exists within the bank 
a structured process for deciding what to disclose and what not to disclose which include clear 
lines of responsibility, assessment of probability and impact as well as review and approval 
processes. Prior literature found that firms establish routine procedures, including a variety of 




et al., 1990; Mayorga, 2013). Further investigation in This study and within the context of risk 
disclosure revealed that the bank designed their risk disclosures to correspond to the risk disclosure 
regulatory requirements, its risk culture, the amount of evidence available to support its claims, 
and their subjective assessment of what the user needs to know.  Management’s subjective 
assessment of what the user needs to know is often based on an assessment of how every piece of 
information disclosed is going to look to the market.  
The bank managers indicated that the risk reporting team, as part of the bank’s second line 
management, together with both the Executive and the Board Committees are responsible for 
identifying disclosure issues, coordinating risk disclosure information, and ensuring that the 
disclosures are adequately reviewed and challenged before approved.  
In line with prior literature, the findings show that risk disclosure issues were assessed through 
routine processes including, the review of collated management reports, review of board and 
committee meeting and board approvals. Interestingly and particularly for risk disclosures, This 
study also identifies a separate team responsible for risk reporting and delivery and ensuring that 
its staff were trained to ensure that risk disclosures, specifically, were adequately reported 
internally. Although, a ritualistic behaviour for an organisational routine existed, prepares 
highlight that the design and process of risk reporting was sometimes challenging. The ability to 
get across to all the bank’s risk system as well as being able to differentiate between the bank’s 
day to day risks and the significant risks that have the potential to threaten what the business does 
is often recognised as challenging.   
The views of preparers were broadly consistent with identifying antecedents that influence their 
disclosure process, including the bank’s reporting history, its corporate politics, social legitimacy, 
the regulatory requirements, user needs and any potential effects on their competitive position as 
antecedents within their disclosure process (Gibbins et al., 1990; Adams, 1996; Mayorga, 2013). 
Interestingly, they provide insights on the vital role risk culture plays in expressing the bank’s 
overall business culture. There are the risk disclosures gathered and collated as a part of the bank’s 
internal risk reporting process which will often be in line with the bank’s risk culture or appetite. 
However, the issue lies with filtering out that information and deciding what to disclose to the 
public which then meets their business culture. Management also identified the integrity of the 
bank’s risk function as an internal disclosure antecedent impacting the way disclosures may be 




to the way risk disclosures are provided, and disclosure is one of those tools that would eventually 
demonstrate the bank’s integrity at some point.  
Building on the Disclosure Management Framework, disclosure issues influence the firm’s 
disclosure output as they activate the use of specific activities and procedures as well as influence 
the individuals and groups involved in the disclosure process (Gibbins et al., 1990). These 
determine whether the bank would disclose or not disclose a particular piece of information. 
Disclosure issues highlighted by Gibbins et al., (1990) include, the issue with assessing 
materiality, contingent claims, contract settlements, line of business reporting, loss of provisions, 
inventory valuation, managing expectations and determining timing and content. These issues 
related to the provision of financial information. Mayorga (2013) identified interpretation of 
regulatory information, determining timing and content, media speculation, analyst expectations, 
environmental uncertainties, and third-party involvement as disclosure issues associated with the 
provision of continuous disclosure. By combining the Disclosure Management Framework with 
that of the Gaps Model, This study focuses on two stages (i.e. listening stage and the Design stage 
of disclosure) and identifies disclosure issues as potential causes for a listening gap and a design 
gap.  
As a brief recap, the listening gap refers to the difference between the users’ expectations and 
management’s understanding of what the user expects. The design gap then refers to the difference 
between management’s understanding of what customers expect and the establishment of designs 
to reflect these perceptions. The fulfilment gap, which is the gap between what users expect and 
how they perceive the disclosures delivered, is a function of both the listening and the design gaps. 
Even though most of the disclosure quality specifications users expect were considered critical to 
management, the study identified a few constraints. These include the issue with commercially 
sensitive information, the risk of misinterpretation, the conflict between risk culture and business 
culture, user’s response to consultations, as well as the act of users having to wait until something 
goes wrong. In addition to this, This study also identifies the bank’s incentive to control 
information, its ability to get across the whole banking system and the ability to differentiate 
between day to day risks and significant risks as potential causes for a design gap. It is worth 
noting that the potential causes for a listening gap are also potential causes of the design gap. These 
issues related to the provision of risk disclosure quality. 
Prior studies have emphasised the importance of managing user expectations within the firm’s 




expectations as the main issues associated with the disclosure of material information (Mayorga, 
2013).    
 Summary 
This chapter provided a discussion of the results and findings from the management of risk 
disclosures and the case study which focused on users’ expectations for risk disclosure quality and 
the degree to which risk disclosures are managed to incorporate these.  
The studies by Gibbins et al. (1990), Mayorga (2013), Johansen and Plenborg (2018), Amel-Zadeh 
et al. (2019) have provided important insights into the management of corporate disclosures. 
Consistent with Gibbins et al. (1990), Mayorga (2013) pointed to the importance of user 
expectations as a key antecedent in the corporate disclosure process. Consistent with Mayorga 
(2013) the study argues that there are gaps in expectations between what an informed user believes 
should be disclosed and what the company was prepared to disclose. 
A key finding of This study is that, even though management had an awareness of users’ 
expectations for the disclosure quality specifications discussed, they highlight a few constraints 
and suggest that both management and users themselves have a role to play in ensuring that their 
expectations are incorporated within the risk disclosure process. It is argued that users have a 
responsibility to engage by responding to consultations and discussing their concerns with 
providers and not having to wait until something goes wrong. 
This study also finds that users express some level of tolerance for a few of the disclosure quality 
specifications they expect, such as information reliability, access to regulatory reporting and the 
volume of disclosures provided. However, they believe some disclosure quality specifications 
should not be compromised including, the provision of informed and specific information, clear 
and comprehensive information in ensuring that there is a link between the narratives on risks 
identified and the financial statements. The Gaps Model of Service quality in combination with 
the Disclosure Management Framework has been highly effective in bringing the researcher 
beyond just an examination of the management of risk disclosure but also the degree to which 







Chapter 10: Conclusion 
 Research overview 
Quality risk disclosures are believed to contribute to financial stability by providing investors and 
other market participants with a better understanding of the firm’s principal and emerging risks as 
well as its risk management practices. The aftermath of the GFC has intensified the desirability 
for banks to publicly disclose information on their risks. In response to this, banks have responsive 
systems in place in an attempt to manage compliance and increase its legitimacy. Prior research 
has highlighted that in response to institutional pressures for adequate corporate disclosure, banks 
have in place established and responsive disclosure structures (Gibbins et al., 1990, Mayorga, 
2013). According to the literature, whenever management perceives an event or an issue as having 
a disclosure implication, their decision to disclose or not disclose their exposure to such an event 
depends on the disclosure structures in place.   
Drawing on the Disclosure Management literature, which examines the activities and internal 
responsive systems associated with the establishment of corporate disclosure, the current study 
explored the management of risk disclosures in a UK listed bank. The research particularly focuses 
on the degree to which user expectations may be incorporated into the bank’s risk disclosure 
process. In order to achieve the set research objective, this study adopted and reconceptualised 
concepts from the Gaps model to shed light on users’ expectations and perceptions for quality risk 
disclosures as well as management’s response to these and the degree to which these are 
incorporated within the disclosure management process. This offered the researcher the 
opportunity to explore any discrepancy between users’ expectations for quality risk disclosure and 
their perception of the quality of risk disclosures currently provided. The Gaps Model identifies 
this overarching discrepancy as the fulfilment gap and suggests that the degree to which 
management translates their understanding of these expectations into disclosure quality 
specifications influences the size of this discrepancy. In applying this model, the current study 
argues that, it is important for management to be aware of users’ needs for adequate disclosure in 
order to facilitate market discipline. Management’s understanding of these expectations may have 
disclosure implications and may impact the decisions around the idea of deciding what to disclose 
and what not to disclose in order to meet users’ disclosure quality specifications.  
This chapter concludes the thesis and includes an overview of the research contribution in section 
10.2, the limitations of the study, implications and suggestions for future research in sections 10.3, 




 Research contribution 
Although quality corporate disclosure to some extent has been the subject of studies in the area of 
accounting, and a number of disclosure quality specifications have been identified within the risk 
disclosure literature (Beattie et al., 2004; Abraham et al., 2012; Ryan 2012), the perspectives of 
users on the subject have been neglected by corporate disclosure scholars to a large extent. Inspired 
by Mayorga (2013) which posits that disclosure issues arise mainly from the perceived high costs 
associated with not meeting regulator and market expectations, this study contributes to the 
disclosure management literature by providing new insights into users’ expectations for quality 
risk disclosure and the degree to which issues associated with users’ expectations are incorporated 
within the disclosure management process. It is believed that management spends a lot of time and 
effort providing transparent disclosures to investors and other stakeholders in an attempt to 
improve their disclosure reputation and increase their analyst following. 
Drawing on the Disclosure Management Framework, the main disclosure issue (Gibbins et al., 
1990) explored in this study is the issue of incorporating user expectations for risk disclosure 
quality when providing public risk disclosure.  
The current research questions were arrived at by firstly spotting existing gaps in the Disclosure 
Management Framework initiated by Gibbins et al. (1990).  At the initial stages of the researchers 
PhD experience, while identifying possible gaps in the literature to explore, the Disclosure 
Management Framework initiated by Gibbins et al. (1990) was identified. The Disclosure 
Management Framework presents a structure to inform the activities, procedures, individuals or 
groups involved in the corporate disclosure process. However, the model had been criticised for 
its oversimplification and its failure to identify the relationship between the relationships of its 
components.  
Even though prior studies which adapted this model identified user-expectations as a disclosure 
antecedent they may influence the disclosure process, the framework provided limited scope to 
explore the degree to what user-expectations are management in the disclosure process. Further to 
this, the current study identified the Gaps model of service quality as a lens for exploring users’ 
expectations for risk disclosure quality and management’s response in translating these their 
perceptions on these expectations into disclosure quality specifications. However, the Gaps Model 
does not provide a clear approach to examine the decision choices taken by management in 
translating their perceptions of users’ expectations or in ensuring that their perceptions of users’ 




the Disclosure Management Framework provides a lens also to provide an explanation on how the 
internal decision-making process is undertaken by management when translating their perceptions 
of users’ expectations into disclosure quality specifications. As a result, the current study combines 
both theories in order to provide insights. 
The Gaps Model of service quality serves as a tool for identifying and explaining the discrepancy 
between the customer’s expectation for a service performance and their subjective assessment of 
the actual service performance they get. This overarching discrepancy was referred to as the 
consumer gap (Parasuraman et al., 1985) or the fulfilment gap (Zeithaml et al., 2002). Zeithaml et 
al. (2002) defines the fulfilment gap as the frustrations customers might experience as a result of 
deficiencies in the design and operation of the service in terms of its failure to incorporate 
customers’ desires. Building on Zeithaml et al. (2002), this study reconceptualises concepts from 
the Gaps Model within the context of disclosure in an attempt to identify potential causes for a 
discrepancy between users’ expectations for quality risk disclosures and their subjective 
assessment on the actual disclosures they get. The model argues that this discrepancy is influenced 
by management’s ability to understand these expectations and the degree to which these are 
incorporated within their disclosure process. Thus, the fulfilment gap is a function both the 
information and design gap. For the purpose of this study, service was reconceptualised as 
disclosure and customers redefined as users of disclosure information.  
However, the application of the Gaps Model as a tool for exploring the management of disclosure 
is limited in scope. The Gaps Model does not provide a clear approach to examine the decision 
choices taken by management in translating their perceptions of users’ expectations or in ensuring 
that their perceptions of users’ expectations are incorporated in the actual disclosures provided. 
For this reason, concepts from the Disclosure Management Framework were introduced to provide 
an explanation on how the internal decision-making process is undertaken by management in 
translating their perceptions of users’ expectations into disclosure quality specifications. This is 
where the current study combines both theories in order to provide insights and develop a 
theoretical framework in the process. 
The study, therefore, adds to the existing literature by offering insights into the perspective of both 
preparers and users of risk disclosures on the concept and definition of risk. Thus, research 
question 1. Research question 2 sought to explain users’ expectations for risk disclosure quality 
on the current risk disclosures provided within the case bank’s annual report and pillar 3 report, as 




et al. (2000), Ryan (2012), this study acknowledges the importance of the perception of those who 
actually use the risk disclosures provided in providing insights into the usefulness of current risk 
disclosures.  The purpose of providing quality risk disclosure is mainly to encourage market 
discipline so as to reduce information asymmetry and help to promote comparability among banks 
(Bank for International Settlement, 2015). By exploring users’ expectations for quality disclosures 
and at the same time exploring their perceptions on the quality of the actual disclosures they get, 
it offers insight into the degree to which users might be able to process the information they 
receive.  
Drawing on Zeithaml et al. (1993) the findings of the study supports the view that users’ 
expectations are characterised by a range of levels which are bounded by users’ perceptions of a 
disclosure quality specification as either desired or adequate. As a result, the users may have 
different tolerant zones rather than a single level of expectations for the overall quality of the risk 
disclosures provided (Zeithaml et al., 1993). Interestingly, the findings show that even though user 
participants express a desire for an access to the bank’s regulatory reporting, reduction in the 
volume of the disclosures and the reliability of the information provided, it is evident that they 
recognise these may not always be possible. However, user participants expressed a zero level of 
tolerance for disclosures that are uninformative, unclear and incomprehensible; narrative 
disclosures that lack evidence on how they could be linked back to the financial statement 
provided, as well as disclosures that show a practice of management just ‘box-ticking’.  
The findings of the study support the view that user expectations are a key antecedent to the 
disclosure management process (Holland and Stoner, 1996; Mayorga, 2013). With regard to the 
process management enacts for the development and creation of risk disclosures the study finds 
that before management seeks to understand users’ perceptions on a disclosure quality 
specification, management already has some challenges embedded within their risk reporting 
process. These include management’s ability to get across the bank’s different risk systems and 
their ability to differentiate between the day to day risks and key significant risks that have the 
potential to threaten what the business does. In fact, these challenges would impact the degree to 
which users’ expectations could then be incorporated within their existing process to ensure that 
they provide quality disclosures. In addition to this, the study finds that when it comes to deciding 
what to disclose and what not to disclose, management has an incentive to control the information 
they provide in an attempt to reduce the risk of misinterpretation and prevent disclosing 




Finally, research question 3 investigates how risk disclosure decisions relating to the creation of 
their external public reports (i.e. annual report and pillar 3 risk disclosure report), as well as the 
structures in place to facilitate adequate risk disclosures, are developed. The research question also 
aimed at exploring the perceptions from management on the challenges faced in the risk reporting 
process. 
Additionally, prior research has mainly adopted a statistical approach to risk disclosure and 
reporting. These studies have been useful in providing insights into the different firm-specific 
characteristics and variables associated with a certain level of risk disclosure as well as the 
relationships between these. However, such an approach does not allow them to understand the 
management practices and processes for risk disclosure. Therefore, to achieve the current research 
objectives, the researcher uses a qualitative case study approach as discussed in the methodology 
chapter. 
 Implications of the study 
The findings from the study provide details on the different disclosure quality specifications raised 
by the user participants. The findings suggest that risk reporting management need to acknowledge 
users’ perceptions of the current risk disclosures they provide in order to ensure market discipline. 
With regards to the importance of risk reporting in ensuring that investors and other information 
users are accurately informed to make economic decisions, managers need to interact with users 
to understand how best they can provide risk disclosures in a manner that facilitates this.  
Risk disclosure managers across the world, especially listed companies, have a challenging role in 
providing disclosures that adequately represent the business and risk profile. The current study 
provides insights into the activities taken by management and decisions regarding how their risk 
disclosures are created. This facilitates the identification of the objectives of preparers and the 
challenges faced during the risk disclosure process. 
Managers of other firms could also benefit from the findings from this study, as they could use 
this as a benchmark to review their own disclosure processes. Considering users’ views on the 
current risk disclosures as discussed in the findings, managers could think of ways to improve their 
current disclosure practices. Managers could also reflect on their own disclosures and the degree 
to which they are meeting the needs of what users expect as discussed in the findings.  
Risk disclosures, especially in the aftermath of the GFC, have been the focus of regulators and 
policymakers. Providing insights into risk disclosure decision making is of relevance to regulators 




which these are incorporated in the risk disclosure process, the challenges discussed by 
management, and the ways in which the regulations might amend or include guidelines and 
requirement that could then improve the risk disclosure practice. This research will be useful for 
regulators as it stresses particularly the issues associated with the disclosure of commercially 
sensitive information and the risk of misinterpretation in the provision of risk disclosures. This 
will draw the attention of regulators to provide some guidelines on how firms determine what 
information is commercially sensitive or not.  This is important as it protects users from managers 
who may withhold relevant risk information because of the amount of discretion they have in 
determining what information is commercially sensitive or not. 
Finally, investors and other risk information users could benefit from an understanding of the 
current risk disclosure process within the context of a UK listed bank. This provides insights into 
the decision choices made and the challenges managers remain under when deciding what to 
disclose and what not to disclose. It also provides users with the opportunity to understand the 
different views of other users on the quality of risk disclosure which may then give them a different 
perspective. Also, the findings shed light on the importance of the user’s involvement in the risk 
disclosure process by responding to consultations without having to wait until something goes 
wrong or a crisis happens. 
 Limitations of the study 
In an attempt to achieve the objectives and aims of the current study and at the same time make a 
significant contribution the current study adopts and reconceptualises a framework that has been 
used extensively in the marking literature. This was decided by the researcher after attempts were 
made to find an appropriate theory in the accounting and disclosure literature that could provide 
insights into users’ expectations for the disclosure and the degree to which these may be 
incorporated by management into their disclosure decisions.  
One limitation of the study relates to the number of interviewees who participated in this study. 
This limitation restricts the degree to which generalisation could be made based on the results and 
findings from the study. With regard to the research approach chosen for the current study, 
generalisation of other contexts is problematic, since the findings of the case study have inherently 
been context specific. Thus, the current study cannot affirm that the case of Bank ‘A’ and its users 
on the degree to which users’ expectations for quality risk disclosures are incorporated within 
Bank A’s disclosure process is representative of other UK banks or banks in other contexts. 




of knowledge and theory should not be ignored. Moreover, the generalisability of findings as the 
term is commonly interpreted in quantitative positivist research is not a concern in an interpretivist 
qualitative research.  
Secondly, there are the limitations with analysing qualitative data associated with how the 
researcher summarises lots of pages of data collected from interviews, to arrive at the findings. In 
relation to this Collins and Hussey (2014, p154) highlights that with interpretivist research, the 
researcher should seek to collect in-depth and rich data by limiting the scope of their study to key 
concepts and themes. This will then provide more focus and help reduce the amount of qualitative 
data analysed. With this in mind, the researcher uses the principles for adequate risk disclosure 
established by the Bank of International Settlements as a starting point for identifying the concepts 
drawn within the broad concept of user expectations. 
 Suggestions for future research 
This research explored the nature of a UK listed bank’s risk disclosure process and the degree to 
which users’ expectations may be incorporated within this process. The current study also explored 
what users may expect This is a relatively new area of research within the risk disclosure literature 
and demonstrates an understanding of both the desired and adequate expectation of user as well as 
their perception on the current state of the risk disclosures provided. Due to the exploratory nature 
of the current study, it is likely to provide a number of opportunities for future research in this 
area. 
The current study investigated how risk disclosures are created from the perception of risk 
reporting managers. The empirical evidence identifies the structures and decision choices made by 
management in their disclosure process within the context of a UK listed bank as. It is 
recommended that future research could explore this in other UK banks to match these disclosure 
process to those of other UK banks in order to gain a better and fuller understanding of the creation 
of risk disclosures within management. Future research could also extend this research to any 
corporate reporting entity outside of the financial sector. There is also the potential to explore the 
creation of risk disclosure in other countries, especially developing countries, who may be different 
due to their regulatory and institutional environments.  
The current study did not include the views of external auditors. Considering the role of the 
external auditor in the corporate disclosure process, the views of these participants in this study 




follow-up invitations to external auditors, there were no responses. Similar research in the future 
should consider interviewing external auditors. 
The current study also identifies a few challenges that act as potential causes for a discrepancy 
between what users expect and the degree to which these expectations may be translated into 
disclosure quality specifications by management when deciding what to disclose and what not to 
disclose. It would be interesting in further research to explore in more detail how organisations 
deal with challenges such as the risk of misinterpretation and the disclosure of commercially 
sensitive information and how they decide what information is commercially sensitive or not 
commercially sensitive. This would then enable regulators, influential users and managers in other 
banks to assess the degree to which management could be assisted to address these in order to 
improve the adequacy of risk disclosures.   
There is also the scope to apply the new theoretical framework developed in this study in other 
contexts of corporate disclosure (e.g. disclosures on Corporate Social Responsibilities). Applying 
the model to other disclosure contexts will allow the identification of potential causes for a 
listening gap and the design gap which will be different from those identified in this study. 
Furthermore, there is currently little scope theoreticality to guide the examination of the disclosure 
management process within an organisation and their interactions with information users. In 
relation to this, there are likely to be possibilities to develop theories that would assist in offering 
insight into corporate disclosures. This would contribute to the literature and provide the 
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Appendix A: Interview questions for risk disclosure managers 
1. I would like to know a bit about your role at Bank A and a little bit about your background? 
2. How will you define risk in your view? 
3. How are risk disclosures important for achieving the objectives of the bank at top level? 
4. In your view, what are some of the key issues that give rise to disclosure implications in 
Bank A? 
5. What would you say are some of your responsibilities as a risk reporting manager?  
6. How are risk disclosure responsibilities assigned and guided? 
7. How are risk disclosures supervised both internally and externally? 
8. What would you say are the major issues Bank A faces in relation to internal risk reporting 
and external risk reporting?  
9. With the different branches of the bank within the country, how is risk information collated 
and how does risk communication work across these branches? 
10. So apart from the risk disclosure requirements from the IFRS, I know there are also risk 
disclosure requirement from the Basel as well, but then what other bodies require the 
disclosure of risks? 
11. What would you say is the process within the bank for internally reporting risk? 
12. I know with external reporting a lot of it is highly regulated but what would you say is the 
process within the bank for externally reporting risk? 
13. In your opinion do you think mandatory risk disclosures have been more of a positive or a 
negative and why?  
14. What is the process of disclosing new risks that occur which are outside the scope of the 
mandated risk disclosures?  
15. What degree of discretion do you have when providing disclosures? What is the 
significance of providing voluntary disclosures? 
16. What are some of your views on the importance of risk related disclosures both internal 
and external? What are the costs associated with providing such information to bank? 
17. Does the provision of risk disclosures provide any benefits to the bank itself and if yes 
what are some of these benefits? 
18. In the provision of risk related disclosures, would you say they are provided with the aim 
to legitimise or to be efficient and why? 




20. In terms of providing risk disclosures, the users of these disclosures tend to different 
agendas for the disclosures, so how is the variability of the usage of risk disclosures 
incorporated in the construction of these reports? 
21. Apart from investor presentations where you engage with investors to understand what 
their main concerns are, and AGMs and Governance forums what other channels of 
communication do you use to obtain this information? 
22. So, are there any interactions between risk reporting managers and investors or other users 
of the risk disclosures provided? 
23. Are there any interactions between risk reporting managers and other bank’ risk reporting 
managers regarding risk disclosures? 
24. Are there instances where management meets with the regulators to discuss such complex 
issues relating to these non-financial risks for instance? 
25. What are some of your views on the non-financial risk disclosures like those relating to 
operational risk for instance? 
26. How will you describe the risk culture in Bank A? 
27. I would like to also know how the banks risk culture is embedded in the provision of risk 
related disclosures? 
28. How does corporate history and experience influence risk and the management of risk 
disclosures? 
29. In your view does how does a bank’s tradition, history and experience influence the risk 
disclosures provided by the bank? 
30. Are there instances where there has been an error in the disclosures submitted say last year 
and you have had to do a resubmission? If yes, what is the process of resubmitting such 
disclosures of risk?  
31. How will you perceive the availability of the resources necessary for providing these risk 
disclosures within bank A? 
32. So, when I spoke to users, they do highlight some concerns with respect to the clarity and 
consistency of the risk disclosures of Bank A. What would you say is your view or are 
there any issues in relation to ensuring that the reports are consistent and clear over time? 







Appendix B: Interview questions for the regulator 
1. I would like to kindly know a little bit about your background and role as a manager of 
prudential policy, accounting and disclosures? 
2. What role does the FRC play in the provision of risk related disclosures? 
3. How will you define risk? 
4. How relevant are risk disclosures in your opinion? What are some of your views on the 
usefulness of risk disclosures provided by banks?  
5. What are the various sources policy makers obtain when assessing the risks, the risks banks 
face? 
6. How often do you meet with these managers? So, does the regulator have any interaction 
with the bank in relation to the risk disclosures, and if yes what are some of the issues 
discussed? 
7. Do you have meeting with other risk information users, for example investors to discuss 
such disclosures? if yes what are some of the issues discussed? 
8. How are the different user agendas incorporated in the formation of risk disclosures? How 
is the issue of user variability incorporated and dealt with in the formation of risk related 
disclosures? 
9. There has been some recent debate in the academic literature on the importance of 
voluntary risk disclosures over mandatory risk disclosures, what are your views on this? 
10. In your view how has changes in risk disclosure requirements influence risk disclosure 
behavioural patterns in the UK banking sector?  
11. You’ve provided me with some brief information of the formation of operational risk 
related disclosure, but I would like to ask If you could throw more light on how policy 
makers decide what risk related information banks should disclose? 
12. In your perception what type of risk related disclosures are of greatest importance and why? 
what are your views on the importance of non-financial risk related disclosures? Do you 
consider them useful? If yes how useful are non-financial risk related disclosures? 
13. So, from a prudential regulator’s point of view what are your expectations of the risk 
disclosures provided by the bank? 
14. With the principles of disclosure from the Basel (i.e. comprehensive, comparability, clarity, 
meaningful and consistent). In your view how will you perceive the risk disclosures 




assessed in the FRC? In your view what would you consider as the key dimension of a 
quality risk disclosure practice? 
15. In your opinion how useful are the risk related disclosures provided by Bank A? 
16. Are there some mechanisms to recognise best practice on the disclosures of risk related 
information provided by UK banks? Does the FRC give some form of recognition or 
awards for banks that provide best practice in relation to these disclosures? 
17. Overall what is your subjective assessment of the risk disclosures provided by banks? 
18. Is there anything, in your view, that could be improved in the way risk disclosures are 
currently provided? 
 
Appendix C: Interview questions for financial analysts 
1. I would like to know a little bit about your role and a bit about your background as well? 
2. How will you define risk? 
3. How relevant are risk disclosures provided by Bank A in your view? 
4. Do you become any more informed year on year from the public risk disclosures? 
5. How are risk disclosures used in your day to day activities as an equity analyst? 
6. In your analysis do you read the risk reports provided by the banks you do research on? 
Would you say the risk information is readily available to you?  
7. What source documents do you often use to obtain information on the bank’s risk 
disclosures? 
8. Are there instances where risk related information in the media or in the news are found 
useful? 
9. In instances where the risk information provided is not clear within the public reports of 
Bank A, do you contact the bank’s management in anyway or what approaches are taken? 
10. When you contact the bank’s management, are they very responsive?  
11. You did mention you mostly use financial information, are there instances where you 
consider or use non-financial risk information and how is this information used? For 
example, operational risk, conduct risk or people risk 
12. What are your views on the clarity and reliability of the risk disclosures provided? 
13. What are your views on the consistency of the risk disclosures provided, one year to the 
next? 




15. Do you get to have interactions with regulators who make these risk disclosure 
requirements? 
16. What are your current expectations for the quality of risk disclosure? For example, apart 
from those discussed relating to clarity, reliability, consistency etc 
17. what is your overall subjective assessment of the actual risk disclosures provided by Bank 
A? 
18. Is there anything that could be improved in the way risk disclosures are provided? 
 
Appendix D: Interview questions for institutional investors 
1. I would like to know a little bit about your role and a bit about your background as well? 
2. How will you define risk? 
3. How relevant are risk disclosures provided by Bank A in your view? 
4. Do you become any more informed year on year from the public risk disclosures? 
5. How are risk disclosures used in your day to day activities as an institutional investor/fund 
manager? 
6. In your assessments do you read the risk disclosure reports provided by Bank A? Would 
you say the risk information you seek is readily available to you?  
7. Apart from the pillar 3 risk reports and the annual reports, what other documents do you 
use to obtain the risk related information and how are these used? 
8. Are there instances where risk related information in the media or in the news are found 
useful? 
9. In instances where the risk information provided is not clear within the public reports of 
Bank A, do you contact the bank’s management in anyway or what approaches are taken? 
10. When you contact the bank’s management, are they very responsive?  
11. You did mention you mostly use financial information, are there instances where you 
consider or use non-financial risk information and how is this information used? For 
example, operational risk, conduct risk or people risk 
12. What are your views on the clarity and reliability of the risk disclosures provided? 
13. What are your views on the consistency of the risk disclosures provided, one year to the 
next? 
14. Do you think having access to information in the bank’s ICAAP or ILAAP will add any 




access to the ICAAP calculations under pillar 2a requirements. How does this affect the 
usefulness of the risk disclosures to you as an analyst?  
15. What are some of your thoughts on the timeliness of the disclosures?  
16. What are your current expectations for the quality of risk disclosure? For example, apart 
from those discussed relating to clarity, reliability, consistency etc 
17. Do you get to have interactions with regulators who make these risk disclosure 
requirements? 
18. what is your overall subjective assessment of the actual risk disclosures provided by Bank 
A? 
19. Is there anything that could be improved in the way risk disclosures are provided? 
 
Appendix E: Participant Information Sheet 
Participant Information Sheet 
My name is Zaneta Azuma, a second year PhD student at the University of Glasgow. I am currently 
undertaking a project on the management of risk disclosures in the UK banking sector and I would 
kindly like to invite you to take part in this research study, in the form of an interview.  
Before you decide it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what 
it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with 
others if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more 
information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
This project is about gaining an understanding of the issues associated with the provision of risk 
disclosures and the responsive structures management have in place when deciding what to 
disclose and what not to disclose. As well as identifying some gaps in the communication process 
between management and its stakeholders.  
The interview is likely to last from between 45 to 60 minutes. The researcher also intends to keep 
participant’s personal details confidential and the names of participants will be made anonymous 
and would be allocated as manager A, B; Investor A, B; Regulator A,B; and Financial Analyst 
A,B etc.  No record will be retained of how the codes relate to the identifiers/participants.   
Please note also that confidentiality will be respected unless there are compelling and legitimate 
reasons for this to be breached. If this was the case we would inform you of any decisions that 




This research is solely for academic purposes and I would like to confirm that your participation 
is voluntary. The data collected from the interviewees will also be retained for academic purposes 
only.  
The data collected from the interviews in addition to any documents provided by the participants 
in support of the research study will also be processed by the researcher and kept on a USB and 
computer secured with a password. The researcher also intends to change the passwords on a 
regular basis. Any paper documents received from participants to support the research will be kept 
in locked cabinets and in a locked office and the access to the cabinets and passwords will be 
restricted to the researcher. Information collected from the participants and the final results of the 
research study will be stored at the University of Glasgow and the data will be shared/archived or 
re-used in accordance with Data Sharing Guidance (https://www.ukdataservice.ac.uk/manage-
data/plan/how-share). 
Please note that, participants would also be allowed access to the data and results of the research 
study where this is required.  
Finally, I would like to confirm that this project has been considered and approved by the College 
Research Ethics Committee 
 
Thank you for reading this.  
For further information please contact: 
The College of Social Sciences Ethics Officer 
Dr Muir Houston  
email: Muir.Houston@glasgow.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
